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With this Survey Note, the NoTRE DAME LAWYER continues an analysis, first
published in 1958,' of the problems inherent in the church-state relationship. The
second such analysis appeared in the May, 1960, number of the LAWYER.
2
This Note is an attempt to examine critically and exhaustively the judicial recog-
nition of this relation over the past two years. That purpose, stated by the editors
of the first Survey, remains the same. It is not our objective, in this analysis, to
provide a restatement of the legal relations between church and state. The com-
plexity of the problems in this area of the law deny any such hornbook approach.
Rather, it is our simple objective herein to present an exhaustive analysis of the
legal developments of the church-state relation over the past two years. To the
authors of texts much broader in scope and volume we leave the unenviable task of
presenting a complete and interrelated analysis of all the legal and political materials
dealing with the church-state problem in the United States.
The areas of controversy have remained similar in all three Surveys, but empha-
sis has been varied. While the 1960 Survey probed the area of church gambling in
great detail, that subject has, in this Survey, been relegated to a brief exposition in
the concluding section. The section on test oaths is included for the first time simply
because the first case in point was handed down in 1961 after a century and a half
of obscurity. By introducing this into the Survey, the path was cleared for a report
on the problems of individuals in the smaller, or less accepted, religions in the free
exercise of their beliefs. In addition, the editors of this Survey have included two
other areas pertaining to the church-state relation: 1) state regulation of the reli-
gious corporate form, and 2) the status of clerical privilege in the law of evidence.
The conclusions drawn or trends seen in previous Surveys are often referred to
throughout. Thus it may be difficult to gain a complete understanding of the present
Survey without a reference to the contents of the former. This is particularly true
since, in the years covered by this Survey - as was true in the other church-state
notes - few cases have been presented for determination on constitutional grounds.
However all the topics in one way or another are illuminated by the decisions con-
struing the first amendment in the related fields. The areas now in the glare of
adjudication on the constitutional issue are areas such as test oaths, Sunday closing
and education. The other topics stand in varying degrees of proximity to a' final
solution.
All the topics are similar, moreover, in that each field is of practical importance
to the religions in the outcome of judicial controversy or the enactment of statutes.
These difficulties with which the various churches are confronted today are either
concerned with the state as government or with the state as a conglomerate social
body. These may be analogized to the established institution-value distinction in the
topical organization of this and past Surveys. The problems arising out of the neces-
sary conjunction with the state as government - e.g., education, Sunday closing
1 Religious Institutions and Values: A Legal Survey (1955-57), 33 NoTRE DAME LAWYER
416 (1958).
2 Religious Institutions and Values: A Legal Survey (1958-59), 35 NoTRE DAME LAWYER
405 (1960); 35 No=m DAME LAWYER 537 (1960).
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and obscenity - are those closest to the present consensus of the inclusiveness of the
first amendment. The topics considering the individual religion in a neutral, if not
hostile, society - e.g., free exercise problems - are to be considered insofar as they
are actual or potential grounds for state action in behalf of or contrary to some pro-
fessed interest of the church, and not the church itself. For the most part, the
institution-value distinction is sound, but it is not without problems; for example,
the decisions discussed herein concerning public schools in the past two years are
concerned primarily with the religious values in public facilities.
It will be noted that those areas dealing with the state as government, but not
now viewed as presenting constitutional issues, are dealt with in some cases as non-
religious problems. The religious institutions, we shall see, are most usually looked
upon by the courts as buildings, charities, or benefits to the state. Thus the benefits
to the church are considered benefits to the state, eliminating the possibility of con-
flict and a constitutional issue.
Why certain aspects of church institutional existence are presently viewed as
presenting constitutional problems and why some values of a particular religion have
been accepted as consistent with the state's best interests cannot be entirely answered
in this Survey. Nevertheless, we may supply certain answers as to the present status
of the law and the likelihood of a future solution in terms of a comprehensive
theory of church-state relations in the United States.
II. RELIGIOUS INsTITUTIONS
A. CHURCH PROPERTY
1. Basic Concepts - Emerging Constitutional Standards
Despite St. Paul's exhortation that they should avoid lawsuits,3 neither Christians
nor other American sects have shown much inclination to keep their internal dis-
agreements out of the courts. On the contrary, a survey of the past three years
shows a large number of these cases coming before the appellate courts and decisions
appear on questions of property ownership, church membership, the tenure of clerics,
and occasionally what seem to be purely doctrinal conflicts. The reasoning and
decisions of the courts in each of these areas will be examined in turn. Some reli-
gious disputes have arisen in the more limited context occasioned by the existence
of religious corporation laws in forty-eight of the states. Separate treatment will be
given these rather distinctive problems near the end of this section of the Survey.
By far the most common type of religious dispute to reach the courts has been
that involving disagreement with respect to the ownership or use of property.
First examined will be the conflicts arising in local churches which are in some
way affiliated with a central body; then discussed will be those involving independent
congregations.
Kresnick v. St. Nicholas Cathedral4 is the only case in this area to reach the
Supreme Court in the last three years. In disposing of this case with a per curiam
opinion, the Court seems to have ended a controversy which began in the 1920's.
What is perhaps more important, the Court has made it clear that its decision in an
earlier case, that of Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral,5 did in fact place constitu-
tional limits on the actions of courts as well as legislatures in deciding intra-church
disputes.
The long controversy culminating in Kresnik cannot be described within the
limits of this Survey,6 but at least one important principle has been established by
those decisions, i.e., that the property of hierarchical churches split by schism rests
3 I Corinthians 6:7.
4 363 U.S. 190 (1960).
5 344 U.S. 94 (1952).
6 See the extensive discussion of the struggle for possession of Saint Nicholas Cathedral in
Duesenberg, Jurisdiction of Civil Courts over Religious Issues, 20 OHo ST. L.J. 508, 516
(1959).
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secure in the first established branch of that church. State attempts to award the
property to the schismatic faction are prohibited by the fourteenth amendment. That,
however, may not be all there is to the Kedroff-Kresnik diptych. The Court in both
cases relied heavily on Watson v. Jonesg a nineteenth century case arising out of a
Civil War era schism of the Presbyterian Church. Though it only decided that courts
should, on common law grounds, defer to the decisions of the central bodies of asso-
ciated churches in determining property disputes, the Court in its opinion included
a famous three-part classification of religious dispute cases. It divided them as
follows:
1. The first of these is when the property which is the subject of controversy
has been, the deed or will of the donor, or other instrument by which the
property is held, by the express terms of the instrument devoted to the teach-
ing, support, or spread of some specific form of religious doctrine or belief.
2. The second is when the property is held by a religious congregation
which, by the nature of its organization, is strictly independent of other
ecclesiastical associations, and so far as church government is concerned,
owes no fealty or obligation to any higher authority.
3. The third is where the religious congregation or ecclesiastical body hold-
ing the property is but a subordinate member of some general church organ-
ization in which there are superior ecclesiastical tribunals with a general
and ultimate power of control more or less complete, in some supreme judi-
catory over the whole membership of that general organization.$
For each of these three divisions the Court prescribed a different mode of
judicial action. In the first situation, a court must enforce the trust.9 In the second
class of cases, where a church is governed by a congregational polity, a court must
follow either the majority of the congregation, or, if the congregation itself has a
representative government, the officers elected by the majority.10 The third class of
cases is, of course, that actually present in Watson and Kedroff. With regard to these
situations the Court said:
In this class of cases we think the rule of action which should govern the
civil courts, founded in a broad and sound view of the relations of church
and state under our system of laws, and supported by a preponderating
weight of judicial authority is, that, whenever the questions of discipline, or
of faith, or ecclesiastical rule, custom, or law have been decided by the
highest of these church judicatories to which the matter has been carried,
the legal tribunals must accept such decisions as final, and as binding on
them, in their application to the case before them."
The extensive presentation of the doctrine of Watson v. Jones is given for two
purposes. The first is to illustrate that in the years following, only the third Watson
proposition has been definitely raised to constitutional standing. The second is to
present the standard posed by this most noteworthy case, against which the following
cases may be judged. One more thing need be said before going on to the state
cases; it seems probable, now that Kresnik has established beyond doubt that there
are fourteenth amendment limitations upon courts in this area, that the constitu-
tional aspects of future cases will receive much more attention than they have in the
past. The property disputes occasioned by schismatic factions, similar to that in
Watson, have not occurred in recent years as frequently as have cases involving suits
by central bodies against local congregations to recover local church property.' 2 In
each of the three'such cases noted, the laws of the central church provided that under
certain circumstances local congregations could be declared defunct by the central
7 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1871).
8 Id. at 722-23.
9 Id. at 723.
10 Id. at 725.
11 Id. at 727.
12 Presbytery of the Everglades v. Morgan, 125 So. 2d 762 (Fla. App. 1961); Louisiana
District, Church of the Nazarene v. Church of the Nazarene, 132 So. 2d 667 (La. App. 1961);
Beauchamp v. Trustees of the Miami Conference of the Evangelical United Brethren Church,
110 Ohio App. 109, 160 N.E.2d 343 (1959).
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body, in which case all property would revert to the central body. In a fourth sim-
ilar case, the court denied recovery to the central body saying that it had "procedural
lack of capacity" in having failed to follow its own prescribed procedures in pro-
claiming the local body extinct.13
A recent New Hampshire case involving the right of the central body to the
proceeds of a taking by eminent domain presented a more difficult problem. 4 The
agreement between the central body and the local church provided that the site
would revert to the central body if Baptist services were not held on it for the space
of one year. Clearly, services could not be held on that site, but the local congrega-
tion had applied the proceeds to the building of a new church. The court properly
held that the central church retained a trust in the eminent domain proceedings, but
that it could not collect until such time as the congregation failed to hold prescribed
services on the new site.'5 The rights of the central body were also upheld in Trus-
tees of Transylvania Presbytery, U.S.A. v. Garrard County Board of Education.
There, the court held that the Board of Education had no right to the proceeds from
the sale of church property no longer in use because the local congregation had with-
ered away. Neither an apparent condition in the original deed granting the land nor
a Kentucky escheat statute 7 were held to apply against the claim asserted by the
central body of an affiliated church.'
The most difficult problem confronting the courts in the property disputes of
associated churches arises when the central body itself divides in schism. This was
the situation in First Protestant Reformed Church v. De Wolfe.'9 When the case
first arose, the court had deferred to the judgment of the higher church body,
awarded the property to the faction opposed to present plaintiffs on the local level,
and enjoined the plaintiff from interfering with the other faction's control. Subse-
quently, the central church split and a court decided that the faction favoring the
plaintiff constituted the true central body. In the present case therefore, the plaintiffs
sought to have the judgment against them changed under the device of seeking modi-
fication of the injunction.20 The court held that the decree in the first suit was not
primarily injunctive and therefore not subject to modification.
21
This case illustrates one of the difficulties not covered by the Watson approach
of deference to the central body. Seemingly in a situation such as that in First Protes-
tant, where the central body had split, the courts cannot avoid deciding the essentially
theological problem of who represents the faction which is the true successor and
thus the one which should retain the property.
The principles recognized in allowing the central body of an affiliated church
a right of action against a local congregation to enforce church rules are analogous
in Apostolic Faith Mission v. Christian Evangelical Church.22 In that case it was
decided that where a majority of the local congregation sought to withdraw from the
central church and brought an action in ejectment to gain possession from the minor-
ity loyal to the central church, the loyal minority should prevail.
Located halfway between the conflicts arising in local churches affiliated with
a central body, and those involving independent congregations, are problems growing
13 Annual Mississippi Conference of the Methodist Protestant Church v. First Methodist
Protestant Church, 121 So. 2d 256 (La. App. 1960).
14 United Baptist Convention of New Hampshire v. East Weare Baptist Church, 176 A.2d
325 (N.H. 1961).
15 Id. at 328.
16 348 S.W.2d 846 (Ky. 1961).
17 Ky. REy. STAT. § 273.130 (1955).
18 Trustees of Transylvania Presbytery, U.S.A. v. Garrard County Board of Education, 348
S.W.2d 846, 849, 852 (Ky. 1961).
19 358 Mich. 489, 100 N.W.2d 254 (1960).
20 Id. at 255.
21 Id. at 256.
22 55 Wash.2d 364, 347 P.2d 1059 (1960).
NOTES •
out of the merging of churches. A noted author in this field has said that: "Almost
every merger case is also a schism case."23
The merger of large denominations, coupled with the resistance of individual
groups against joining the new combination, provided the conflict in the two cases
decided within the last few years. In the first of these cases, a minority of a congre-
gation sought to enjoin the conveyance of title (to its local church) to a new denom-
ination. The new denomination had been formed by the union of the synod, to
which the minority had formerly belonged, and other bodies.2 4 The court found the
manner in which the conveyance was attempted improper, but more important, it
held that the local church was not automatically affiliated with the new body merely
because its parent group had joined.25 In effect, the majority of the congregation is
at least temporarily denied its freedom of action necessary to affiliate with the new
body. In Hayman v. Saint Martin's Evangelical Lutheran Church,2 6 the opposite
situation obtained in the local congregation. In that case the parent body was about
to consummate a merger with another denomination. A minority of the local congre-
gation was in favor of the union, and sought to enjoin a proposed withdrawal from
the central body. The court decided the question on the basis of the laws of the
parent body, which were held to allow withdrawal by vote of the congregation.2
Here again, the local congregation was withdrawn from the merger.
These cases are neither sufficiently numerous nor revealing to show a judicial
pattern or policy toward merger, but as this area promises to be an important one,
it seems profitable to quote from a seminal study in it:
In the merger cases, as in the schism cases, the law tends to uphold the
polity and confession of the original denomination, the law tends to conserve
its position against modification, but at the same time fundamental public
policy encourages dissidents to constitute themselves as "new" sects or
denominations.
2S
A large percentage of the intrachurch disputes to reach the appellate courts in
the past few years have arisen from conflicts within congregations organized as inde-
pendent democratic polities. All of these cases deal in some way with property rights
in the congregation's place of worship. All hinge on a struggle for control of the con-
gregation by two factions thereof.
Most common are the schism cases. In these situations the congregation has split
to such a degree that control over the church property itself is hotly disputed. The
five cases found here present an interesting contrast. It will be recalled that the
Supreme Court said in Watson v. Jones, that cases such as these should be decided by
simple deference to the decision of the congregation expressed either through its
majority or through its officers.2 9 Three state cases in recent years have shown a sig-
nificant exception to this rule. In each of these cases the court in effect said that,
when confronted with a schism in a congregational church, it will award the prop-
erty to the majority only if that majority is faithful to the tenets of the congregation
as they existed before the schism.3 0 The language of the court in an earlier hearing
of one of these three cases is a good example of this position: "It is settled in this
State that where there is a schism in a congregational church, the majority group are
entitled to exclusive use of the church property, unless they have departed from the
fundamental doctrines of the church as advocated and practiced at the time of its
23 Stringfellow, Law, Polity and Reunion of the Church: The Emerging Conflict between
Law and Theology in America, 20 OHIo ST. L.J. 412, 434 (1959).
24 American Lutheran Church v. Evangelical Lutheran St. Paul's Church, 343 P.2d 711
(Colo. 1959).
25 Id. at 712-13.
26 176 A.2d 772 (Md. 1962).
27 Id. at 776.
28 Stringfellow, supra note 21, at 434.
29 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 725 (1871).
30 Sorenson v. Logan, 32 Ill. App. 2d 294, 177 N.E.2d 713 (1961); Rife v. Fleming, 339
S.W.2d 653 (Ky. 1960); Maynard v. Headlem, 334 S.W.2d 930 (Ky. 1960).
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organization... ."31 Other cases have taken different viewpoints. Thus, in a dispute
over pulpit affiliations, the Arkansas court held that the majority had a right to an
injunction against the minority to restrain it from interfering with church services,
saying simply that in a congregational church the majority controls.-2 In Simpson v.
Mullineaux33 it was held that if the minority withdraws from the congregation, it
forfeits all rights to the church property.3 4 Apparently, in this case it was impossible
to determine who professed the true doctrine.3 5
Two cases arising in Orthodox Jewish congregations provide additional insight
into the various judicial approaches to the problem of schism in independent
churches. In Davis v. Scher,3 6 a minority member of a synagogue sought an injunc-
tion to forbid the practice of mixed or family seating, recently introduced into his
congregation. The court issued the injunction after plaintiff had established to its
satisfaction that it was a property right which he sought to have protected.- The
court's argument, may be summarized as follows: 1) this is an Orthodox synagogue;
2) Orthodox Jews do not allow mixed seating; 3) therefore, the majority is depart-
ing from Orthodox doctrine; 4) the court will not allow this departure if the effect
is to deprive plaintiff of a property right.3 Here again, we find a court determining
orthodoxy in order to settle the dispute.
A much different approach was taken in Katz v. Singerman, 9 a Louisiana case.
Again the dispute involved mixed seating and again the plaintiff was a minority
member of a congregation which had recently adopted the practice by the veto of
an overwhelming majority. 40 This time, however, the theory of the plaintiff was
different. He claimed that the majority's action violated the conditions of an express
trust set up for the congregation some years before.4' The trust required that the
practices of the congregation always accord with "Orthodox Polish Jewish Ritual.
42
The trial court in an opinion adopted by the intermediate appellate court found the
case to be covered by the express trust principle of Watson v. Jones,43 discussed above.
After hearing extensive expert testimony as to the meaning of "Orthodox Polish
Jewish Ritual," the court found that mixed seating violated the trust, enjoined the
practice and was upheld in the first appeal.44 The Supreme Court, in reviewing the
case also relied on Watson v. Jones,45 but found it to fit in the second category estab-
lished in that case. Primarily, the court argued, this was a case involving the kind of
decision by a congregation which should not be set aside.46 As to the expressed trust,
the court said it could be interpreted to admit this practice and that if the maker
had wished to prevent mixed seating, he should have expressed that mandate.41
These cases involving schisms and doctrinal disputes in congregational churches
may be evaluated from several points of view. It seems clear, first of all, that those
courts which inquire into the doctrinal controversy and favor the body which most
closely adheres to the traditions of the church are favoring stability in doctrine at
the expense of development. Judgment as to the wisdom of such policy turns, it is
submitted, less on a legal criterion than on a theological viewpoint. Secondly, it
31 Fleming v. Rife, 328 S.W.2d 151, 152 (Ky. 1959).
32 Rush v. Yancey, 349 S.W.2d 337, 338-39 (Ark. 1961).
33 188 Kan. 139, 360 P.2d 893 (1961).
34 Id. at 895.
35 Id. at 894.
36 356 Mich. 291, 97 N.W.2d 137 (1959).
37 Id. at 140.
38 Id. at 141.
39 120 So. 2d 670 (La. App. 1960), rev'd, 241 La. 103, 127 So. 2d 515 (1961).
40 Id. at 678.
41 Id. at 672.
42 Id. at 680.
43 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1871).
44 Katz v. Singerman, 120 So. 2d 670 (La. App. 1960).
45 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1871).
46 Katz v. Singerman, 241 La. 103, 127 So. 2d 515, 520 (1961).
47 Id. at 532-33.
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might be argued that, when a church had adopted a congregational polity, the favor-
ing of a minority on doctrinal grounds is an interference with constitutionally pro-
tected freedom of religion - the freedom of the majority to govern their church by
the form they have chosen. Research has revealed no case in which this point has
been raised, but it seems implicit in the final disposition of the Kedroff controversy.
Finally, an argument might be made from judicial administration. It would seem
that in these cases courts have particular difficulty finding the correct doctrine. The
simple position that in congregational churches the majority rule is decisive on all
issues would greatly reduce both the difficulty of the cases and the number of dis-
putes brought to court.
Though the majority of cases arising from religious disputes involve disagree-
ments over control or use of property as discussed above, other issues arise which
must be briefly discussed. Thus, in congregational denominations relief is sometimes
sought in the courts because governing bodies have not followed their own rules of
decision. Courts seem willing to inquire into this procedural regularity, judge the
action of the congregation's government against its own rules and validate or in-
validate it depending upon what they find.-s Courts recently facing the problem also
seem uniformly agreed that they will not review the substantive issues involved in
expulsion of church members.4" California, however, apparently requires procedural
due process.50 A few cases have involved the removal of pastors but that topic is
believed to be outside the scope of this Survey.
The recent cases discussed above substantially exhaust problems of intrachurch
disputes. It remains, however, to discuss the closely related subject of litigation aris-
ing from the incorporation of religious bodies. A comparative study of religious
corporation laws would of necessity be a book-length work.51 Such a project will not
be attempted here. The history of these laws is of substantial interest, particularly
in light of the problem caused by the application of congregationally-oriented statutes
to churches organized with the episcopal structure such as the Roman Catholic.
5 2
That topic, apparently a dead issue now, is also beyond our scope. What will be
attempted is a brief examination of the litigation arising out of these statutes. By
way of introduction to that material, it may be well to glance at the status of the
unincorporated religious society.
Though the religious society may enjoy certain advantages by incorporating,
not otherwise obtainable in a given jurisdiction,53 it is also clear that for some pur-
poses the law treats such bodies as entities. So, for example, in Alabama an unincor-
porated religious association may bring suit in the name of its church 4 and in
Georgia such a group is subject to foreclosure of a lien on its property.55
When religious groups do wish to incorporate, they are permitted to do so in all
states except Virginia5 6 and West Virginia.57 Most of their problems as corporations
are much like those of business corporations. Thus, two cases involved problems of
compliance by the religious association with the statutory procedures for incorporat-
48 See Coates v. Parchman, 334 S.W.2d 417 (Mo. 1960); McHague v. Feltmer,
325 S.W.2d 349 (Ky. 1959); Willis v. Davis, 323 S.W.2d 847 (Ky. 1959).
49 Louison v. Fishman, 168 N.E.2d 340 (Mass. 1960); Moorman v. Goodman, 59 N.J.
Super. 181, 157 A.2d 519 (1960); Bentley v. Shanks, 348 S.W.2d 900 (Tenn. App. 1960);
Owen v. Board of Directors of Rosicrucian Fellowship, 173 Cal. App. 2d 112, 342 P.2d 424
(1959).
50 Owen v. Board of Directors of Rosicrucian Fellowship, 173 Cal. App. 2d 112, 342 P.2d
424 (1959).
51 See generally, ZOLLMAN, AMERICAN CHURCH LAw 102-94 (1933).
52 See generally, DIGNAN, HISTORY OF THE LEGAL INCORPORATION OF CATHOLIC CHURCH
PROPERTY IN THE UNITED STATES (1935).
53 E.g., in Alabama an unincorporated religious association cannot hold land. Johnson v.
Sweeny's Lane Church of God, 270 Ala. 260, 116 So. 2d 899 (1959).
54 Floyd v. East End Baptist Church 271 Ala. 13, 122 So. 2d 155 (1960).
55 Rogers v. Lindsey Street Baptist Church, 104 Ga. App. 487, 121 S.E.2d 926 (1961).
56 VA. CONST. art. IV, § 59.
57 W. VA. CONST. art. VI, § 47.
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ing. s Two other cases arose because of claims that the acts of a religious corporation-
were ultra vires.59 One court held that only members of a religious corporation may
complain of ultra vires actions; 60 the other refused even to hear the complaint of a
member because no such right had been given him under the charter of his church.
6
1
Religious corporations, just as business corporations, have been held subject in New
York to writs of mandamus requiring them to issue financial statements and adopt
by-laws.
62
In some states, religious corporations do find themselves in court with problems
that would not bother their analogue, the business corporation. In New York where
religious corporations must apply to the Supreme Court, rather than to an adminis-
trative office, to obtain or amend a corporate charter, they have sometimes had diffi-
culty in obtaining the court's approval. 63 Religious corporations in New York must
also receive the permission of a court before selling land. Courts have conditioned
such permission6" and have refused it as not being in the interests of the church.65
The cases interpreting religious corporation statutes reveal neither serious prob-
lems nor substantial movement in the law. As the above discussion reveals, however,
constitutional issues of considerable importance are arising in the area of judicial
review of religious disputes. These two topics, taken together, deal with the central
core of the law of religious institutions - subsequent sections will deal with particular
problems of special controversy.
2. Zoning - In Search of a Standard
The zoning of churches presents problems which are quite distinct from those
which the zoning board and courts must decide in more conventional cases. Freedom
to use one's property as one wishes is now generally recognized as qualified in most
instances by a community interest in orderly development. Such is not the case with
the zoning of churches. When objections are raised against exclusion of religious
functions from an area, the courts are faced not only by the generalized due process
objection but also by the special deference with which they feel compelled, on con-
stitutional or other grounds, to treat churches. The truly paradoxical nature of these
cases and the repeated refusal of the Supreme Court to review them has resulted in
considerable diversity of approach in state courts. This diversity is amply reflected by
the cases decided in the last two years.
Beyond doubt the most important recent church zoning decision is Lake Drive
Baptist Church v. Village of Bayside Board of Trustees.6 The case is important for
three reasons: 1) It presents an excellent summary of the various factors considered
by the courts in attempting to solve these problems; 2) the opinion of the court sets
forth a proposed test of the validity of all zoning of churches; 3) the Wisconsin court
in this case takes a unique position, balanced between the majority and minority
positions.
58 Bruce v. Hunter 32 Ill. App. 2d 207, 177 N.E.2d 425 (1961); Louisiana District, Church
of the Nazarene v. Church of the Nazarene, 132 So. 2d 667 (La. App. 1961).
59 Stone v. Salt Lake City, 11 Utah 2d 196, 356 P.2d 631 (1960); Church of God of the
Union Assembly v. Carmical, 214 Ga. 365, 104 S.E.2d 912 (1958).
60 Church of God of the Union Assembly v. Carmical, 214 Ga. 365, 104 S.E.2d 912, 914
(1958).
61 Stone v. Salt Lake City, 11 Utah 2d 196, 356 P.2d 631, 634 (1960).
62 Eisenberg v. Fauer, 25 Misc. 2d 90, 200 N.Y.S.2d 749 (Sup. Ct. 1960).
63 In re Jesus Sobre Las Aguas, 21 Misc. 2d 937, 197 N.Y.S.2d 804 (Sup. Ct. 1960); In re
Application for Approval of Certificate of Incorporation of First Temple of the House of David
(Hebrew Catholic Faith), 195 N.Y.S.2d 588 (Sup. Ct. 1959); Application for Amendment of
Certificate of Incorporation of Saints of God in Christ Incorporated, 20 Misc. 2d 532, 194
N.Y.S.2d 339 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
64 Application of Congregation Ahavas Achem, 27 Misc. 2d 1097, 213 N.Y.S.2d 770 (Sup.Ct. 1961).65 Application of Margolin, 16 Misc. 2d 961, 183 N.Y.S.2d 36 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
66 12 Wis.2d 585, 108 N.W.2d 288 (1961).
The facts in Bayside are much like those said by a noted authority to be typical
of the church zoning area:
The legal problem arises in those cases where there is an attempt to
exclude churches, particularly those attended by minority groups within the
community, and often where the churches of faiths or denominations at-
tended by the majority of the community are already established in the
community as valid non-conforming uses.
67
The actions of the village of Bayside differed from this usual pattern only in the
fact that it first attempted to exclude all churches from the community; then in a
later ordinance, the village allowed thein only in a restricted area which did not
include plaintiff's proposed site. The Lakesid Baptist Church had acquired its
site before the passage of either ordinance and had been negotiating with the village
for permission to build. Upon final denial of its requests for rezoning and a building
permit, the church appealed to the courts. 68 An adverse result at the circuit level led
to an appeal by the church to the Supreme Court of Wisconsin which reversed and
enjoined the village from enforcing its ordinance against the church and ordered
the village building inspector to issue a building permit.6 9
The court, in the opinion written by Justice Fairchild, first discussed a problem
dealing with construction of the state's enabling statute. In deciding that the statute
did give local communities some power to zone churches,70 it reached a result oppo-
site that of the Missouri Supreme Court in a case decided two years earlier 1 and
fully discussed in the last Survey.
7 2
Turning to the question of the constitutionality of the ordinance, the court
classified zoning ordinances applied to churches as follows:
With respect to use of land in residence districts for a church, zoning
ordinances fall into three types: (1) permitting churches in all; (2) permit-
ting a church only upon special permit, after hearing; (3) excluding
churches, often, if not usually from districts where residential use is itself
restricted to certain types of dwellings.
73
Most zoning ordinances, said the court, fall into one of the first two types.74
Many courts, it went on to say, have held the third type invalid, although there are
several decisions to the contrary.7 5 The court's next paragraphs well state the exist-
ing law:
Most of the decisions on this subject appear to involve denials of a special
permit to build a church under the second type of ordinance. In a number,
the denial has been set aside, sometimes with an accompanying statement
that there is no valid basis for exclusion.
In a few cases, denials under the second type of cases have been upheld.
It is clear enough that a church has some attributes which tend to make
it less desirable to its next-door neighbor than a one-family, dwelling. It
entails substantial gatherings of people, resulting disturbance, and the prob-
lem of parking automobiles.
76
In the last of the quoted paragraphs the court showed its essential realism in
facing the problem which confronted it. It refused to take the easy way out by deny-
ing that there is a hardship imposed on close neighbors of churches or that these
factors should be considered by zoning boards. In this segment of its opinion the
Wisconsin court maintained what seems to be a unique position, but it went on to
show that realism includes more than concern for material hardship or advantage.
67 I RATHICOPF, ZONING AND PLANNING § 19-1 (1960).
68 State ex rel. Lakeside Drive Baptist Church v. Village of Bayside Board of Trustees, 12
Wis.2d 585, 108 N.W.2d 288, 289-92 (1961).
69 Id. at 299.
70 Id. at 293.
71 Congregation Temple Israel v. City of Creve Coeur, 320 S.W.2d 451 (Mo. 1959).
72 1958-59 Church-State Survey, supra note 2, at 407.
73 State ex rel. Lakeside Baptist Church v. Village of Bayside Board of Trustees, 12 'Wis.2d
585, 108 N.W.2d 288, 293 (1961).
74 Ibid.
75 Id. at 294.
76 Id. at 295.
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A church, however, is not to be viewed merely as the owner of property
complaining against a restriction on its use. It may also challenge an ordi-
nance as an unwarranted burden upon, or interference with the freedom of
the adherents of the church to worship after the manner of their faith. We are
familiar with the constitutional protection of freedom of religion from gov-
ernmental interference.
An ordinance which excludes a church from a particular district must
pass two tests:
(1) Can it reasonably be said that use for a church would have such an
effect on the area that exclusion of such use will promote the general
welfare, and
(2) Does the exclusion impose a burden upon freedom of worship which
is not commensurate with the promotion of general welfare secured?
The test is whether a regulation is an undue infringement. Any restric-
tion upon the opportunity to build a house of worship is at least a potential
burden upon the freedom of those who would like to worship there. Whether
the burden is slight or substantial will depend upon circumstances. In a com-
munity where adequate and accessible building sites are available in alldistricts, it might be a negligible burd n to exclude churches from some of
them. There must be many circumstances under which a religious groupcould demonstrate that an exclusion from a particular area would be a s b-
stantial burden.7 7
This case was decided by the court on the basis of the first of its proposed tests.
Consequently, there was no need for it to reach the question whether the village had
unduly restricted freedom of worship. Yet it is this second part of the court's cri-
terion which marks a real break with the past. Though law review and treatise
writers on the subject of church zoning have consistently urged that the first amend-
ment, as applied to states by the fourteenth, was crucial to the decision of cases in
the area 78 no court previous to Bayside appears to have directly adopted such a
test.7 9 The court in Bayside adopts no absolutes. Its test is presented as applicable
to each of the three types of zoning ordinances. The Wisconsin court, in its treat-
ment of the problem, establishes both a valuable precedent and a good example to
be followed by other courts.
Several other state courts have considered problems similar to that in Bayside
during the period of this Survey. Each of the cases illustrates a different approach.
Pelham Jewish Center v. Marsh, 0 involved an ordinance excluding places of worship
from residential districts. The Appellate Division disposed of the case in a unanimous
memorandum decision striking down the ordinance. In doing so, it followed the
accepted New York rule on the subject - that there may be no complete exclusion
- as expressed in the oft-cited Diocese of Rochester case."' No new principles were
formulated in this jurisdiction.
A 1961 Colorado case82 involved the Wisconsin court's second type of ordinance,
one in which religious uses were permitted only upon approval of the local zoning
board. The plaintiff church had been excluded. The opinion of the court, in striking
down the ordinance,8 3 focused on the property right of the church rather than on
freedom of religion. The court apparently ignored any distinction between ordi-
nances which exclude churches and those which leave religious uses to the discretion
of the zoning board. A concurring opinion would have upheld the ordinance, but
would have reversed the zoning board's refusal to allow the church a conditional use
on the ground that the board's action was arbitrary.84 It is submitted that the opin-
ion of the court substantially misconstrued the problem. No consideration is taken
77 Id. at 295-96 (emphasis by the court).
78 E.g., Note, 70 HARv. L. REv. 1428 (1957).
79 See I, RATHuOPF, ZONING AND PLANNING § 19-4 (1960).
80 197 N.Y.S.2d 258 (App. Div. 1960).
81 1 N.Y.2d 508, 136 N.E.2d 827, 154 N.Y.S.2d 849 (1956).
82 City of Englewood v. Apostolic Christian Church, 362 P.2d 172 (Colo. 1961).
83 Id. at 175.
84 Id. at 177.
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of facts which might have led to the board's decision and no mention is made of
freedom of religion or its limits.
Board of Zoning Appeals of Meridian Hills v. Schulte, 5 an Indiana case, pre-
sented the classic problem of an exclusive suburb seeking to maintain high property
values by barring religious uses from areas adjacent to residences. s6 The religious
group involved wished to erect a complete parish "plant" including church, school,
rectory and convent. The parties in their briefs had argued the desirability of an
alternative site which the village had proposed. The court discussed the matter of
maintaining property values and concluded "that the general public interest in moral
and intellectual education of the young far outweighs the private interest affected
by any depreciation in neighboring property values."8 7 The Indiana court seems to
have reached a proper result. It appears that the decisions of the zoning boards of
small suburbs in large metropolitan areas excluding churches may be most realisti-
cally characterized as serving private rather than public interests.88
In most discussions of the problems of church zoning, the California position
has been treated as the major exception to the rule that a church may not be ex-
cluded by ordinance from an area.8 9 One authority has found the California policy
to mean that religious uses are to be treated exactly as other uses and may be exclud-
ed if they do not fit the locality's comprehensive plan.90 Two recent cases in that
state show no retreat from the position attributed to it.9' Significantly, they are the
only two cases discovered within the scope of this Survey in which the party seeking
to establish the religious use has lost in the appellate courts.
All of the cases considered thus far have involved challenges by religious groups
to rulings of local zoning authorities. It sometimes happens that other landowners
in a zoned area will protest a decision of a zoning board allowing a religious use.
Two such cases have arisen in the last two years. In Black v. Town of Montclair2
neighboring landowners attacked the decision of a zoning board which granted a
variance allowing a small Catholic elementary school to remodel. The court laid
particular emphasis upon the respect due the decisions of local authorities in such
matters. 3 Upon full review of the facts the court upheld the decision of the Board.9 4
A 1960 Pennsylvania case also involved an action by landowners to overturn the
decision of a zoning board.95 Though the decision turned on an issue of retroactive
legislation, the opinion of the court, by Justice Musmanno, speaks of the special
regard due to the interest of churches.96
Two recent New York cases turned on the interpretation rather than the validity
85 172 N.E.2d 39 (Ind. 1961).
86 In its facts, this case very much resembles one of the early leading cases in the area of
church zoning. State ex rel. Synod of Ohio v. Joseph, 139 OHIO ST. 229, 39 N.E.2d 515 (1942).
87 Board of Zoning Appeals of Meridian Hills v. Schulte, 172 N.E.2d 39, 44 (Ind. 1961).
88 The focus of the court's opinion in this case appears to be on the use of this property for
parochial school purposes. In this connection the following statement is worth noting:
We have, then, two grounds upon which public schools are admitted
thereto. The first of these grounds is that it is unreasonable to make a dis-
tinction between public and parochial schools since they both teach the same
curriculum and fulfill the same function. The second ground is that the ex-
clusion of such schools has no relationship to the public safety, health, morals
or general welfare, and is therefore arbitrary, capricious and unconstitutional.
I Rathkopf § 18-20 (1960).
89 See, e.g., 2 YOKLEY, ZONING LAW AND PRAcTac § 222 (2d ed. 1953).
90 I RATHKOPF, THE LAw OF ZONING AND PLANNING § 19-4 (1960).
91 City of San Marino v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Los Angeles, 180 Cal App. 2d 657, 4
Cal. Rep. 547 (1960), cert. denied 364 U.S. 909 (1960); Garden Grove Congregation of
Jehovah's Witnesses v. Garden Grove, 176 Cal. App. 2d 136, 1 Cal. Rep. 65 (1959).
92 34 N.J. 105, 167 A.2d 388 (1961).
93 Id. at 392.
94 Ibid. This case apparently overrules Rarney v. Instituto Pontifico Delle Maestre Fl-
lipini, 20 N.J. 189, 119 A.2d 142 (1955).
95 Yocum v. Power, 398 Pa. 223, 157 A.2d 369 (1960).
96 Id. at 370.
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
of zoning ordinances. A retreat house was held to be within the spirit of an ordinance
which allowed churches, parish schools, rectories and convents.9? A similar result was
reached as to a center for the distribution of religious literature.9
Closely related to the problem of exclusion of religious uses by zoning is that of
restriction by private covenants. Two cases were found on enforcement of such
covenants against religious groups. 99 . Both were decided on issues unrelated to the
religious use and neither court even dealt with the possibility of giving special consid-
eration to such uses.
The cases discussed above include all those decided in the past two years. They
provide little basis for prediction. It is expected that the test developed in the Bay-
side case will commend itself to courts deciding future cases and it appears that such
a test provides a better basis for decision than others which have been employed.
More tentatively, it might be predicted that employment of the Bayside test will
eventually result in review of this entire problem by the Supreme Court.
3. Taxation - Constitutionality and Controversy
While the battle over the degree of church-state cooperation has raged in past
years, until 1961, the right of the state to free the church from the burden of taxation
remained uncontested. Controversy over the constitutionality of the tax exemption
provisions was confined to a few legal articles. 100 However at the close of the period
surveyed here, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island was confronted with an attack
on the validity of any religious exemption to state taxes. In General Finance Corp. v.
Archetto,'10 the contention was raised by a taxpayer that the exemption of these
religious institutions caused a higher rate of taxation on his property. This, it was
argued, was a violation of the state constitution in that it was not a fair distribution
of taxes among the entire populace, and because the exemption was in favor of reli-
gious institutions, a violation of the first amendment and the comparable section of
the Rhode Island Constitution. 0 2 The first Point was dismissed without trouble,
but the freedom of religion question posed a more complex problem.
The court, however, in a unanimous opinion ruled that the tax exemption did
not contravene either constitutional provision. The major point relied on in relation
to the state provision was the existence of exemption for religious institutions at the
time of the ratification of the constitution. As to the federal right, the court discussed
the three education cases conceding the Everson and Mcollum cases may have
shed doubt on the practice by their strict construction of the first amendment, relied
on the Zorach dicta that "We find no constitutional requirement which makes it
necessary for government to be hostile to religion and to throw its weight against
efforts to widen an effective scope of religious influence."'103 The present court then
went on to analyze the decision by writing: "We are persuaded that the court has
not gone so far as to hold that clearly and beyond a reasonable doubt the tax exemp-
97 Diocese of Central New York v. Schwarzer, 23 Misc.2d 515, 199 N.Y.S.2d 939 (Sup. Ct.
1960), aff'd mem., 217 N.Y.S.2d 567 (App. Div. 1961).
98 Application of Faith for Today, 204 N.Y.S.2d 751 (App. Div. 1960), aff'd mem., 9
N.Y.2d 80, 174 N.E.2d 751, 215 N.Y.S.2d 70 (1961).
99 Smith v. Second Church of Christ Scientist, 87 Ariz. 400, 351 P.2d 1104 (1960);
Protestant Episcopal Church v. McKinney, 339 S.W.2d 400 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960).
100 Paulsen, Preferment of Religious Institutions in Tax and Labor Legislation, 14 LAw &
CONTEMP. PROB. 144 (1949); Blake, Christianity Today, Aug. 3, 1959, p. 7. For a general
discussion of arguments against the exemption, see PFZEFFER, CHURCH, STATE & FREEDOM 188-
190 (1953); III STOKES, CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES 418 (1950).
101 176 A.2d 73 (R.I. 1961).
102 R.I. CONST. art. I, § 3. The applicable section reads: "[We therefore declare that no
man shall be compelled to frequent or to support any religious worship, place, or ministry what-
ever, except in fulfillment of his own voluntary contract; nor enforced, restrained, molested, or
burdened in his body, or goods."
103 Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 314 (1952).
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tion statutes here in issue are in contravention of article I of amendments to the
federal constitution." 10 4
The court seemed to partake of the same spirit that had been recognized some
years earlier by a legal writer when he had observed "The tax exemption battle has
been won by exhaustion."'1 s For this feeling of exemption victory in years 'past
appears to underlie the court's theory of an exemption's lawfulness until proven
unlawful. The most concrete evidence of this victory is the present existence of the
exemption statutes. The form of litigation until the Archetto case had been restricted
to a formulation of the proper construction to be given the particular statute.
The general rule governing the construction of tax exemption statutes was well
stated by Cooley who wrote: "lI]t is a well settled rule that, when a special privilege
or exemption is claimed under a statute, charter or act of incorporation, it is to be
construed strictly against the property owner and in favor of the public."'' 06 Cases
in the past two years adequately show that this is not always applied to religious in-
stitutions. On the contrary there have always been two general viewpoints in this
matter: that favoring an interpretation of the statutes, granting the exemption, which
includes almost all the humanitarian and religious activities of the various chuich
organizations, and the other urging strict construction. It would be neither wise nor
just to attribute this divergence of interpretation to a particular judicial philosophy
of church-state relations or to a conception of the permissible bounds of encourage-
ment for religious activities. What the divergence really signifies is a difference in
the legal materials the state courts have at hand in deciding cases.
These materials are basically the state constitution and/or statutes granting an
exemption from taxation for religious institutions, e.g., "property used exclusively
for religious purposes."'10 7 In the eastern states, the immunity was originally meant
to continue the favors shown by the state to the established church prior to the
Revolution. 08 In those states, the exemption evolved simply as a matter of intuitive
justice to include all religions.'0 9 The states which subsequently joined the Union
shared in this feeling and included some sort of tax exemption, either in their consti-
tutions or in their early statutes." 0 This idea of the church's freedom from taxation
104 GeneralFinance Corp. v. Archetto, 176 A.2d 73, 78 (R.I. 1961).
105 Paulsen, Preferment of Religious Institutions in Tax and Labor Legislation, 14 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB. 144, 152 (1949).
106 II COOLEY, THE LAW oiz TAXATION § 672 (4th ed. 1924). However, in regard to the
religious and charitable exemptions, he writes: "[T]he better rule seems to be that laid down in
several states requiring a liberal rather than a strict construction in such cases." Id. at § 673.
107 ILL. STAT. ANN. ch. 120, § 500(2) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1961).
108 Van Alstyne, Tax Exemption of Church Property, 20 OHIO ST. L.J. 461, 462 (1959).
The fact that some Eastern states did not pass laws in this matter until the middle of the nine-
teenth century does not affect the much older custom of exemption. See III STOKES, CHURCH
AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES 419 (1950).
109 Van Alstyne, Tax Exemption of Church Property, 20 OHIO ST. L.J. 461, 462 (1959).
For the evolution in one state, Pennsylvania, see Comment, Taxation of Land Owned by Chari-
table and Religious Institutions in Pennsylvania, 3 U. PITT. L. Rnv. 206 (1937).
110 Fifteen states make mandatory provision for the exemption in their constitutions: ALA.
CONST. art. 4, § 91; Asu. CONsT. art. 16, § 5; KAN. CoNsT. art. 11, § 1; Ky. CoNsT. § 170;
LA. CONST. art. 10, § 4; MINN. CONST. art. 9, § 1; N.J. CONST. art. 8, § 1; N.M. CONST. art.
8, § 3; N.Y. CONST. art. 16, § 1; N.D. CONST. art. 11, § 176; OKLA. CONST. art. 10, § 6;
S.C. CONST. art. 10, § 4; S.D. CONST. art. 11, § 6; UTAH CONST. art. 13, § 2; VA. CONST. art.
13, § 183. However all but four of these states have enacted statutes controlling the exemption:
ALA. CODE tit. 51, § 2 (Supp. 1959); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 84-206 (1947); KAN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 79-201 (1949); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 272.02 (Supp. 1961); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54:4-3.6
(1960); N.Y. TAX LAw § 4(6A); N.D. CENT. CODE § 57-02-08(7) (1960); OKLA. STAT. tit.
68, § 15.2 (Supp. 1961); S.D. CODE § 57.0311(3) (1939); UTAH CODE ANN. § 59-2-1
(1953) ; VA. CODE ANN. § 58-12(2) (1950).
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by the state is not a peculiar American sensitivity. It has been rooted in most cultures
for centuries."'
As juristic analysis developed, the courts attempted to find justifying reasons for
the long-granted exemption in terms of the public burden the religious organization
was itself assuming. For this, it was thought, compensation was owing from the
state."' Another reason advanced was that the humanitarian goals of religious in-
stitutions deserved this form of gratitude from the state government."' Whether
these arguments are correct or not, the statutes have suffered little from constitutional
attacks and seem to have been taken as settled doctrine, as exemplified by the court
in the Archetto case.1 4
The various statutes may be broken down into three main categories: those
exempting "places of worship," those exempting property "used for religious pur-
poses," and a small number exempting property "owned by a religious organiza-
tion." 1"s Some states require a combination of these, and a few would seem to
demand all three, i.e., "place of worship," "use," and "ownership," to qualify property
for the religious exemption." 6
The first category, "place of worship," has generally been the most narrowly
construed. Two cases have arisen in states with this type of statute. In Church of
God v. Dalton,"7 the Supreme Court of Georgia was required to determine the appli-
cability of its tax exemption statute to four buildings owned by a church but used
for income-producing purposes. In regard to three of the buildings, not on the land
occupied by the church itself, the court held:
This unambiguous language [of the statute] means that, if the property
is used primarily for either profit or purposes other than the operation of the
institution it is not exempt. The fact that the property is used to make profit
111 Stokes writes: "The exemption from taxation of churches,- and of land immediately about
them used for church purposes, is based on a European tradition which goes back to the fourth
century when the Emperor Constantine the Great, after his conversion, gave the Church this
privilege. III STOKES, CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES 419 (1950). PFEFFER,
CHURCH, STATE & FREEDOM 183 (1953) makes allusion to the tax exemption in biblical times,
in Egypt, and in Rome.
112 See, e.g., Young Men's Christian Ass'n v. Douglas County, 60 Neb. 642, 83 N.W. 924
(1900). Stokes gives a rather extreme example of this theory in stating that "Mhese Institu-
tions contribute enormously to the moral status of the community, thereby ultimately relieving
the state treasury of excessive contributions to reformatory and penal institutions." III STOKES,
CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES 422 (1950).
113 "The long and short of it, gentlemen, that the things that make it worthwhile to live in
Massachusetts, - to live anywhere in the civilized world, - are precisely the things that are not
taxed; the things exempted are the things which are in the highest degree profitable to the
community, the colleges, the museums, the churches .... They are what makes the common
life worth living." Address by Charles W. Eliot, President of Harvard, 1906, in III STOKES,
CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES 423 (1950).
114 General Finance Corp. v. Archetto, 176 A.2d 73 (R.I. 1961). Previously the Supreme
Court had dismissed an appeal for want of a substantial federal question in Heisey v. County of
Alameda, 352 U.S. 921 (1956). State courts have never agreed with the contention. See Gar-
rett Biblical Institute v. Elmhurst State Bank, 331 II. 308, 163 N.E. 1 (1928); City of Hannibal
v. Draper, 15 Mo. 634 (1852).
115 (places of worship) e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 92-201 (1961): "The following property
shall be exempt from taxation, to wit: All public property, places of religious worship or burial.
. . ."; (property used for religious purposes) e.g., ILL. STAT. ANN. ch. 120, § 500(2) (Smith-
Hurd 1954): "All property exclusively used for religious purposes, or used exclusively for school
and religious purposes ..... ; (property owned by a religious organization) e.g., N.M. CONST.
art. 8, § 3: "All church property ....
116 (combination) e.g., N.Y. TAX LAW § 4(6): "The real property of a corporation or as-
sociation organized exclusively for the moral or mental improvement of men or women, or for
religious . . . purposes .. . and used exclusively for carrying out these purposes . . . by the
owning corporation...."; (all three) e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-81(13)-(14) (1960):
"Houses of religious worship . . . real property and its equipment owned by, or held in trust
for, any religious organization...."
117 216 Ga. 659, 119 S.E.2d 11 (1961).
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which will in turn be given or used by he church for church purposes in no
degree confers tax exemption thereupon.118
As to a restaurant connected with the church itself, the court allowed the exemption,
saying: "But the restaurant... being a part of the church, and used primarily for
church purposes, though secondarily to feed some people for pay, if able, and with-
out charge if unable to pay, comes within the exemption... ."119 While this decision
is contrary to some of the decisions reported in the previous Survey, it appears logical
and necessary in view of the narrow wording of the statute.
In Radio Bible Hour v. Hurst-Euless Independent School District,120 an appel-
late court of Texas agreed with the Georgia court that "place of worship" must be
exactly and literally interpreted. Here, the corporation seeking the exemption con-
ducted short religious services on the property in question during the week but not
on Saturday or Sunday. Its work, in addition to printing a monthly religious paper,
consisted in the "preparation, recording, and dissemination of religious programs and
sermons to radio stations in Texas."' 21 The court, citing an earlier case that held a
building must be owned and exclusively used for religious worship, as distinguished
from religious work, 22 reasoned that the present property did not come within the
statutory exemption.
In so doing the court gave assent to a strict construction of tax exemptions. It
stated its theory as follows:
The term "actual place of religious worship" as used in the Constitution
and the statute heretofore mentioned has a meaning which may be materially
different from the meaning to be implied by the use of the same or similar
words or phrases in relation to matters other than taxation statutes. In
other respects, such words or phrases if susceptible of more than one meaning
may be given a more liberal construction. The same is not true where the
question is whether property is or is not exempted from the burden of
taxation.1
23
Statutes framed in more general language are not as susceptible to the narrow
construction given that in the Radio Bible Hour case. Consequently, the statutes
which speak in terms of "religious purpose" or "use" exempt property other than the
actual church.' 2 4 People ex rel. Watchtower Bible and Tract Society v. .Haring,'"
illustrates the operation of this type of statute. Under the New York statute, proper-
ty used exclusively for carrying out religious purposes is within the exemption.irs In
Watchtower the plaintiff, the governing body of the Jehovah's Witnesses, owned a
farm quite distant from its religious headquarters. The farm supplied the food used
by ministers and students residing at the headquarters. The ministers and students
were engaged in evangelizing by selling bibles and religious literature in public places
and from house to house. Part of the farm's produce was sold to the public when
there was a surplus. The Court of Appeals reversed a decision- of the Appellate Divi-
sion refusing the exemption. The sale of a very small part of the farm's production
was seen as merely incidental and insubstantial. In regard to the unusual form of
evangelizing employed, the court quoted with approval from the United States
118 Id. at 13.
119 Ibid.
120 341 S.W.2d 467 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960).
121 Id. at 468.
122 City of San Antonio v. Young Men's Christian Ass'n, 285 S.W. 844 (Tex. Civ. App.
1926).
123 Radio Bible Hour v. Hurst-Euless School District, 341 S.W.2d 467, 469 (Tex. Civ. App.
1960).
124 Many statutes make express provision for other purposes, such as schools, cemeteries,
libraries, and parsonages. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 57-02-08 (1960): *
All land used exclusively for burying grounds or cemeteries; All school-
houses, colleges, institutions of learning.. .; any dwellings belonging to reli-
gious organizations intended and ordinarily used for the residence of the
bishop, priest....
125 8 N.Y.2d 350, 170 N.E.2d 677, 207 N.Y.S.2d 673 (1960).
126 N.Y. CONST. art. 16, § 1; N.Y. TAX LAw § 4(6).
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Supreme Court decision in Murdock v. Pennsylvania. 27 "[T]he mere fact that the
religious literature is 'sold' by itinerant preachers rather than 'donated' does not
transform evangelism into a commercial enterprise."' 128 The New York court con-
cluded that:
It is a new and inadmissible idea that an organization not organized for
profit but for religious or educational purposes loses its status as such because
out of the sale it makes a first profit which goes into capital or because the
distributors of the books make a tiny gain therefrom.'
2 9
With regard to a contention that the farm was too distant from the religious
headquarters to be considered an integral part of the religious activity, Chief Judge
Desmond cited an earlier New York case which held that such a construction of the
statute would defeat the purposes for which it was enacted. In construing the statute,
the court said:
-While an exemption statute is to be construed strictly against those
arguing for nontaxability ... the interpretation should not be so narrow and
literal as to defeat its settled purpose, which in this instance is that of encour-
aging, fostering, and protecting religious and educational institutions....
Historically and in reason, the only test is whether the farm operation is
reasonably incident to the major purpose of its owner.13o
This argument for an application of the statute in light of its underlying objec-
tives was accepted by the courts of Ohio in Holy Trinity Protestant Episcopal Church
v. Bowers.'3' The Ohio statute read in terms of "houses used exclusively for public
worship,"' 32 thus seemingly providing a more narrow exemption than the previously
cited New York statute."33 The question presented in this case concerned the appli-
cation of the statute to land purchased for the purpose of building a church at some
future time. The Ohio Supreme Court, in allowing this exemption, provided only
that the land should not be used for commercial purposes in the meantime. The
argument of the court was phrased in this way:
The basis for tax exemption is the public benefit, and the ultimate
purpose of tax exemption, whether in relation to public property or non-
governmental property, is to insure that property or funds devoted to one
public benefit -hall not be diminished by diverting such funds by means of
taxation to another public benefit. ...
Many nongovernmental entities such as hospitals and churches are consid-
ered to be operated for the public benefit."34
In applying this reasoning to the situation before them, the court borrowed from
an earlier Ohio opinion which had stated:
It is the purpose and intent of the tax exemption statutes with which
we are concerned that the funds be devoted exclusively to the benefit of the
public for that particular use, and so to differentiate and deny an exemption
to property acquired for such use but not presently so used would defeat
the purpose of the exemption statutes."35
This seems to be a quite liberal interpretation of the spirit of the exemption
statutes. Three members of the court saw it as too liberal, stressing the doctrine of
strict construction of all tax exemptions." 6 It is to be regretted that the court chose
to present the issue in terms of the "trust fund" theory now discredited in the area
127 319 U.S. 105 (1942). This case concerned the constitutionality of a Pennsylvania
licensing tax imposed on members of the Jehovah's Witnesses conducting house to house sales of
their religious tracts.
128 Id. at 111.
129 People ex rel. Watchtower Bible & Tract Society v. Haring, 8 N.Y.2d 350, 170 N.E.2d
677, 679, 207 N.Y.S.2d 673, 675 (1960).
130 Id. at 680, 681.
131 172 Ohio St. 103, 173 N.E.2d 682 (1961).
132 Onio REv. CODE § 709.07 (Page 1953).
133 N.Y. CONST. art. 16, § 1; N.Y. TAx LAW § 4(6).
134 Holy Trinity Protestant Episcopal Church v. Bowers, 172 Ohio St. 103, 173 N.E.2d 682,
683 (1961).
135 Carney v. Cleveland City School District Public Library, 169 Ohio St. 65, 157 N.E.2d
311, 314 (1959).
136 Holy Trinity Protestant Episcopal Church v. Bowers, 172 Ohio St. 103, 173 N.E.2d 682,
685 (1961).
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of tort liability. Nevertheless, it is to be noted that the court did refuse to hide
behind concepts of "public burden" or "humanitarian goals." The exemptions were
taken for what they were - encouragement of religions by the state. In a very
proper sense, this decision is a clear example of the "quid pro quo" rationale of
exemptions accepted by the writers of the tax section of the last Survey.137
Before leaving state tax exemption, it must be noted that the religious exemp-
tion is merely one of several, recognized by all the states. Quite often where the reli-
gious exemption is interpreted in a strict sense, the court may classify the activity as
a charitable institution. This exemption is broader than some religious exemption
statutes.138 Of equal importance with state tax exemptions are those made by the
federal government. The Internal Revenue Code of 1954 exempts "corporations,
and any community chest, fund, or foundation, organized and operated exclusively
for religious ... purposes. . . .""' The United States Court of Claims, in a 1961
case, interpreted this exemption as not applicable to the Scripture Press Foundation,
a nonprofit corporation engaged in the publication of religious books for the "better-
ment of the Protestant Sunday Schools of'America."' 40 The court accepted the dis-
tinction laid down by the Tax Court in Saint Germain Foundation v. Comm'r.,a '
between "incidental" and other activities which would remove the corporation from
the exemption. It laid particular emphasis on the fact that a mere five percent of
the accumulated capital and surplus of the business was devoted to expenditures for
religious educational programs. The court thus held: "We conclude that the sale
of religious literature was the primary concern of plaintiff's activities. We further
conclude that the sale of these materials, however religiously inspired, involved the
plaintiff directly in the conduct of a trade or business for profit"'1
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Clearly, there must be limitations on the religious purposes included under any
statutory exemption. But that the fact situation presented by this case is beyond the
protection of the exemption is not as clear as the court's unaninity would lead one
to believe. It is to be recalled that the stated purpose of the corporation was reli-
gious. The Scripture Press was not a business within the definition embraced by the
Ninth Circuit in an earlier decision: "A corporation which in its inception engages
in trade, business, or speculation and only has a vague charitable design, does not in
our opinion come within the terms of the statute."'14
Section 511 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 provides that the exemption
accorded to religious 'institutions does not cover income of such corporations and
organizations which is unrelated to their religious purposes, unless the recipient is a
"church, a convention or association of churches."144 The Code of Federal Regula-
tions defines a church as follows: "The term 'church' includes a religious order or a
religious organization if such order or organization (a) is an integral part of the
church and (b) is engaged in carrying out the functions of the church."' 4 5
A case arose last year as to the application of this exemption to the winery of the
De La Salle Institute, a corporation formed by the Christian Brothers Order, to own
and operate certain private schools. In De La Salle Institute v. United States,"4" a
federal district court decided that the winery was not exempt, whether it be regarded
as the business of the feeder corporation, established by the Order, or the business of
the Christian Brothers Order itself. That the Institute was not a church was evident
137 1958-59 Church State Survey, supra note 2, at 420.
138 See, e.g., In re Estate of Miller, 171 Ohio St. 202, 168 N.E.2d 743 (1960); Pittsburgh
Bible Institute v. Board of Property Assessors, 175 A.2d 82 (Pa. 1961).
139 INT. Rnv. CODE 01? 1954, § 501(c) (3).
140 Scripture Press Foundation v. United States, 285 F.2d 800, 802 (Ct. Cl. 1961).
141 26 T.C. 648 (1956).
142 Scripture Press Foundation v. United States, 285 F.2d 800, 805-06 (Ct. Cl. 1961).
143 Randall Foundation v. Riddell, 244 F.2d 803, 808 (9th Cir. 1957). (Emphasis added.)
144 INT. REv. CODE oF 1954, § 511(a) (2) (A).
145 26 C.F.R. § 1.511-2(a)(3) (ii) (1961).
146 195 F.Supp. 891 (N.D. Cal. 1961).
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to the court because of its corporate purposes, i.e., education. The contention that
the Catholic Church was the true owner of both schools and winery, because of canon
law on the matter of real property, was dismissed as irrelevant in a secular court. The
three interrelated organizations, the Institute, the Order, and the Church, were
viewed as three independent entities at law because of the three distinct legal persons
existent. The schools, it was decided, could not rightly be considered churches, even
though chapels were found in conjunction with them. The court gave as its reason-
mng the old maxim: "The tail cannot be permitted to wag the dog."14?
The Institute based its argument that it was a church within the scope of the
exemption on the theory espoused in Swart v. South Burlington School District,'"
where the Vermont Supreme Court held that parochial schools were an integral part
of the Catholic Church. The court answered this in terms of the legislative history
of the exemption, which shows an intent to place a restrictive interpretation on the
word "church." However, the court also rejected the Vermont motion as a general
proposition by writing, "I am not persuaded by the logic of this [Swart] decision."'14 9
With regard to the taxpayer's contention that the first amendment forbade the
government from granting privileges solely to groups constituting churches in the
orthodox sense of the term, it was answered that if there were any constitutional
questions, they would only concern the question whether Congress could exempt any
religious organization from the business tax.150
The court said that even if the corporate veil of the Institute were pierced so as
to find that the real owners of the schools and winery were the Christian Brothers
themselves, the holdings would not fall within the exemption. To be classified as a
church within the meaning of the statute, an Order must be performing the functions
of the church with which it is connected. To be performing "functions," the order
must be a "sacerdotal" organization, according to the federal tax regulations.' 5' The
court found these conditions unfulfilled in the instant case: "The functions of the
Christian Brothers Order are educational and religious. These functions are not
'church' functions in the sense intended in the statutory language."'152
Apart from the generalized statement as to the interrelation of education and
religion (which would certainly be denied by the Catholic Church), the decision was
based on a complete, though perhaps erroneous, study of the legislative purpose in
enacting the exemption statutes. Following the liberal approach of the New York
Court of Appeals in Watchtower,"'3 it would appear that the true intent of the
statute might demand a reading of the pertinent section as more than a mere tech-
nical conception of an organization's power to conduct worship. It may be doubted
that the Order in question is not as much an integral part of the Catholic Church
as the Jesuit Fathers with whom the Order was contrasted in the opinion. In reject-
ing the argument of the taxpayer framed in the terms of canon law, the court is
147 Id. at 901.
148 Swart v. South Burlington School District, 122 Vt. 177, 167 A.2d 514 (1960).
149 De La Salle Institute v. United States, 195 F.Supp. 891, 903 (N.D. Cal. 1961).
150 The plaintiff apparently tried to bring itself within the principle of Murdock v. Penn-
sylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1942). Thus, it was argued that the tax was discriminatory against the
irregular types of religious activity which the Supreme Court had placed on an equal footing
with the more usual activities. The clear fallacy of the argument was pointed out by Justice
Douglas in Murdock,
We do not mean to say that religious groups and the press are free from
all burdens of government.... It is one thing to impose a tax on the income
or property of a preacher. It is quite another thing to exact a tax from him
for the privilege of delivering a sermon. Id. at 112.
151 26 C.F.R. § 1.511-2(a) (3) (ii):
A religious order or organization shall be considered to be engaged in
carrying out the functions of a church if its duties include the ministration
of sacerdotal functions and the conduct of religious worship.
152 195 F.Supp. 891, 905 (N.D. Cal. 1961).
153 People ex rel. Watchtower Bible & Tract Society v. Haring, 8 N.Y.2d 350, 170 N.E.2d
677, 207 N.Y.S.2d 673 (1960).
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compelled, in order to be consistent with the rest of its opinion, to dismiss as irrele-
vant the canon law interpretation of the activity. By American standards, based as
they are on the pluralism of religious belief, the Order may well be considered as an
element of leadership in the Catholic Church, and tiferefore "sacerdotal" in nature.
The court relied on a revenue regulation which declared that the question of
whether the activity is religious worship or the administration of "sacerdotal" func-
tions depends on the tenets and practices of the particular religion. 5 4 But, it is sub-
mitted, the conclusion, based on canon law, that the teaching brothers are considered
by the Catholic Church as a mere appendage to its religious purposes, is an entirely
new variety of statutory interpretation. It is precisely that conclusion that may spell
the mischief of De La Salle in the broader context of the relations between church
and state.
In the area of tax exemption, the state courts have followed the decisions of the
past. No great change can be expected in this judicial treatment; while at the same
time the legislatures continue reluctant to adopt changes in the current tax exemp-
tion statutes. The constitutional issue here seems dead at present. One writer has
reasoned that the Supreme Court of the United States will never take up the ques-
tion. The basis of this observation is the Court's ruling that a taxpayer has no stand-
ing to sue in federal courts. As of now a taxpayer's suit would seem the only way
that the question could be presented to the Court. 55
The federal income tax exemptions will, more than likely, be the subject of as
little litigation as they have in the past. Of all the fields of church-state relations,
taxation is the most static at present.
4. Tort Liability - A Trend under Criticism
As with tax exemption, the immunity granted to religious institutions for torts
committed by them or their servants is bound up with the privilege granted to all
charitable institutions. In point of fact, the tie-in is yet closer in this area than in
taxation for here the privilege is judge-made, thereby escaping the limiting influence
of a defining statute.'1 6 As the previous Survey on tort liability remarked: "mhe
majority of courts have made little, if any, distinction between a religious charitable
institution and other types of charitable institutions ... .,157 It appears that the fun-
damental reasons supporting the immunity are applicable equally to institutions of a
nonprofit character regardless of religious affiliation. In only one case' during the
last two years has specific mention been made of a church's status as the basis of a
decision. Even here it was not the status of church qua church, but the fact that
a small institution was completely dependent on the generosity of a small number of
people that determined the outcome of the controversy. Perhaps it is correct to con-
clude that religious institutions' immunity to tort liability, as an independent area of
law, is nonexistent.
Yet, the past two years have abounded with cases dealing with the value and
154 C.F.R. § 1.511-2(a) (3) (ii) (1961): 'VWhat constitutes the conduct of religious worship
or the ministration of sacerdotal functions depends on the tenets and practices of a particular
religious body constituting a church."
155 PFEFFER, CHURCH, STATE & FREEDOMs 190 (1953) : "More likely it [the Supreme Court]
would, on the basis of the Doremus decision refuse to accept an appeal from a state court, and
would, on the ground that the taxpayer has no standing to sue, dismiss a suit in federal court."
See also Lawrence, Chicago Daily News, Feb. 10, 1962, p. 8, col. 4.
156 See Shulte v. Missionaries of La Sallette, 352 S.W.2d 636 (Mo. 1961); President and
Directors of Georgetown College v. Hughes, 130 F.2d 810 (D.C. Cir. 1942); PROSSER, LAw
OF TORTS 784 (2d ed. 1955).
157 1958-59 Church-State Survey, supra note 2, at 422-27. Neither Prosser nor Harper &
James in their treatments of the subject note any distinction. See 2 HARPER & JAMES, The Law
OF TORTS § 29.16 (1956); PROSSER, LAw OF TORTS 784 (2d ed. 1955).
158 Rosen v. Concordia Evangelical Lutheran Church, 111 Ohio App. 54, 167 N.E.2d 671
(1960).
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limitations of charitable immunity in regard to torts committed by a religious organ-
ization. While cases upholding or abrogating the doctrine in regard to other types of
charities are controlling also in respect to religious institutions, we shall limit our con-
sideration to decisions involving'a religious organization as a party to the suit.
Immunity from tort liability is not a tradition of the common law. Rather it
seems to have had its foundations, almost by accident, in Victorian England.15 9 Eng-
lish courts soon thereafter overruled both the doctrine and the case from which the
doctrine received its life.160 American courts, however, refused to follow the English
retraction. 6' Up until the last few years, the majority of states recognized the exemp-
tion, although none did so because of a statutory mandate. 6 2 About twenty years
ago, a frontal attack on the privilege commenced with its abolition in the District of
Columbia in President & Directors of Georgetown College v. Hughes.6 3 When the
courts were called upon to abolish the doctrine, they found themselves constrained
only by their early reasoning. Accordingly, in an age of "growing social responsibil-
ity,"' 64 the courts did examine the matter anew and many rejected their past deci-
sions. Two more states, where heretofore immunity had been the rule, have by
judicial decision, imposed liability on charitable institutions.0 5 The trend toward
realism, as the previous Survey discerned, seems to be continuing apace.
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One of these decisions involved a hospital conducted by the Sisters of Charity.
The plaintiff, who suffered injury due to the negligence of a hospital employee, was
confronted with the defense of immunity upon bringing suit. This case, Howard v.
Sisters of Charity,67 was the first on the subject in the state of Montana. A federal
district court, hearing the case on diversity grounds, decided the case squarely on the
question of immunity. The court cited modern treatises 6 s and recent decisions in
other jurisdictions' 169 and concluded that immunity could not be established in light
of the attitudes expressed therein. The decision specifically imposed liability upon
charitable institutions on the grounds of respondeat superior.
Two eastern states, with long-established views on the question, have seemingly
reaffirmed their views. The Rhode Island Supreme Court, holding a church. liable
for the claimant's fall on ice covering the church property, merely reiterated its posi-
159 The doctrine appears to have arisen from dictum in Feofees of Heriot's Hospital v. Ross,
12 Clark & Fin. 507, 8 Eng. Rep. 1508 (1846). The court wrote: "To give damages out of a
trust fund would not be to apply it to those objects whom the author of the fund had in view,
but would be to divert it to a completely different purpose." Id. at 1510. This was then applied
to charitable corporations for the first and only time in English jurisprudence. Holliday v. St.
Leonard's Shoreditch, 11 C.B., N.S. 192, 142 Eng. Rep. 769 (1861).
160 Mersey Docks Trustees v. Gibbs, L.R. 11 H.L. 686 (1866); Foreman v. Mayor of Can-
terbury, L.R. 6 Q.B. 214 (1871).
161 McDonald v. Massachusetts General Hospital, 120 Mass. 432 (1876) was the first
American case holding charities immune.
162 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 16:1-48 (Supp. 1958), restored immunity in that state after a
judicial overruling of the doctrine a year before. The statute expired by its own terms on June
30, 1959 and has not been replaced.
163 130 F.2d 810 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
164 FRIEDMAN, Charitable Institutions-A Reexamination of the Doctrine of Immunity from
Tort Liability, 24 GA. B.J. 201, 218 (1961).
165 Howard v. Sisters of Charity, 193 F.Supp. 191 (D.Mont. 1961); Parker v. Port Huron
Hospital, 361 Mich. 1, 105 N.W.2d 1 (1960).
166 1958-59 Church-State Survey, supra note 2 at *
167 Howard v. Sisters of Charity, 193 F.Supp. 191 (D.Mont. 1961).
168 RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TRUSTS § 402(2) (1957): "A person against whom a tort
is committed in the course of the administration of a charitable trust can reach the trust proper-
ty and apply it to the satisfaction of his claim." IV SCOTT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS p. 2895 (2d
ed. 1956): "Such a sweeping exemption from liability of charitable institutions seems to be
clearly against public policy. The institutions should be just before they are generous."
169 Avellone v. St. John's Hospital, 165 Ohio St. 467, 135 N.E.2d 410 (1956); Pierce v.
Yakima Valley Memorial Hospital, 43 Wash. 2d 162, 260 P.2d 765 (1953); President and
Directors of Georgetown College v. Hughes, 130 F.2d 810 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
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tion on the subject.1 7 0 This view is that charitable institutions are, with no ex-
ceptions, liable for their torts. Massachusetts, on the contrary, dismissing a tort claim
against a church for negligence in lighting its property, avoided an opportunity to
review immunity, holding: "A verdict for the defendant [church] was properly
directed on this evidence, even were the doctrine of charitable immunity inapplicable,
which we do not intimate, not having reached that point."'1' Both states seem quite
satisfied with the reasoning of their respective predecessors on the bench.
Although two more states have overruled their past immunity decisions, perhaps
the most significant happening during the course of this year's Survey has been the
refusal of a number of courts to do so, and the limitation by others of decisions abro-
gating immunity. In Schulte v. Missionaries of La Sallette,'72 the Missouri Supreme
Court dealt with a tort claim against a seminary for negligence in the upkeep of its
swimming pool. The court, carefully noting the arguments for and against immunity
advanced in recent decisions, upheld the defense for a variety of reasons. It stressed
the fact that the state legislature had twice refused to pass an act creating liability
for charitable institutions. 73 The immunity rule was adjudged consistent with the
Missouri constitutional provision for tax exemption of charitable and religious insti-
tutions. The court denied the major premise used by those courts which have abro-
gated the rule. It stated:
Certainly not all of our charities are big businesses, generously endowed
(as some of the opinions indicate), and thus able to absorb substantial losses.
Throughout Missouri we have many small charities which certainly have not,
and never will, reach the suggested status of affluence, - religious, cultural,
educational, medical, and those strictly benevolent in the sense of aiding the
poor and needy.., nor do we agree with the apparent theory of some that
private charity is a thing of the past and that all burdens of suffering human-
ity should be placed in the lap of government, state and federal. 7 4
One of the cases cited in the opinion supporting the vitality of the immunity
policy was Helton v. Sisters of Mercy 7 5 an Arkansas decision. There, a careless
mistake in the operating room left the plaintiff seriously maimed for life. The court
refused to abandon the doctrine basing its decision on stare decisis. It inclined to
view a privilege granted in many past decisions as having become a matter of right
with the passage of time. The court stated: "Decisions which become rules of prop-
erty should never be overruled, whether they are right or wrong."'17 The case is
also interesting in that the plaintiff sought recovery on the alternate theory of breach
of contract. It was alleged that the proper performance of the operation was con-
sideration for the fees paid by the patient. The court dismissed this cause on curious
grounds. Because of the immunity rule, said the court, the institution was not held
to due care in its treatment of the patient and the parties could not contract for some-
thing which law had ruled they had no right to expect.
The current status of the immunity doctrine in Ohio is illustrative of the caution
now employed in abrogating the defense. The Avellone decision of 1956 held that
charitable institutions engaged in hospital work were no longer immune. 77 The court
in a well-reasoned opinion (cited by almost all the courts dealing with the problem
recently) was persuaded that the public policy underlying the immunity doctrine has
disappeared due to modem conditions. The ease of procuring liability insurance was
170 De Mello v. St. Thomas the Apostle Church, 165 A.2d 500, 504 (R.I. 1960): "As to
this state's position on the question of immunity of charitable corporations, see Glavin v. Rhode
Island Hospital, 12 R.I. 411...." This was the first American case rejecting the doctrine.
171 Holiday v. First Parish Church of Groton, 339 Mass. 692, 162 N.E.2d 48, 49 (1959).
172 352 S.W.2d 636 (Mo. 1961).
173 Mo. CONST. art. 10, § 6: "All property, real and personal, not held for private or cor-
porate profit, and used exclusively for religious worship, for schools and colleges, for purposes
purely charitable... may be exempted from taxation by general law."
174 Schulte v. Missionaries of LaSallette, 352 S.W.2d 636, 643 (Mo. 1961).
175 351 S.W.2d 129 (Ark. 1961).
176 Id. at 131, quoting from Pitcock v. State, 91 Ark. 527, 121 S.W. 742, 747 (1909).
177 Avellone v. St. John's Hospital, 165 Ohio St. 467, 135 N.E.2d 410 (1956).
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one of the salient changes the court mentioned. When two lower court opinions later
allowed the defense in situations where no insurance was carried by the defendant
institutions, it appeared that the presence or absence of insurance was the controlling
factor in the immunity decisions in Ohio.7'
Consequently, when a case arose in 1960 concerning the drowning of a boy in a
religious corporation's swimming pool and the court of appeals overruled a demurrer
on the basis of the Avellone decision without regard to insurance, 179 the Supreme
Court of Ohio granted certiorari to resolve the question. In Gibbon v. Young
Women's Christian Association, °80 the court, weighing all the reasons for and against
the doctrine, this time agreed with the conclusion of the dissenters in Avellone. 'It
stated:
In the Avellone case, the court felt that changed modern conditions of
nonprofit hospitals required it to reject and abandon the previously declared
public policy. Similarly compelling reasons are not established to the satis-
faction of the majority in this case, particularly in light of recent legislative
developments... , showing the conflict of views in the area of charitable
immunity or liability. Therefore, we decline to again declare an extension
or modification of public policy. We feel that under these circumstances the
doctrine of stare decisis should be applied and followed in order if for no
other reason, to avoid retroactive imposition of liability on a charitable insti-
tution which would result from the declaration of a different public policy -
and we hold accordingly.'18
The legislative development mentioned was the introduction of a bill in the state
legislature which would have had the effect of reversing the Avellone decision and
safeguarding immunity for other charitable institutions. The bill was overwhelmingly
passed in 1958 and again in 1961 (a year after the instant case); it was, however,
vetoed by the governor on both occasions.
An appellate court in Ohio explained the retreat from total liability more clearly
in the case of Rosen v. Concordia Evangelical Lutheran Church.'5 ' There, the suit
arose from injuries sustained from the falling of a shutter from a picnic ground
pavilion owned by the church. The court, in allowing the applicability of the defense
of immunity, distinguished churches from hospitals as follows:
While it might be that the charitable character of hospital service has, in
part, changed, the relationship of the church to the community remains as it
always has been, supported entirely by gifts of its members and benefiting
many who seek its help but do not give to its support.' 83
The court also made what seems to be the correct analysis of the judicial defer-
ence to the legislative will in this matter. It concluded that the issue of immunity or
liability was sociological, and therefore better left to the legislature which has the
facilities for a more detailed study of the effects of abrogating the doctrine.
Yet in still a later decision, the Ohio Supreme Court narrowed even this reason-
ing somewhat by holding that charitable institutions were immune from tort liability
only in respect to torts committed while acting in pursuit of the purpose for which
the institution was organized. 8 4 Here, the injury occurred during a bingo game, a
benefit function of the church conducted on church property. Bingo was thought to
have removed the church from the sphere protected by the Gibbon decision. Adop-
tion of this theory would, it seems, have called for a different result in the Rosen case,
178 Hunsche v. Alter, 145 N.E.2d 368 (C.P. Ohio 1957); Tomasello v. Hoban, 155 N.E.2d
82 (C.P. Ohio 1958). See comment on these cases in 1958-58 Church-State Survey, supra
note 2, at 424.
179 Gibbon v. Young Women's Christian Association, 159 N.E.2d 911 (Ohio Ct. App. 1959).
180 170 Ohio St. 280, 164 N.E.2d 563 (1960).
181 Id. at 572.
182 111 Ohio App. 54, 167 N.E.2d 671 (1960).
183 Id. at 673.
184 Blankenship v. Alter, 171 Ohio St. 65, 167 N.E.2d 922 (1960). Another exception
in Ohio Law of charitable immunity is illustrated in Bell v. Salvation Army, 172 Ohio St. 326,
175 N.E.2d 738 (1961). Liability was imposed on the charity for a paying customer who
was injured in a hotel owned by the charity.
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since running a picnic ground is certainly no more incidental to purposes of worship.
Ohio's position on immunity was unstable at the beginning of this Survey. These
cases, while providing some answers for future controversies, have contributed little
to the settlement of the law in Ohio..
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Even where the immunity has not been overruled formally, the introduction of
exceptions to the doctrine may have the same practical effect as an outright repudia-
tion. One of the favorite devices for reaching this result has been the allowance of a
recovery for lack of care shown to a plaintiff on the invitee theory of tort liability. 8s
On these grounds, the Washington Supreme Court granted recovery to a laborer who
was working without pay for his church when a scaffold collapsed under him. 1 7
Other cases have granted invitee status to one woman coming to a church sodality
meeting ss and another attending a church luncheon.8 9 The New York courts, on
the contrary, although they removed charitable immunity five years ago,8 0 have
been quite reluctant to grant recovery on the invitee rationale.' 9'
The trend toward greater liability on the part of religious associations for their
torts has itself been subjected to examination in the past two years. It is submitted
that in this re-examination, stare decisis alone should not be enough to render im-
munity sacrosanct, as the Helton case-decided, 1. 2 but neither should a vague sense of
social responsibility on the part of charitable institutions be enough to overrule the
established doctrine. Nor should a legislature's inaction compel hesitancy on the
part of the courts where the reasons given for the immunity are no longer sound.
Dean Prosser's prediction that "the end of another decade will find a majority
of American jurisdictions holding that it [immunity] does not exist,' 9 3 has already
been fulfilled. Yet, unanimity seems an impossibility at the present time. A distinc-
tion between charities, insofar as a particular type of charity may be able to afford
individual claims, may be as "fair" an answer as possible. A small church or syna-
gogue differs substantially from a medical research center in financial stability.
However, it is submitted that it is confusion and not unfairness that is the most
pressing concern. Consequently, the overriding consideration the courts should bear
in mind in formulating a solution is certainty of application, that is, either complete
immunity or, perhaps more justly, complete liability.
B. EDUCATION - The Interregnum
With the inauguration of America's first Catholic President, the relatively quiet
controversy that has existed for almost one hundred years over the problem of reli-
gion in education has broken into a raging public debate. The court decisions of the
past two years would give little indication of the change in the American political
climate, but the public dialogue may well set the stage for judicial creation of more
definitive statements in the near future. It is for this reason that the period covered
in this Survey analysis may be termed an interregnum. It is the lull between the
imposition of constitutional controls over state action in regard to religion and edu-
185 For an extensive analysis of Ohio's recent changes, see Morris Recent Developments in
Ohio's Charitable Immunity, 10 CLEv.-MAR. L. Rxv. 402 (1961). For a report on how each
jurisdiction stood in regard to immunity as of three years ago, see Simeone, The Doctrine of
Charitable Immunity, 5 ST. Louis U.L.J. 357 (1959).
186 E.g., in Hintz v. Zion Evangelical United Brethren Church, 13 Wis. 2d 439, 109 N.W.2d
61 (1961), the defendant church was held liable for violation of Wisconsin's "safe place" statute
in failing to keep a stairway to the church in proper repair.
187 Haugen v. Central Lutheran Church, 361 P.2d 637 (Wash. 1961).
188 De Mello v. St. Thomas the Apostle Church, 165 A.2d 500 (R.I. 1960).
189 Price v. Central Assembly of God, 356 P.2d 240 (Colo. 1960). See also Bader v. United
Orthodox Synagogue, 148 Conn. 449, 172 A.2d 192 (1961).
190 Bingv. Thunig, 2 N.Y.2d 656, 143 N.E.2d 3, 163 N.Y.S.2d 3 (1957).
191 Kiernan v. Roman Catholic Church of St. John the Evangelist, 205 N.Y.S.2d 706 (App.
Div. 1960); Krieger v. Holy Name Church, 199 N.Y.S.2d 696 (App. Div. 1960).
192 Helton v. Sisters of Mercy, 351 S.W.2d 129 (Ark. 1961).
193 PRossaa, LAw oF TORTS 788 (2d ed. 1955).
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cation and the new era, seemingly about to dawn, concerning itself with a re-examina-
tion of the place of these constitutional safeguards in the present American society.
The debate revolves primarily around a philosophical quarrel over the ideal rela-
tionship of church and state. It focuses on one concrete question, the rights of both
in education. Is the state to concern itself with the religious education of its citizens,
and thus to cooperate with the religious communities grouped within it,"" or is the
government to eschew any and all cooperation no matter how indirect, for fear of
hastening an establishment of religion?195 The two extreme positions may well serve
as the guideposts for the decisions considered here. It seems that the Supreme Court,
in the "education" cases of Everson, 96 McColIum, 97 and Zorach9 s first took a view
requiring rigorous separation of church and state wherever possible, and then allowed
some accommodation in recognition of the historic interplay between the two. The
pendulum now seems to have shifted back to a strict separationist theory such as that
expressed in the test oath case.' 99 The Constitution has been called upon sparingly
in the past two years to determine questions of relationship in education. Yet, all
the cases mirror in some way the current interpretation of the first amendment. The
cases considered have arisen in relation to the two agencies now primarily entrusted
with education, the public schools and the church-controlled schools.
1. Religion in the Public Schools
One view of the place of religion in the public schools is that of Professor Rosen-
field: "The Constitution requires the public school to be more than nonsectarian
and impartial or neutral among the various churches. The Constitution directs the
public school to be a completely secular agency. ' 20 0 The last Church-State Survey
recognized this as the current status of the law and liable to be extended in the deci-
sions of the future.201 The prediction was generally correct. The extension of the
"secularism" concept is most evident in the history of Schempp v. Abington Town-
ship School District.20 2 In 1959 a three-judge federal district court struck down a
Pennsylvania statute requiring bible-reading in the public schools. 202 The pzevious
Survey attributed much weight to the fact that the statute then under attack made
no provision for excusing those children unwilling to take part in the reading. While
the case was in transit to the Supreme Court, the state legislature sought to cure this
supposedly fatal defect by amending the statute to allow unwilling children to be
excused.204 The Supreme Court vacated the judgment and remanded the case to
the district court in light of the statutory change.20 5 Again, the practice was adjudged
unconstitutional, not as a violation of the free exercise clause, but as an establishment
of religion. The bible-reading was ruled to be a sectarian religious program, even
though no comment was made by the reader.
194 PARSONS, THE FRST FREEDOM 80-93 (1948).
195 For an example of the latter view, see BUTTS, THE AMERICAN TRADITION INt RELIGION
AND EDUCATION 150 (1950).
196 Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
197 McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
198 Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952); the education cases are examined in 1958-59
Church-State Survey, supra note Re-cite at 412-19.
199 "We renew our conviction that we have staked the very existence of our country on the
faith that complete separation between the state and religion is best for the state and best for
religion." Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 494 (1961).
200 Rosenfield, Separation of Church and State in the Public Schools, 22 U. PITT. L. REv.
561, 570 (1961).
201 1958-59 Church-State Survey, supra note Re-cite, at 418.
202 30 U.S.L. WEEK 1125 (1962).
203 Schempp v. School District, 177 F.Supp. 398 (E.D. Pa. 1959).
204 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 15-1516 (Supp. 1960), which reads as follows: "At least ten
verses from the Holy Bible shall be read, without comment, at the opening of each public school
on each school day. Any child shall be excused from such Bible reading, or attending such Bible
reading, upon the written request of his parent or guardian."
205 School District v. Schempp, 364 U.S. 298 (1960).
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In Brown v. Orange County Board of Public Instruction,' the courts of Florida
were faced with the identical problem and reached the same conclusion. The bible
introduced into the Florida public schools was the King James version distributed by
the Gideons. The court saw the distribution and use as a clear violation of the
Florida Declaration of Rights, which prohibits the preference of one religion by the
state.2 07 The argument accepted by some courts in the past - that the book was
nonsectarian but of universal truth - was not accepted by the present court. It
considered the bible as the Christian equivalent of the Koran or Buddhist Scriptures,
which, it said, all would agree have no place in the public schools. It is interesting
to note that this court did not object to the bible-reading on the separationist theory
the Schempp court implicitly accepted, but solely on the grounds that the practice
was a preference shown to one religious group over all others. The decision leaves
open the question of what the Florida court would do with regard to a practice
acceptable to all religions.
That question was raised in the courts of New York in Engel v. Vitale. 20 The
New York public schools begin the class day with the so-called "Regents Prayer.'s
The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division's decision that the practice did
not contravene either the first amendment to the Constitution or the equivalent
section of the New York constitution. 20 9 While the prayer may correctly be said to
be acceptable to anyone believing in a higher being, its use does not differ substan-
tially from the bible-reading struck down in Schempp. The New York practice
favors theistic religions; the Schempp practice favors some theistic sects. The number
of people objecting to this prayer will be smaller, but their reasons will be the same
as the sects that objected in Schempp. The opinion of Chief Judge Desmond makes
no attempt to distinguish the practices.
The court based its decision on the assertion that complete exclusion of religion
from public affairs was not the objective of the federal and New York constitutions.
To support its thesis, the court referred to the many government documents at the
beginnings of American history that made express reference to God, the early crea-
tion of a day of Thanksgiving, the establishment of military chaplaincies, the invo-
cation of God in our national anthem, and similar indicia of our religious tradition.
Following the spirit of Justice Douglas' statement in Zorach, that "We are a religious
people .... ",210 Desmond wrote:
The "universally accepted tradition" [that ours is a nation founded and
nurtured by belief in God] has been maintained without break from the days
of the Founding Fathers.... It is an indisputable and historically provable
fact that belief and trust in a Creator has always been regarded as an inte-
gral and inseparable part of the fabric of our fundamental institutions. It is
not a matter of majority power or minority protection. Belief in a Supreme
Being is as essential and permanent a feature of the American governmental
system as is freedom of worship, equality under the law and due process of
law. Like them it is an American absolute .... 211
A dissenting opinion called the use of the prayer in the public schools a state
endorsement of religion (the majority would certainly agree), and said that the con-
stitutional demands were that the state be absolutely neutral to the entire question of
religion. Neutrality was thus interpreted to mean not a lack of preference between
various religions, but an inability on the part of the state to promote religion or to
associate with it in any form.
206 128 So. 2d 181 (Fla. Ct. App. 1960); cert. denied, 129 So. 2d 141 (Fla. 1961).
207 FLA. CONST., § 6 provides: "No preference shall be given by law to any church, sect or
mode of worship and no money shall ever be taken from the public treasury directly or indirectly
in aid of any church, sect, or religious denomination or in aid of any sectarian institution."
208 10 N.Y.2d 174, 176 N.E.2d 579, 218 N.Y.S.2d 659 (1961).
209 N.Y. CONST. art I, § 3: "The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and
worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed in this state to all man-
kind ......
210 Zorach v.. Clausen, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952).
211 Engel v. Vitale. 10 N.Y.2d 174, 176 N.E.2d 579, 582, 218 N.Y.S.2d 659, 662 (1961).
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It is submitted that Engel and Schempp are fundamentally contradictory appli-
cations of the first amendment. The recitation of prayer, regardless of a universal
acceptance, is clearly as devotional an act as the reading of the inspired word. The
Supreme Court would seem to have taken cognizance of the different underlying
theories. Certiorari has been granted in Enge1212 and the School Board has the right
of appeal to the Court by statute.2 13 On the basis of past decisions, most notably
the dicta on church-state relations expressed in Torcaso v. Watkins,21 4 decided last
term, it may be predicted that the Court will reject the cooperation theory expressed
in Engel. Justice Douglas, upon whom the New York court relied, has in the mean-
time explained his Zorach approval of interplay to mean something much less than
a requirement that our government support religion.2 15 The present attitude of the
Court seems highly receptive to the strict separationist theory of Schempp, and the
result of this term will likely be a more secularized public school system.
A trial court in New York was the scene of a rather bizarre suit brought by one
Joseph Lewis, a frequent litigant on church-state matters in that state.10 The case
concerned the use of the amended pledge of allegiance containing the words "one
nation under God." The plaintiff contended that the public schools, in using this
form of pledge, were disseminating religion under the cloak of patriotism and were
compelling the children to recite words against their religious beliefs. The trial court
rejected both grounds without difficulty. The children were not required to join in
the saying of the pledge and were even permitted to leave the room during its recita-
tion. The dissemination of religion argument was met with the Zorach dictum that
religion and government were not to be separated in every and all respects.
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The courts of New York have adopted in these cases an interpretation of the
first amendment that allows for greater cooperation between church and state than
the Supreme Court decisions of the past would seem to tolerate. The Lewis case
cannot be distinguished in essence from Schempp except by a use of the "de minimis"
doctrine. The application of that doctrine would seem to solve the conflict between
Lewis and Engel, if as is foreseen the Engel decision is overturned by the Supreme
Court. The one vestige of religion in the classroom seen in Lewis seems fairly certain
of protection in any court.
The use of released or dismissed time in public schools has once again come up
for scrutiny by a state court. The rule as derived from the McCollum 21 8 and Zorach 21 9
cases appears to be that dismissed time programs for religious instruction are licit,
if no use of the public school facilities is made. But a state constitution could require
212 368 U.S. 924 (1961). See Butler, Wall of Separation - Judicial Gloss on the First
Amendment, 37 NOTRE DAME LAWYFR 288 (1962).
213 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (1958).: "Except as otherwise provided by law, any party may appeal
to the Supreme Court from an order granting or denying, after notice and hearing, an inter-
locutory or permanent injunction in any civil action, suit or proceeding required by any Act of
Congress to be heard and determined by a district court of three judges."
214 "Neither state nor Federal governments can constitutionally pass laws nor impose re-
quirements which aid all religions against nonbelievers, and neither can aid those religions
based on a belief in the existence of God as against those religions founded on different beliefs."
367 U.S. 488, 495 (1961).
215 "The Puritan influence helped shape our constitutional law and our common law ... (It]
put individual conscience and individual judgment in the first place." McGowan v. Maryland,
366 U.S. 420, 563 (1961) (separate opinion).
216 Application of Lewis, 207 N.Y.S.2d 862 (App. Div. 1960).
217 "There cannot be the slightest doubt that the First Amendment reflects the philosophy
that Church and State should be separated .... The First Amendment, however, does not say
that in every and all respects there shall be a separation of Church and State." Zorach v.
Clausen, 343 U.S. 306, 312 (1952).
218 McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
219 "In the McCollum case the classrooms were used for religious instruction and the force
of the public school was used to promote that instruction. Here, as we have said, the public
schools do no more than accommodate their schedule to a program of outside religious instruc-
tion." Zorach v. Clausen, 343 U.S. 306, 315 (1952).
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a contrary decision. The Supreme Court of Oregon in Dilger v. School District220 ex-
amined that state's dismissed time statute last year. The case arose out of a refusal by
a defendant board to arrange the school schedule to conform with the use of dismissed
time programs. The plaintiff sought an injunction ordering the board to do so in
order that his daughter might receive the religious education offered by a nearby
church. The school board defended on the grounds that the statute was silent as to
who was responsible for carrying out the arrangements, and that the statute was so
worded as to give the local board discretion in determining whether the program
should be used in the district. In a split decision, the court decided that the proper
interpretation of the statute was that on application by the child, the granting of dis-
missal time for the purpose of religious education was mandatory. The board had
discretion to determine only the proper time and place for the dismissal.
The dissenters saw the statute as too vague to be enforced by the court. They
contended that the interpretation given by the majority was unconstitutional in that
it compelled the state to furnish religious education and that it discriminated against
those children whose church had no dismissed time program and those who pro-
fessed no religion. It is but a short step from this position to the reasons ascribed to
the program by Leo Pfeffer:
The refusal of the promoters of the program to accept a dismissed time
system under which all children are released indicates quite clearly that they
depend on the non-release of the other children as the factor inducing enroll-
ment for released-time religious instruction.21
While the controversy over the released time program is by no means extinct,
the use of the system within the bounds set by Zorach appears beyond serious doubt.
Yet, even this area may be affected by the expected interpretation of the establish-
ment clause in the bible-reading and prayer cases.
22 2
2. Aid to Parochial Schools
While federal aid to education bills have been introduced into Congress regu-
larly for the last forty years,2a the present administration seems to be the first to
stake a large part of its entire domestic program on such a measure. The President
told Congress at the beginning of its 1962 session: "It is imperative that such a
proposal carrying out these objectives [eliminating classrobm shortages and raising
the quality of instruction] be enacted at this session." 22 4 The same bill was proposed
during the last session with the near-unanimous approval of educational and reli-
gious groups, except the Roman Catholic Bishops. At the beginning of debates on
the administration bill, the Bishops issued a statement opposing federal aid unless
religious schools were also made recipients of at least, low-interest loans.22 5 The
President refused to include such a provision because, he said, there were constitu-
tional issues involved.226 To support his position, the Department of Health, Edu-
cation, and Welfare published a memorandum on the subject concluding that
across-the-board grants to religious schools, across-the-board loans, and tuition pay-
220 352 P.2d 564 (Ore. 1960).
221 PFEFFER, CHURCH, STATE & FREEDoM 373 (1953).
222 Rosenfield, Separation of Church and State in the Public Schools, 22 U. PITT. L. REv.
561, 574 (1961), sees the coercive effects of released time programs of any description as being
the basis for a reversal of Zorach by the Court within the coming ten years.
223 See PFEFFER, CHURCH, STATE & FREEDOM 483 (1953); II STOKES, CHURCH AND STATE
IN THE UNITED STATES 744 (1950); Manning, Aid to Education - Federal Fashion, 29 Fore-
HAM L. REv. 495 (1961); Mitchell, Religion and Federal Aid to Education, 14 LAw &
CONTEMP. PROB. 113 (1949).
224 Chicago Sun-Times, Feb. 7, 1962, p. 4, col. 1.
225 N.Y. Times, Mar. 3, 1961, p. 1. "The bishops of the Catholic Church in the United
States ... have made it unequivocally clear that they will oppose any proposed legislation for
federal aid to education which does not include provision for parochial schools." Pfeffer, Fed-
eral Aid to Parochial Schools? No, 37 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 309 (1962).
226 N.Y. Times, April 22, 1960, p. 16, col. 2.
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ments for church school pupils were all unconstitutional. 227 The National Catholic
Welfare Conference (NCWC) issued an answer setting forth the Bishops' reasons
for believing that a bill providing aid for parochial schools would be constitu-
tional. 225 The appearance of serious constitutional research into the problem high-
lights the developments of the past two years and gives the surveyor a beginning
point in evaluating the trends in this area.
Until the announcement of the Bishops, it seemed that many leaders of the
Catholic Church favored merely the inclusion of Catholic school children in the
indirect aids of which the public schools are now the sole recipients, e.g., health
care, transportation, free textbooks, etc.2 29 There is some reason to believe that the
position of many Catholics has changed to that of favoring direct aid. The ques-
tion of direct aid may soon become highly significant in the litigation of edu-
cational problems.
Swart v. South Burlington Town School District 230 is the first case dealing with
the question. There, the school district was using public school funds to pay the
tuition of town children in a nearby parochial school. Under the Vermont statute,
a town without a high school of its own was obligated to furnish education for the
town children by arrangements with neighboring schools. 231 The school district in
a predominantly Catholic area of the state was fulfilling this obligation by paying
the tuition to a Catholic high school. The arrangement was in force for three years
when a local taxpayer brought suit to enjoin the practice. The Vermont Supreme
Court affirmed the trial court's holding that these expenditures were contrary to
the first amendment and to the separation clause of the Vermont constitution; the
two were read to have identical meaning. The purpose of the separation doctrine
was seen as a safeguard for the state against schisms and a safeguard against estab-
lishment for the churches. The court based its entire conclusion on the Supreme
Court's holdings in the education cases. It reasoned: "The Church is the source of
their [the schools'] control and the principal source of their support. This combina-
tion of factors renders the service of the Church and its ministry inseparate from
the educational function. ' 232 Because of the constraint which the education cases
have placed on the states, no other decision on the state level seems possible unless
there is a reinterpretation of the first amendment more in line with cooperation
between church and state. Perhaps the real purpose of this suit was to bring the
question of direct or quasi-direct aid to the attention of the Supreme Court, but in
this it also failed because of the denial of certiorari.2 3 3 The NCWC brief viewed this
failure of the Court to pass on the matter as leaving the question open,s=4 but the
227 DEPT. OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, MEMORANDUM ON THE IMPACT OF THE
FIRST AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION UPON FEDERAL AID TO EDUCATION (1961), as re-
printed in 50 GEO. L.J. 349 (1961).
228 NATIONAL CATHOLIC WELFARE CONFERENCE, THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE IN-
CLUSION OF CHURCH-RELATED SCHOOLS IN FEDERAL AID TO EDUCATION (1961), as reprinted
in 50 GEO. L.J. 399 (1961).
229 BUTTS, THE AMERICAN TRADITION IN RELIGION AND EDUCATION 147 (1950). The
author points out that the Catholic Church was then committed to receiving the welfare meas-
ures meted out solely to public school children. Cardinal Spellman said recently that: "Passage
of the administration's bill to aid public schools alone means the end of our parochial schools."
Denver Register, Feb. 18, 1962, p. 1, col. 6.
230 122 Vt. 177, 167 A.2d 514 (1961).
231 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 793(a) (1958): "Each town district shall maintain a high
school or furnish secondary instruction, as hereinafter provided, for its advanced pupils at a high
school or academy, to be selected by the parents or guardian of the pupil, within or without the
state."
232 Swart v. South Burlington, 122 Vt. 177, 167 A.2d 514, 520 (1961).
233 Anderson v. Swart, 366 U.S. 925 (1961).
234 "Undoubtedly the real reason for the decision in Swart lay in the fact that the tuition
payments, which were made directly to the schools, were not in some manner apportioned to
support of the nonreligious instruction given." NATIONAL CATHOLIC WELFARE CONFERENCE,
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE INCLUSION OF CHURCII-RELATED SCHOOLS IN FEDERALAID
TO EDUCATION (1961), as reprinted in 50 GEO. L.J. 399, 420 N. 54 (1961). One of the con-
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more realistic impression would appear to be that the court is well satisfied with the
education decisions and the Vermont court's interpretation of them in regard to
tuition grants.
235
As to the question of the usual forms of indirect aid to religious schools, the
Supreme Court cases would seem to allow them where no appreciable aid is given
to the religious institution itself. State courts, however, continue to judge the valid-
ity of the program in terms of their own state constitutions, which, while usually
patterned on the first amendment, are often interpreted to mean something quite
different.
The Oregon Supreme Court in the case of Dickman v. School District"36 was
called upon to balance its separation clause237 with a statute granting free textbooks
to children attending parochial schools.23 8 The books were merely loaned to the
religious schools with the ownership remaining in the local school board by terms
of the statute. While this case concerned what was formerly classified as indirect
aid to religious schools, the defenders of the statute mustered all the constitutional
arguments NCWC had made in supporting federal aid 'to religious schools. Aside
from the actual decision invalidating the statute, the court's answers to these argu-
ments are of great importance to any prediction on the future of direct, as well as
indirect, aid to religious schools.
The child benefit theory, which in the past has been used to sustain the con-
stitutionality of measures similar to the textbook service, was dismissed by the court
as follows:
The so-called "child benefit theory" has been applied in other cases in
which the expenditure of public funds is made for the purpose of meeting
the educational needs of pupils,. including those attending parochial schools.
The difficulty with this theory is, however, that unless it is qualified in some
way it can be used to justify the expenditure of public funds for every educa-
tional purpose, because all educational aids are of benefit to the pupil.239
The decisions accepting this rationale were characterized as either sacrificing
"constitutional principles . . . to serve urgent needs of the community"240 or based
on a questionable analysis of the problem.
The contention had been made that the religious schools are merely a means of
fulfilling the law that requires the children to attend school; therefore, it was argued,
the schools have a right to the expenditures necessary to aid in their compliance.
But the entire argument was termed specious by the court: "[I]ts application could
be urged in the justification of the expenditure of public moneys for all educational
clusions drawn from the memorandum is that: "There exists no constitutional bar to aid to
education in church-related schools in a degree proportionate to the value of the public -function
it performs [that is] ... the secular function." Id. at 437.
235 The Kentucky Court of Appeals sees as well settled the questions of state aid directly to
sectarian schools. "However we may properly indulge the presumption that the legislature did
not intend to include schools to which the payments could not legally be made.... [I]t is equal-
ly reasonable to infer that it does not include schools that give sectarian instruction or have any
denominational requirements with respect to their teachers or pupils." Butler v. United Cerebral
Palsy, 352 S.W.2d 203, 209 (Ky. 1961).
At least one constitutional scholar does not agree, however. Professor Kurland writes,
"MIThe continuing question [is] whether the national government can contribute financially to
parochial education, directly or indirectly. (Anyone suggesting that the answer as a matter of
constitutional law, is clear one way or the other is either deluding or deluded.)" Kurland, Of
Church and State and the Supreme Court, 29 U. Cni. L. REv. 1, 96 (1961).
236 366 P.2d 533 (Ore. 1961).
237 ORE. CONST. art. I, § 5 provides: "No money shall be drawn from the Treasury for the
benefit of any religious or theological institution, nor shall any money be appropriated for the
payment of any religious services in either house of the Legislative Assembly."
238 ORE. REv. STAT. § 337.150 (1961) provides: (1) each district school board shall .
provide textbooks, prescribed or authorized by law, for the free and equal use of all pupils
residing in its district and enrolled in and actually attending standard elementary schools or
grades seven or eight of standard secondary schools."
239 Dickman v. School District, 366 P.2d 533, 539-40 (Ore. 1961).
240 Id. at 539.
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needs of parochial schools. ' 241' The court's other reason for rejecting this conten-
tion was that, since the state does not compel pupils to attend parochial schools,
the cost thereof is not a matter of public concern. Neither of these arguments ap-
pear to meet the claim of the proponents of aid that recompense is due religious
schools for all educational services they perform for the state.
2 4 2
The court seems to see some validity in Justice Frankfurter's view that the
Constitution must be read in light of modem circumstances and that the separation
clause hinges on the social theory of the present.243 But the court finds the dangers
of a quarrel among the various sects as to the amount of aid, and the threat of state




The argument had been made that prohibition of aid to school children solely
because of their enrollment in a religious school was in violation of the equal pro-
tection clause. It was answered by the terms of the Constitution itself. The court
seems to have concluded that while it might be called discrimination, it was legal
discrimination because based on another article of the Constitution. The arguments
advanced in the Dickman decision may be somewhat unsatisfactory, but the basic
thrust of the decision, the finding that religious schools are part of the religion, may
be the only answer necessary for the prohibition.
Transportation of parochial school children has been the subject of three cases
during the duration of this Survey. In Matthews v. Quinton,2 45 the Supreme Court
of Alaska was confronted with a statute, authorizing free bus transportation, which
was in effect before Alaska received statehood.24 6 With no local precedents on
either side, the court was free to examine the views of other states on the problem.
Having noted the opinion in Everson, the court disregarded it and found the statute
invalid as a direct aid to religious institutions. The child benefit theory, espoused in
Everson, was rejected on the reasoning that only some parochial school children
were benefited by the statute; therefore, said the court, it could not be contended
that the legislature had enacted the bill for the children's benefit. The statute lim-
ited transportation to those children living near highways used in transporting
children to public schools. The court found the real beneficiaries of the transporta-
tion to be the religious schools themselves. It relied on Justice Rutledge's dissent
in Everson:
Finally, transportation, where it is needed, is as essential to education as
any other element. Its cost is as much a part of the total expense, except at
times in amount, as the cost of textbooks, of school lunches, of athletic equip-
ment, of writing and other materials; indeed of aU other items comprising the
total burden .... Hardly can it be maintained that transportation is the
least essential of these items, or that it does not in fact aid, encourage, sus-
tain, and support just as they do, the very process which is its purpose to
accomplish.
247
241 Id. at 542.
242 "Education in church-related schools is a public function which, by its nature, is deserv-
ing of government support." NATIONAL CATHOLIC WELFARE CONFERENCE, THE CONSTI-
TUTIONALITY OF THE INCLUSION OF CHURCH-RELATED SCHOOLS IN FEDERAL AID TO EDUCA-
TION (1961), as reprinted in 50 Gao. L.J. 399, 437 (1961).
243 McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 463 (1961) (separate opinion). "illuminated...
by our national experience. ... "
244 McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203, 212 (1948).
245 362 P.2d 932 (Alaska 1961).
246 ALASKA Comnp. LAWs ANN. § 37-11-5 (Supp. 1958).:
In those places in Alaska where transportation is provided . . . for chil-
dren attending public schools, transportation shall likewise be provided for
children who, in compliance with the compulsory education laws of Alaska,
attend non-public schools ... where such children, in order to reach such
non-public schools, must travel distances comparable with, and over routes
the same as, the distances and routes over which the children attending
public schools are transported.
247 Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 47-48 (1947) (separate opinion).
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The argument that providing transportation was a valid exercise of the police power
by the state was also rejected on this rationale. The police power, said the court,
cannot extend to a practice otherwise found unconstitutional.
A long dissent was entered by one of the three justices. His argument relied
mainly on the legislative proceedings that led up to the passage of the constitutional
article prohibiting "direct" aid to religious organizations. The line of cases which
the majority followed was distinguished by reason of the fact that the word "direct"
was included in the Alaska constitution, while the other states invalidating transpor-
tation statutes had done so under provisions prohibiting aid in general. 248 The
actual reasons for the majority's decision were laid to practical grounds in the dis-
sent. It stated:
Those who would deny transportation for children attending non-public
schools are not concerned with transportation as such. Nor are they truly
solicitous about the relatively minor expense to the state which will result
from the operation of Chapter 39 (the statute authorizing the free trans-
portation). Their real anxiety, and the real issue in this case, has to do with
the very existence of the sectarian or religious educational institutions, and
the belief of some persons in the supremacy of public education administered
and controlled by the state.
249
It is submitted that this remark portrays the true conflict in the field of aid to
religious schools. Something more than the mere relationship of church and state
enters into the controversy. Establishment in the historic sense does not appear to
be a consideration in this field. Rather, the opponents of aid in any form seem
committed to the view that, while private schools must be tolerated by virtue of
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, °0 no encouragement to increasing their vitality may be
forthcoming. The courts of Oregon permit the transportation of parochial school
students but forbid the giving of free textbooks; the Alaska Court, more logically,
would prevent even transportation, a function divorced from the basic operation
of the school .25  The Connecticut Supreme Court, in Snyder v. Town of Newton,
252
upheld the power of the state government to authorize transportation for parochial
school children. The state statute, although struck down for other reasons, was
upheld as to transportation on the theory that complete separation was never the
attitude of the state. In this connection, the court referred to the historic practice
of tax exemption for religious institutions. The court accepted the child benefit
theory, saying:
The reasoning in these cases [the state cases allowing transportation serv-
ices] is substantially the same advanced in Everson v. Board of Education,
that is, that public transportation to private schools aids the parents, who
are under the compulsion of law to send their children to school; that it is a
measure to promote the safety of the children; and that therefore it helps
the parents and the children and not the school.
253
The court went on to quote, with approval, the following statement from Chance v.
Mississippi State Board: "The state which allows the pupil to subscribe to any reli-
gious creed should not, because of his exercise of this right, proscribe from him the
benefits common to all." 254 The court in the instant case seems on the verge, not
248 Judd v. Board of Education, 278 N.Y. 200, 15 N.E.2d 576 (1938); State ex rel. Traub
v. Brown, 36 Del. 181, 172 At. 835 (1934); Sherrard v. Jefferson County Board of Educa-
tion, 294 Ky. 469, 171 S.W.2d 963 (1942).
249 Matthews v. Quinton, 362 P.2d 932, 957 (Alaska 1961).
250 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925). "The fundamental theory of liberty upon which all govern-
ments in this Union repose excludes any general power of the State to standardize its children
by forcing them to accept instruction from public teachers only."
251 "Like the dissenters in the bus fare case, I am not now able to distinguish between minor
payments there involved and payments for educational costs. I believe, therefore, that none of
such nondiscriminatory uses of tax funds are forbidden by the First Amendment." Katz, Free-
dom of Religion and State Neutrality, 20U. H.L. Ry. 426, 428 (1953)..
252 147 Conn. 374, 161 A.2d 770 (1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 299 ((1961).
253 Id. at 777.
254 190 Miss. 467, 200 So. 706, 710 (1941).
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only of approving the furnishing of such indirect aid, but of demanding that it be
administered so as to allow the parent his full right to educate the child in any
school he sees fit.
A third case arose in New York over the legality of allowing transportation to
religious schools in adjoining areas. In Application of Silver,255 the distance covered
by such transportation was some thirty-five miles. The court held that this was a
reasonable trip under the circumstances, once more affirming the right of the state
to furnish transportation for parochial school children. It is interesting to note that
while New York has one of the most liberal transportation statutes, the states that
have struck down bus transportation have relied quite heavily on the New York
case which invalidated an earlier New York statute.256 The remedy in New York
was a constitutional amendment. Perhaps that would be the surest way for pro-
ponents of indirect aid to proceed in all states.
In summary it can be said that the cases in the last two years have done little
to illuminate the present position of American law in regard to the education prob-
lem. Religion in the public schools has been further de-emphasized as a result of the
Schempp case and the guiding principle may soon be that freedom of religion is
really a freedom from religion. That "We are a religious people ' 257 seems to be true
only outside the public schools. Even if the Supreme Court adoits a broad prohibi-
tion of religious influences in public schools, the matter would not be closed. Rather,
the controversy might shift into the political forum, much as. has the religious school
problem. While such a prohibition would delineate the constitutional essence of the
public school, would the definition be the correct one? It has been argued that the
studied absence of religion in the classroom has the psychological effect of establish-
ing a religion of irreligion. It must be admitted, however, that no other solution has
as yet gained popular acceptance.
Religious schools stand in a completely different light today. The man believ-
ing in their usefulness is not encouraged by the recent decisions, but then neither is
the man arguing for a complete excision of public support. There seems to be no
clear trend satisfactory to either. The resolution of the problem awaits the public
debate still in its formative stages. The role of the state in religious education may
be temporarily delineated by more detailed pronouncements by the courts in the
coming few years, but a lasting answer awaits the formulation of an interpretation
of the establishment clause that is capable of general application. Thus, the only
prediction as to the future of our educational problems is their continued existence.
III. RELIGIOUS VALUES
A. SUNDAY CLOSING - A Definitive Rationale
Sunday closing legislation has given rise to considerable litigation in both state
and federal courts. However, no decision nor series of decisions has been more
definitive in this area than those which were handed down on May 29, 1961, by the
United States Supreme Court.
In McGowan v. Maryland,25s and Two Guys v. McGinley,259 the Court upheld
the constitutionality of the Sunday laws of Maryland and Pennsylvania. The cases
255 205 N.Y.S.2d 650 (App. Div. 1960).
256 Judd v. Board of Education, 278 N.Y. 200, 16 N.E.2d 576 (1938). Before concluding the
survey of the transportation area, it is interesting to note the Wisconsin Legislature's attempt to
frame a law that would provide transportation for religious school children and yet not stand in
danger of violating the separation clause of that state's constitution. The statute was amended
to read: "[Tihe school boards of all school districts*** shall provide transportation, only to
and from the public school which they are entitled to attend, for all pupils, attending public and
nonpublic schools, residing in the district, on regular routes approved for the public school bus.
. . Ch. 648, Laws of 1961, amending Wis. STAT. ANN. § 40.53 (1957).
257 Zorach v. Clausen, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952).
258 366 U. S. 420 (1961).
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of Braunfeld v. Brown2 6 0 and Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Market,26 ' were con-
cerned with the constitutionality of the Sunday closing laws of Pennsylvania and
Massachusetts, as applied to members of the Orthodox Jewish Faith. These laws
were found to be valid by the Court, although no exemption was made for such
Sabbatarians - those who celebrate the Sabbath on Saturday.
The Supreme Court had considered the constitational validity of Sunday
legislation prior to 1961.262 However, none of the decisions were reached on the
precise issues decided in 1961.263 The decisions in Song King v. Crowley,2" Hen-
nington v. Georgia,26 s and Petit v. New York, were recorded before the first
amendment was held to be applicable to the states in regard to the establishment of
religion 267 or the free exercise thereof; 268 thus, these cases decided only that the laws
in question were not violative of the equal protection clause of the fouiteenth
amendment. The cases on Sunday laws that had been previously presented to the
Court during this century had all been dismissed for want of a substantial federal
question.
269
The 1961 decisions for the first time focused on the objections that these laws
were violative of the establishment and free exercise clauses of the first amendment.
In McGowan v. MarylandJ770 the Court, in an opinion rendered by Mr. Chief
Justice Warren, held that the Sunday laws of Maryland were neither violative of
the establishment clause, nor offensive to the equal protection or due process clauses
of the fourteenth amendment. It was also decided that, since the appellants did not
allege an infringement of their own religious freedoms, they had no standing to
question whether the laws prohibited the free exercise of religion.2 7'
The Maryland appellants, employees of a large 'department store, maintained
that the commodities exempted from the Sunday sales prohibition rendered those
statutes violative of due process. They contended that the distinctions therein were
unreasonable. Certain merchants, such as operators of bathing beaches and amuse-
ment parks, were allowed to sell their products on Sundays. The appellants argued
that, because they were prohibited from selling the same type of merchandise on that
day, they were denied the equal protection of the law. In rejecting these arguments,
the Court stated:
Although no precise formula has been developed, the Court has held that
the Fourteenth Amendment permits the States a wide scope of discretion in
enacting laws which affect some groups of citizens differently from others.
The constitutional safeguard is offended only if the classification rests on
grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievements of the State's objective. State
legislatures are presumed to have acted within their constitutional power
despite the fact that, in practice, their laws result in some inequality.
A statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any state of facts reason-
ably may be conceived to justify it...
It would seem that a legislature could reasonably find that the Sunday
260 366 U.S. 599 (1961).
261 366 U.S. 617 (1961).
262 See Song King v. Crowley, 113 U.S. 703 (1885); Hennington v. Georgia, 163 U.S. 299
(1896); Petit v. Minnesota, 177 U.S. 164 (1900); Friedman v. New York, 341 U.S. 907
(1951); McGee v. North Carolina, 346 U.S. 802 (1953); Gundaker Central Motors v. Gassert,
354 U.S. 933 (1957); Grochowiak v. Pennsylvania, 358 U.S. 47 (1958); Ullner v. Ohio, 358
U.S. 131 (1958); Kidd v. Ohio, 358 U.S. 132 (1958).
263 McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 436 (1961).
264 113 U.S. 703 (1885).
265 163 U.S. 299 (1896).
266 177 U.S. 164 (1900).
267 Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947).
268 Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).
269 Friedman v. New York,'341 U.S. 907 (1951); McGee v. North Carolina, 346 U.S. 802
(1953); Gundaker Central Motors v. Gassert, 354 U.S. 933 (1-957); Grochowiak v. Pennsyl-
vania, 358 U.S. 47 (1958); Ullner v. Ohio, 358 U.S. 131 (1958); Kidd v. Ohio, 358 U.S. 132
(1958).
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sale of the exempted commodities was necessary either for the health of the
populace or for the enhancement of the recreational atmosphere of the
day ...
The record is barren of any indication that this apparently reasonable
basis does not exist, that the statutory distinctions are invidious, that local
tradition and custom might not rationally call for this legislative treatment.
• ..Likewise, the fact that these exemptions exist and deny some vendors
and operators the day of rest and recreation contemplated by the legislature
does not render the statutes violative of equal protection since there would
appear to be many valid reasons for these exemptions, as stated above, and
no evidence to dispel them.
27 2
The appellants next contended that the Maryland statutes violated the con-
stitutional prohibition of the first amendment respecting an establishment of reli-
gion. They argued that, since Sunday is the Sabbath of the predominant Christian
sects, the purpose of the enforced cessation of labor on that day is to facilitate and
encourage church attendance by Christians, and to recruit new members from
people without religious beliefs or with marginal beliefs. In order to substantiate
this "establishment" argument, the appellants relied on the phrasing of the present
Maryland statutes, as well as earlier versions of Sunday laws and pronouncements
of the highest court of Maryland.
7 3
In order to decide the questions raised by these contentions, the Court felt it
necessary to examine the historical background and development of Sunday closing
laws in America. It discovered that although the original Sunday laws were moti-
vated by religious forces, "beginning before the eighteenth century, nonreligious
arguments for Sunday closing began to be heard more distinctly and statutes began
to lose some of their totally religious flavor."
27
Before reaching a decision, the Court turned its attention, as it had in the
famous Everson v. Board of Education case,27 5 which also involved the establish-
ment clause, to the historical context surrounding the enactment of the first amend-
ment. Therein, it discovered that James Madison, who proposed the first amend-
ment in Congress, had previously co-authored Virginia's Declaration of Rights which
included a "free exercise of religion" clause, and had also sponsored an "act for
establishing religious freedom" in Virginia. In the same year, 1785, that this act
passed the Virginia Assembly, Madison presented to the Virginia legislators a bill
concerning the punishment of those who labored on Sunday. This bill became law
the next year, 1786. In 1799, the Virginia legislature repealed all subsequently
enacted legislatiori deemed inconsistent with that establishing religious freedom.
Virginia's statute banning labor on Sunday stood.
76 Thus, it can be seen that
neither James Madison, who introduced the first amendment into Congress, nor
the members of the Virginia legislature, who were also vitally concerned with
religious liberty, felt that Sunday laws were an infringement of freedom of religion.
Before specifically reviewing the Maryland statutes in question, the Court
reached the conclusion that Sunday closing laws, per se, did not offend the estab-
lishment clause of the first amendment. It stated:
In light of the evolution of our Sunday Closing Laws through the cen-
turies, and of their more or less recent emphasis upon secular considerations,
it is not difficult to discern that as presently written and administered, most
of them, at least, are of a secular rather than a religious character, and that
presently they bear no relationship to establishment of religion as those words
are used in the Constitution of the United States....
... The present purpose and effect of most of them is to provide a uni-
form day of rest for all citizens; the fact that this day is Sunday, a day of
particular significance for the dominant Christian sects, does not bar the
State from achieving its secular goals. To say that the States cannot pre-
272 Id. at 425-27.
273 Id. at 430-31.
274 Id. at 433-34.
275 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
276 McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 437-39 (1961).
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scribe Sunday as a day of rest for these purposes solely because centuries ago
such laws had their genesis in religion would give a constitutional interpreta-
tion of hostility to the public welfare rather than one of mere separation of
church and State.
27 7
The Court, after closely scrutinizing the relevant Maryland statutes, held
that their purpose was to set aside a day of rest and recreation, not to aid reli-
gion, and that thus these Sunday laws were not in conflict with the "establish-
ment" prohibition of the first amendment. It was emphasized, however, that this
decision was not to be taken as carte blanche approval of all state Sunday dos-
ing laws. The Court declared:
We do not hold that Sunday legislation may not be a violation of the
"Establishment" Clause if it can be demonstrated that its purpose - evi-
denced either on the face of the legislation, in conjunction with its legisla-
tive history, or in its operative effect - is to use the State's coercive power to
aid religion.
278
In a companion case, Two Guys v. McGinley,27 9 the Court applied the ra-
tionale of McGowan to its consideration of the constitutionality of the Sunday laws
of Pennslyvania, and concluded that the purpose of these statutes was to set aside
a day of rest and recreation, not to aid religion s. 28  In an opinion penned by Mr.
Chief Justice Warren, it also concluded that the distinctions and exemptions con-
tained in the statutes were not violative of equal protection.28 1 The decision, as
in McGowan, was by an eight to one margin, with Mr. Justice Douglas dissenting.
In Braunfeld v. Brown,2 2 and a companion case, Gallagher v. Crown Kosher
Market,2 3 the Court found that the Sunday laws of Pennsylvania and Massa-
chusetts were neither violative of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment nor of the establishment clause of the first amendment, nor in con-
travention of the free exercise provision of that amendment. This decision was
reached, even though the applicable statutes did not exempt Orthodox Jews and
other Sabbatarians from the force of the cessation-of-labor-on-Sunday provisions.
Members of the Orthodox Jewish Faith, as Sabbatarians, are required, by their
Faith, to close their businesses and abstain from' all manner of work from night-
fall on Friday to nightfall on Saturday each week. Thus, the combined effect of
holding this belief and being subject to the Sunday closing laws would be a ces-
sation of all business activities for such persons from Friday at nightfall until Mon-
day morning. Since the appellants in these two cases alleged an infringement of
their own religious freedoms, they had standing to question whether or not such
laws, providing no exemptions, interfered with the free exercise of their religion.
In the Braunfeld case,&8 appellants, who were clothing and furniture mer-
chants, alleged that the Sunday closing laws would result in an impairment of
their ability to earn a living. Braunfeld further contended that he would be forced
to discontinue his business unless the state provided an exemption for Sabbatarians
who closed on another day in accord with the dictates of their conscience; the
alternative, he argued, would be to force them to abandon their religious beliefs.
The Supreme Court disposed of both of these contentions by pointing out that
the Sunday laws do nothing more than regulate a secular activity; they do not make
any religious practice itself unlawful. Admitting that such laws operate so as to
make the practice of some beliefs more expensive, the Court felt that to strike down
277 Id. at 444-45.
278 Id. at 453.
279 366 U.S. 582 (1961).
280 Id. at 598.
281 Id. at 591-92.
282 366 U.S. 599 (1961). For an excellent discussion of Sunday closing laws as applied to
Sabbatarians see Mann and Garfinkel, The Sunday Closing Laws Decisions - A Critique, 36
NoTR DAME LAWYER 323 (1962). Mann argued appellants' position before the Supreme
Court and Garfinkel assisted him on the brief.
283 366 U.S. 617 (1961).
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such legislation - "legislation which imposes only an indirect burden on the exer-
cise of religion"285 would radically limit the operating latitude of a legislature. The
Court, after noting that a number of states provide an exemption for Sabbatari-
ans,s8s went on to state that while this may be a wise course, it was not concerned
with the wisdom of the legislation, but rather with its constitutionality. It was
also pointed out that to permit such an exemption might undermine the state's
objective of providing a day of rest, i.e., the elimination of as much commercial
noise and activity on that day as possible. The Court concluded that the Penn-
sylvania laws did not interfere with the free exercise of appellants' religion.
In Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Market,5 7 the Court applying the reasoning of
the McGowan and Braunfeld decisions, evaluated and upheld the Sunday laws of
Massachusetts.
Justices Brennan, Douglas, and Stewart dissented in both Sabbatarian cases.
Mr. Justice Brennan forcefully argued against the majority opinion when he
declared:
[T]he issue in this case - and we do not understand either appellees or
the Court to contend otherwise - is whether a State may put an individual
to a choice between his business and his religion. The Court today holds that
it may. But I dissent, believing that such a law prohibits the free exercise
of religion.
... For in this case the Court seems to say, without so much as a defer-
ential nod towards that high place which we have accorded religious free-
dom in the past, that any substantial state interest will justify encroachments
on religious practice, at least if those encroachments are cloaked in the guise
of some nonreligious public purpose.
... [T]heir effect is that appellants may not simultaneously practice their
religion and their trade, without being hampered by a substantial competitive
disadvantage. Their effect is that no one may at one and the same time be
an Orthodox Jew and compete effectively with his Sunday-observing fellow
tradesmen. This clog upon the exercise of religion, this state-imposed
burden on Orthodox Judaism, has exactly the same economic effect as a tax
levied upon the sale of religious literature. And yet, such a tax, when applied
in the form of an excise or license fee, was held invalid in Follett v. Town of
McCormick, supra.28 8
Brennan next proceeded to question whether the interest of the state in having
everyone rest on the same day is so compelling that it entitles the state to impede
appellants' freedom of worship. In order to reach a determination as to this issue,
he considered the infringements allowed upon the free exercise of religion in Rey-
nolds v. United States,2s 9 where the Court upheld polygamy conviction of a
member of the Mormon faith despite the fact that it was an accepted doctrine that
male members had a duty to practice polygamy. In Prince v. Massachusetts,290
the Court upheld a statute making it a crime for a female under eighteen years of
age to sell printed matter or other merchandise in public places, despite the fact
that one of the tenets of the Jehovah's Witnesses prescribes that a child should
distribute religious literature in public - that a child should "lead" them. Bren-
285 Id. at 606.
286 CONN. GEN STAT. REV. § 53-303 (1958); FLA. LAws ch. 59-1650, § 2 (1959); IND.
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STAT. ANN. RIv. § 18.855, 18.122, 9.2702 (1957); Mo. REv. STAT. § 563.700 (1959); NEa.
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nan distinguished these cases by arguing that the interest of the state in stamping
out polygamy, "a practice deeply abhorred by society,"291 and in protecting children
provides a much stronger justification for an infringement upon religious beliefs,
than does the state's interest in having everyone rest on the same day.
The objection has been raised that if an exemption were to be allowed for
Sabbatarians, then all their employees, including Christians, would have to labor on
Sunday. This may be answered by pointing out that the Sunday. laws forbid the
labor of all persons (with certain limited exceptions) on Sunday, and that an
exemption granted to Sabbatarians need not apply to their non-Sabbatarian
employees.219
Mr. Chief Justice Warren, in his opinion in the Braunfeld case, raised the
point that, because of this fact, an exempted employer might hire employees on
the basis of whether or not their own religious beliefs qualified them for the exemp-
tion, and that such a practice might violate state antidiscrimination policy in regard
to hiring.2 93 Brennan answered this problem when he stated:
Finally, I find the Court's mention of a problem under state antidis-
crimination statutes almost chimerical. Most such statutes provide that hiring
may be made on a religious basis if religion is a bona fide occupational quali-
fication. It happens, moreover, that Pennsylvania's statute has such a
provision.
294
The recent Supreme Court, decisions could do much to correct current incon-
sistencies 29 in state evaluations of Sunday closing laws in the light of state and
federal constitutional provisions. In its disposition of the four cases 2 6 involving
Sunday closing legislation, the Court developed a rationale which outlines the basic
requirements of due process, equal protection, and freedom of religion. All of these
standards could, and should, prove invaluable in achieving some sort of uniformity
of state decisions in this area. For examples of the current chaos, one need merely
look at a sampling of the decisions handed down by state courts since the last
Survey.
In Moore v. Thompson,29 7 the Supreme Court of Florida held that an act
which prohibited the sale or exchange of new or used motor vehicles on Sunday
by car dealers was unconstitutional. It felt that the distinctions and exemptions of
the statute were arbitrary, and consequently were not a reasonable basis for valid-
ly exercising the state police power. The court pointed out that it was fully cogni-
zant of the fact that decisions of other states were in conflict with its own
determination.
A New Jersey superior court, relying on pronouncements of the New Jersey
Supreme Court, held in State v. Monteleone,298 that the classification of articles as
saleable and nonsaleable on Sunday was not discriminatory, and that the Sunday
closing law was thus constitutional.
The Supreme Court of South Carolina considered the constitutionality of a
statute prohibiting the showing of motion pictures on Sunday, and found, in Caro-
lina Amusement Co. v. Martin,299 that it was not violative of constitutional provi-
sions, either state or federal, respecting equal protection, due process, free speech,
and freedom of religion. It might be noted that the South Carolina Sunday law
permitted Sunday motion pictures in certain areas of the state under specified condi-
291 Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 614 (1961).
292 E.g., IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-4301 (1956).
293 Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 609 (1961).
294 Id. at 615.
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supra note 2, at 427-32; 35 NOTRE DA E LAWYER 569 (1960).
296 McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961); Two Guys v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582
(1961); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961); Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Market, 366
U.S. 617 (1961).
297 126 So. 2d 543 (Fla. 1960).
298 63 N.J. Super. 596, 165 A.2d 39 (1960).
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tions. While not directly deciding the point, the court indicated that it did not
consider such distinctions violative of equal protection.
Two recent Ohio cases demonstrate that inconsistent applications, interpreta-
tions, and evaluations of Sunday laws occur even within the same state. In State
v. Woodville Appliance, Inc.,300 an Ohio county court held the Ohio Sunday laws
unconstitutional in that, in addition to containing unreasonable classifications, they
were arbitrary, capricious, and vague, and were contrary to the constitutional pro-
visions and the Bill of Rights of Ohio. The court ignored precedents of the Ohio
Supreme Court, such as State v. Kidd,301 which was decided in 1958, in reaching
its decision. It justified this oversight on the grounds that the Ohio Sunday laws
had recently been revised, and that the Ohio Supreme Court had not passed on
their constitutionality since revision.
About three months after this decision, the Supreme Court of Ohio cited the
new Sunday laws with apparent approval in reaching the determination that a city
ordinance, requiring a junk yard in a residential district to close on Sunday, did
not conflict with an exemption for Sabbatarians, contained in the state Sunday
closing laws.3
0 2
In a very recent decision, 03 the Illinois Supreme Court ruled that the state
law banning car sales on Sunday was unconstitutional. The Illinois court consid-
ered and applied the rationale of the United States Supreme Court's decisions 0 4
in reaching its determination. The court accepted the proposition that the basic
purpose of Sunday closing laws is to provide a general day of rest for all citizens,
but it felt that when a statute "singles out only one activity or occupation to which
this day of rest shall apply,"30 -5 that it is then a special law and thus forbidden by
the Illinois constitution. The same conclusion could probably be reached by appli-
cation of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment of the
Constitution.
It would seem that the Supreme Court reached the right result in holding
that Sunday closing legislation is a justifiable exercise of the state's police power
when public welfare, rather than religious belief, is made the rational basis. It
should be noted that Russia, scarcely considered at this time in history to be a
Christian nation, has decreed that Sunday is to be the general rest day in a seven-
day week. 0 6 This suggests that the Supreme Court's rationale has a substantial
foundation in reality - that it does, indeed, reach the core of the question.s07
However, the correctness of the Court's ruling that nothing in the Constitution
requires an exemption from Sunday closing legislation for Sabbatarians might be
questioned. The right to freely exercise one's religion should not be infringed upon
without a compelling justification.
B. OBSCENITY - A Comparison of State and Church Positions
1. Problem of Definition
Essentially, obscenity poses a problem of balance - of weighing the constitu-
tional guarantee of freedom of expression against the upholding of basic moral
300 171 N.E.2d 565 (Ohio 1960).
301 167 Ohio St. 521, 150 N.E.2d 413 (1958).
302 City of Akron v. Klein, 171 Ohio St. 207, 168 N.E.2d 564 (1960). An Ohio court of
appeals has recently held that the state's new Sunday laws were constitutional in City of Euclid
v. MacGillis, 179 N.E.2d 131 (Ohio 1962). For a similar case in Missouri, see State v. Katz
Drug Co., 352 S.W.2d 678 (Mo. 1962).
303 Courtesy Motor Sales v. Ward, 179 N.E.2d 692 (Ill. 1962).
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standards. It is the purpose of this section of the Survey to analyze the law of
obscenity s in order to ascertain what balance has been struck between the demand
of society that freedom of speech and press be safeguarded and its desire to prevent
the corruption of public morals. An analysis of this type requires a comparison
of the respective positions of state and church with regard to the definition of
obscenity.
It was determined in Roth v. United States309 that "[O]bscenity is not within
the area of constitutionally protected free speech or press." The Supreme Court out-
lined the legal test for obscenity: "[Wjhether to the average person, applying con-
temporary standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to
prurient interest." 310 The Court endorsed the American Law Institute's definition
of prurient interest3 11 Therein, it is defined as, "a shameful or morbid interest
in nudity, sex, or excretion . . . if it goes, substantially beyond customary limits of
candor in description or representation of such matters .... ,,s2
The element of scienter must be alleged and proved in order to sustain the
conviction of a violator of the obscenity laws. The Supreme Court so held in
Smith v. California;13 however, the Court left any determination of the extent of
the scienter requirement for future consideration.31 4
Recent cases in the area of obscenity have exemplified judicial application of
the principles to be derived from the two leading cases discussed above. A federal
district court in Illinois applied the Roth definition in a decision involving a literary
review entitled "Big Table." In determining that by this standard, the material
contained therein was neither obscene nor filthy and therefore mailable, the court
stated:
Obscene material, as stated above, is "material which deals with sex in a
manner appealing to prurient interest." The Kerouac article does not deal
with sex any more than it does with anything else. And, surely, the meaning
of "manner" in that approved definition implies a method of presentation
which is something more than simply using unaccepted words.
In comparison, the other article . . . while not exactly the wild prose
picnic in the style of Kerouac, is, taken as a whole, similarly unappealing to
the prurient interest. The exacerbated, morbid, and perverted sex related
by the author could not arouse a corresponding interest in the average
reader, as the Hearing Examiner in the case agreed. The dominant theme or
effect is of shocking the contemporary society, in order to better point out its
flaws and weaknesses, but that clinical appeal is not akin to lustful
thoughts.315
The court also discussed the charge that the contents of the magazine were
"filthy," which is a separate classification of nonmailable matter. It decided that
the standard governing this classification could not be of a lesser degree than that
announced in the Roth decision, and thus should be considered as substantially the
same as that standard, or as requiring a somewhat more positive reaction.3
1l
The "Rule of Thumb" set up by the superintendent of police of New Orleans
and his deputy, that a publication was obscene if it contained a picture showing
"bare breasts or bare buttocks," was held to be an infringement on constitutionally
308 For discussions of the historical development of the law of obscenity see 1955-57 Church-
State Survey, supra note 1, at 436-52. 1958-59 Church-State Survey, supra note 2, at 537-46.
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protected rights. 17 The court insisted upon application of the standards established
in Roth.
In State v. Jackson31 the Supreme Court of Oregon also accepted the Amer-
ican Law Institute's test 19 for obscenity in its application and interpretation of the
Oregon statutory provisions in this area.
The Ninth Circuit decided in Ackerman v. United States,3 20 that the Roth
test of obscenity is applicable to private letters. It held that the scienter require-
ment set down in the Smith decision3 21 was met by the defendant's knowledge, as
the writer of the letters, that they were obscene within the statute prohibiting the
mailing of obscene matter.
3 22
In City of Cincinnati v. King,3 23 the municipal court of Cincinnati concluded
that a bookseller must have had some knowledge of the book or books alleged to be
obscene if a conviction was to be sustained. In discussing the scienter requirement
imposed by the Smith case,3 24 wherein the extent of that requirement was not
defined, the court said:
So far as we are concerned here, the Smith case stands for the legal
proposition that a bookseller, such as the defendant in the Cincinnati case,
must have some notice of the books he sells: must have some knowledge of
the contents of the book or books alleged to be obscene .... All that the
United States Supreme Court is requiring in such prosecution is that the
prosecuting authority prove that the bookseller had a general knowledge of
the general, ordinary, and usual contents of the books in his store. We do
not believe that the United States Supreme Court ever intended to establish a
rule of law allowing a bookseller with impunity to shut his eyes to something
which he could readily see, nor shut his mind to something which he should
and easily could know .... 325
The Supreme Court of Florida held in Cohen v. State326 that the requirement
of scienter was impliedly included in the state obscenity law, and that the state
must therefore prove that the accused had knowledge of the obscene character of
the material involved.
3 27
However, it has been held that it is not necessary to establish that a bookseller
actually read the book in question, in order to convict him of violating a statute
proscribing sale of obscene books. The necessary element of knowledge may be
established by circumstantial evidence.
3 28
In order to ascertain what balance has been struck between the demands of
society for freedom of speech and press and its desire to prevent the corruption of
public morals, it is necessary to focus attention on the views of some of the moralists
and theologians as to the meaning of obscenity.
It appears that it is acceptable to many moralists to define the "obscene'" in
terms of its tendency to arouse venereal pleasure.3 2 9 This definition differs little in
essence from the Supreme Court's definition in Roth v. United States,3 ' especially
when it is remembered that "prurient" conveys the idea of a tendency to excite
lustful thoughts s.3 3  The Roth rule requires consideration of the book or film as a
317 In re Louisiana News Company, 187 F.Supp. 241 (E.D. La. 1960).
318 224 Ore. 337, 356 P.2d 495 (1960).
319 See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 487 n.20 (1957).
320 293 F.2d 449 (9th Cir. 1961).
321 Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959).
322 Ackerman v. United States, 293 F.2d 449 (9th Cir. 1961).
323 168 N.E.2d 633 (Ohio 1960).
324 Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959).
325 City of Cincinnati v. King, 168 N.E.2d 633, 636 (Ohio 1960).
326 185 So. 2d 560 (Fla. 1960).
327 Id. at 563.
328 People v. Sckenkman, 20 Misc. 2d 1093, 195 N.Y.S.2d 570 (Sup. Ct. 1960).
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whole,3 3 2 which is in conformity with canon law, requiring that the subject be con-
sidered in its entirety.333 However, many moralists and theologians might argue that
the natural law, being broader than canon law, would declare a publication obscene
where it contained a single obscene passage.
The "average person" standard enunciated in Roth24 meets no serious moral
objection as long as provision is made for the protection of the young and the im-
mature.3 3 5 "[W]here adoption of the Federal Rule has removed the protection of
the law from children, some statutory provision should be made to prohibit such
literature as tends to the corruption of the morals of youth.133
6
In Butler v. Michigan,'2 7 the Supreme Court held that a statute, which makes
it a misdemeanor to sell or make available to the general public material detrimental
to the morals of youth, violates the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment. The Court stated: "The incidence of this enactment is to reduce the adult
population of Michigan to reading only what is fit for children. It thereby arbi-
trarily curtails one of those liberties of the individual, now enshrined in the Due
Process Clause .... ,33 The Court did, however, cite with apparent approval an-
other Michigan statute making it a crime to furnish a minor material tending to
corrupt his morals.
33 9
There appears to be no legal objection to a tightly-drawn statute which would
be protective of minors as long as "what is fit for children" is not the standard by
which publications available only to adults are judged. The Roman Catholic
Church's position is that such legislation is necessary, but state legislatures and
Congress have not seen fit to follow the proposal. However, in a recent compari-
son of the law of obscenity and pertinent moral principles, it was reasoned that:
In American law, as in Catholic philosophy, freedom of the press is
regarded as a natural right, just as that of self-preservation.... In evaluat-
ing the American law against obscene literature, however, we must approach
with a certain tolerance.... Should the Constitutional guarantees of a free
press prevent the obscenity laws from being developed to perfection, we must
remember that according to Catholic moral principles some imperfection in
the law may be tolerated in order to secure a greater good. The Constitu-
tional guarantees of a free press, which often handicap the legislator when he
draws up a law against obscene literature, are a safeguard against tyranny.
The greater good involved, the safeguarding, namely, of essential rights,
justifies a certain tolerance of imperfection in the law against obscene
literature.3 40
2. Prior Restraint
The question of prior restraint is one of the most troublesome questions raised
by obscenity laws. The hallmark case in this area is Near v. Minnesota,341 where
the Supreme Court stated: "In determining the extent of the constitutional protec-
332 Id. at 489.
333 Theisen, supra note 22, at 61, 66, 101. See Gardiner, Moral Principles For Discerning
the Obscene, PROCEEDINGS OF THE CATHOLIC THEOLOGICAL SOCIETY OF AmERICA 128 (1954).
334 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 489 (1957).
335 Theisen, supra note 22 at 105.
336 Id. at 108.
337 352 U.S. 380 (1957).
338 Id. at 383-84. See Police Comr of Baltimore v. Seigel Enterprises, 223 Md. 110, 162
A.2d 727 (1960). The court held that the section of the state statute, which prohibited display,
upon the public streets or highways or other places within the view of children, of publications
obscene for a child, was unconstitutional; it prohibited adults from viewing books which it is
their right to buy and read, the court held.
339 Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383 (1957). See State v. Jackson, 224 Ore. 337,
356 P.2d 495 (1960), where, in dictum, the court -approved the idea of a tightly-drawn statute
for the protection of children; In re Louisiana News, 187 F. Supp. 241 (E.D. La. 1960). (The
court, in dictum, stated that there is no objection to an effective state policy of safeguarding
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tion, it has been generally, if not universally, considered that it is the chief purpose
of the guaranty of free speech to prevent previous restraints upon publication." ' ,
The Court proceeded to explain that there may be exceptions even to so sacrosanct
a principle as this.
[The protection even as to previous restraints is not absolutely unlimited.
But the limitation has been recognized only in exceptional cases ... No
one would question but that a government might prevent actual obstruction
of its recruiting service or the publication of sailing dates of transports or
the number and location of troops. On similar grounds, the primary require-
ments of decency may be enforced against obscene publications.
343
In 1952, in Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson,344 the Court reached the conclusion
that under the first and fourteenth amendments, a state may not place a prior
restraint upon the showing of a motion picture on the basis of the censor's conclu-
sion that it is sacrilegious. However, it refused to consider whether the prohibition
also applied to the showing of obscene films.3 45
Mr. Justice Frankfurter delivered the opinion of the Supreme Court in the
1957 case of Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown 346 which upheld a New York statute
which permitted the state courts to enjoin the further distribution of books dis-
played for sale or intended to be sold or distributed, if the books were found to be
obscene after due trial. The Court distinguished the Near case, which involved
matters deemed to be derogatory of a public officer. "Unlike Near, [the statute
is concerned solely with obscenity and, as authoritatively construed, it studiously
withholds restraint upon matters not already published and not yet found to be
offensive."
3 47
Until 1961, the Supreme Court, despite the language in the Near decision, had
never decided the precise question of whether obscenity was a permissible exception
to the principle forbidding prior restraint. That question was raised in Times Film
Corp. v. Chicago.348 The Court upheld a municipal ordinance requiring submis-
sion of films to the office of the commissioner of police for examination or censor-
ship prior to public exhibition, and forbidding their exhibition without a permit
obtained from that office by meeting certain standards.
Admittedly, the challenged section of the ordinance imposes a previous
restraint, and the broad justiciable issue is therefore present as to whether
the ambit of constitutional protection includes complete and absolute free-
dom to exhibit, at least once, any and every kind of motion picture. It is
that question alone that we decide. We have concluded that [the section] of
Chicago's ordinance requiring the submission of films prior to their public
exhibition is not, on the grounds set forth, void on its face. 349
The petitioner's attack upon the ordinance did not include any challenge to
the validity of the standards set out therein, as prior movie censorship cases before
the Court had. Mr. Justice Clark, writing for the majority, noted that distinction
and said: "Obviously, whether a particular statute is 'clearly drawn,' or 'vague,' or
'indefinite,' or whether a clear standard is in fact met by a film are different ques-
tions involving other constitutional challenges to be tested by considerations not
here involved."33 0
The Court reviewed Near v. Minnesota,'" and subsequent decisions in the
area of prior restraint, in order to support its conclusion. It found these cases to
hold that the first amendment guarantees are not absolute, that all previous
342 Id. at 713.
343 Id. at 716.
344 343 U.S. 495 (1952).
345 Id. at 505, 506.
346 354 U.S. 436 (1957).
347 Id. at 445.
348 365 U.S. 43 (1961).
349 Id. at 46.
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restraints are not invalid, that motion pictures are within the protection of the first
and fourteenth amendments, but that obscenity is not so protected.3"
Based on a claim of absolute privilege against prior restraint, the petitioners
contended that the state's sole remedy was the invocation of criminal process under
the Illinois pornography statute, and that only after a transgression. Rejecting that
.argument, the Court stated: "To illustrate its fallacy, we need only point to one of
the 'exceptional cases' which Chief Justice Hughes enumerated in Near v. Minne-
sota . . . namely, 'the primary requirements of decency [that] may be enforced
against obscene publications.' ,,5
Four members of the Court - Justices Black, Brennan, Douglas, and Warren
- dissented. Warren and Douglas wrote opinions expressing their disapproval.
They viewed the Court's decision in Times as having a much wider application
than that stated by Justice Clark in the majority opinion. Warren contended that
the Court was approving of prior restraint not just in regard to obscene films, but
rather was sanctioning it for all films. He stated:
Let it be completely clear what the Court's decision does. It gives official
license to the censor, approving a grant of power to city officials to prevent
the showing of any motion picture these officials deem unworthy of a license.
It thus gives formal sanction to censorship in its purest and most far-reaching
form, to a classical plan of licensing that, in our own country, most closely
approaches the English licensing laws of the seventeenth century which were
commonly used to suppress dissent in the mother country and in the
colonies. 354
Warren also noted that Chicago had chosen this procedure without any apparent
attempt to discover other, more suitable, means to achieve its ends.
Douglas, relying on quotations from Plato, Thomas Hobbes, John Milton and
John Courtney Murray, caustically reminded the majority that "Regimes of censor-
ship are common in the world today. Every dictator has one; every communist
regime finds it indispensable."355 He argued that when the government must wait
until after publication, rather than imposing a prior restraint, then the protections
of the Bill of Rights remain to shield the accused. The Douglas opinion stated
that:
The presumption of innocence, the right to jury trial, proof of guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt - these become barriers in the path of officials
who want to impose their standard of morality on the author or producer.
The advantage a censor enjoys while working as a supreme bureaucracy
disappears. The public trial to which a person is entitled who violates the
law gives a hearing on the merits, airs the grievance, and brings the com-
munity judgment to bear upon it.356
Implicit in the Douglas dissent seems to be a fear that the Times decision holds
the seeds for future application of the principle of prior restraint to Other media of
communication; if prior restraint is appropriate for motion pictures, there seems
to be no constitutional objection to its applicability to books, newspapers, magazine.
and the like in a drive to eliminate the obscene.
Since the majority opinion is couched in rather general, abstract terms, it is
difficult to determine the ultimate effect of Times. In City of Portland v. Welch,"'
7
a case decided eight months after Times, the complaint alleged that the defendant
exhibited a motion picture without deleting certain scenes as required by the censors,
as a condition to the issuance of a license to show the picture. The Supreme Court
of Oregon held that it failed to charge the defendant with a crime. The court
noted that nothing in the complaint advised the defendant how the movie fell
352 Times Film Corp. v. Chicago, 365 U.S. 43, 47-48 (1961). See 36 NOTRE DAME LAwYER
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short of the standards set by the city, or why the scenes had been ordered de-
leted.35 The court distinguished its case from Times by pointing out that the
defendant here had not been accused of failing to submit the film for inspection
by the censors.
In Zenith International Film Corp. v. City of Chicago3 5 19 the Seventh Circuit,
which met reversal in Times, held that the administration of Chicago's prior re-
straint ordinance, as applied to the film involved, deprived the owner of its right
to a full and fair hearing.
Zenith had no opportunity to present evidence of contemporary com-
munity standards; the responsible city officials failed to view the film as a
whole and thus could under no circumstances apply the proper standard of
obscenity; there was no de novo hearing before the mayor; the sole group
that saw the film was a Film Review Board whose procedure does not allow
for a hearing; there are no standards for selection of such Board and no safe-
guards to preclude an entirely arbitrary judgment on its part; and finally,
there was no indication given to Zenith why the city found the film to be
"obscene and immoral."
The fundamental procedural elements of notice and hearing have been
denied Zenith where they should have been provided - before the licensing
body itself....
The recent Times Film decision does not provide carte blanche authori-
zation for ad hoc, unfair, abortive municipal licensing procedures. We re-
emphasize that it does hold a city has the power to impose a system of prior
restraints on movie distribution, if it does so properly. Chicago's procedure,
as followed in the case at bar, is lacking in the requisite elements of pro-
cedural due process.
360
The City of Portland 61 case and the Zenith3s  decision may well be strongly
indicative of the manner in which the courts will look upon the now permissible
principle of prior restraint, where motion pictures are involved. Both of these deci-
sions, but especially Zenith, emphasize the fact that while prior restraint is now
permitted, the essential requirements of procedural due process - notice and fair
hearing - remain unaltered. If courts were steadfastly to maintain that these
requirements must always be met when there is an attempt, at any level of govern-
ment, to censor, then it is not inconceivable that a fair and efficient administrative
process would develop. This, at any rate, could be the net effect of the position
taken by the Seventh Circuit in Zenith. It will not satisfy the minority in Times,
but it may well provide some safeguards against the dangers they saw inherent in
the Times holding.
It may be predicted that the Supreme Court will be very reluctant to extend per-
mission for prior restraint to other communications media. Four Justices vehement-
ly dissented in Times, and it could not be said that the majority revealed a reckless
abandonment of Near, given the carefully narrowed basis for the Times holding.
As with the law, there is no unanimity in the religious approach to prior
restraint. For example, Justice Douglas, dissenting in Times, quoted from John
Courtney Murray, S.J., as follows:
The freedom toward which the American people are fundamentally ori-
ented is a freedom under God, a freedom that knows itself to be bound by
the imperatives of the moral law. Antecedently it is presumed that a man
will make morally and socially responsible use of freedom of expression;
hence there is to be no prior restraint on it. However, if his use of freedom
is irresponsible, he is summoned after the fact to responsibility before the
judgment of the law. There are indeed other reasons why prior restraint on
communications is outlawed; but none are more fundamental than this.36
s
From their teachings and writings, it is not difficult to discern that there are
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many moralists, in direct conflict with Murray, who would be delighted with the
exercise of the principle of prior restraint as to communications - in any form -
thought to be obscene. It is precisely because there is this judicial and moral diver-
gence of opinion that the subtle questions of church-state relations in the area of
obscenity laws defy a simple, or even clear solution. Undeniably, an absolute con-
stitutional principle of freedom of expression is irreconcilable with prior restraint,
whatever the reason. But, as is evident from the holding in Times, the prevailing
view is that there can be no absolute principles of constitutional law which will
prevail against legal and moral opposition to what is admittedly a serious problem
affecting the very foundations of society - gross and unrestrained obscenity.
The great conflict in this area is not over what is or is not obscene. The church
and the state appear to have reached essential agreement on the meaning of the
term. The great value judgments appear to have been made - the general mean-
ing of the term has been established by Roth and it is clear from Times that some
prior restraints may be imposed. But it is the application of those judgments that
will provide a fertile field for debate and litigation as society tries to reconcile con-
stitutional principles with those that are essentially moral and religious. The past
few years have shed more light on the problem, but much obscurity still prevails.
C. DOMESTIC RELATIONS
In dealing with the institutional problems of church-state relations, e.g., edu-
cation, taxation, and tort liability, the delicate balance between demands of the
church and demands of the state is measured in the courts by pitting constitutional
values and institutional values in direct conflict.
There is another more subtle conflict between church and state, which has
largely remained unmeasured by the courts, simply because the problems have not
yet been cast in terms of the first amendment. It is to be doubted whether some of
the problems herein will ever be adjudicated in those terms, because there are ade-
quate existing bases of decision, e.g., in divorce and child custody. In other areas, such
as artificial insemination, the basic issue has not even reached the stage of formula-
tion in terms of a social consensus, and therefore is not embodied in any positive
legislation. The role to be played by religion and the churches, then, in the field of
"family law" is a variable, perhaps best determined by the exigencies of each
particular problem.
1. Separation and Divorce Problems - Legal Imbalance
(a) Divorce
The problem of church-state conflict is seen in the law of divorce and separa-
tion only in the rare cases in which the parties directly urge a religious ground as
the basis for dissolution of the matrimonial bond. Two recent New York cases
36
4
amply illustrate the approach followed by the courts when confronted with reli-
gious conflict. In Diemer v. Diemer,36 a Protestant husband asked for a decree of
separation, alleging cruel and inhuman treatment. Mrs. Diemer, having contracted
an invalid marriage in the eyes of her faith, Roman Catholicism, had three years
later repudiated that marriage and refused sexual relations to her husband unless
he would submit to a remarriage in the Catholic Church. The court held that the
husband was entitled to the decree on the ground of abandonment, making it clear
that "deep-felt and conscientious religious convictions" were insufficient motives in
law to justify the abandonment of marital obligations. The court further said that
it was immaterial to the issue of abandonment that religious beliefs were involved,
and that in this situation, base and illegitimate reasons would be indistinguishable
364 Di Croce v. Di Croce, 27 Misc. 2d 1035, 209 N.Y.S.2d 624 (Sup. Ct. 1961); Diemer v.
Diemer, 8 N.Y.2d 206, 168 N.E.2d 654., 203 N.Y.S.2d 829 (1960).
365 8 N.Y.2d 206, 168 N.E.2d 654, 203 N.Y.S.2d 829 (1960).
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from sincere motives. The second case, Di Croce v. Di Croce,3 0 is one in which the
wife changed her religion after marriage from Roman Catholicism to membership
in the Pentecostal Church. Friction in the family grew as the wife and her brothers
attempted to proselytize the husband and five children. A separation decree was
granted to the husband based on "cruel and inhuman treatment." The court ex-
plicitly stated that change of faith and religious differences would not, of them-
selves, be enough to justify the separation. But where fanaticism results in cruelty
to the husband, even though inspired by religious fervor, there is ample justification.
These cases show the general attitude of the courts in dealing with religious
factors influencing marital discord. -Religious values are not independently consid-
ered, except insofar as they can be dealt with as legal concepts, such as abandon-
ment or cruelty.
(b) Child Custody
In adoption proceedings and in determination of custody after divorce or
separation, the law remains much the same as described in the preceding Church-
State Surveys.367 Matching the religion of the child and the adoptive parents
remains a relatively strong policy, whereas in the allocation of children following a
divorce or separation, religious belief is a relatively minor factor. The consideration
of greatest weight in determining which parent shall have custody of a child, or
who will be fit adoptive parents, is as always the best interests and welfare of the
child.3 68 For example, in In re Stone,169 a mother who had abandoned her child
was contesting an adoption proceeding. The court remanded the case because the
chancellor had neglected to make findings on the "two most important aspects" of
the matter: 1) whether the best interests of the child would be promoted by adop-
tion, and 2) whether the fact that the natural mother was Protestant should pre-
clude an adoption by Jewish parents on the basis of statutory policy. The statute
in question requires that: "Whenever possible, the petitioners shall be of the same
religious faith as the natural parents of the child -to be adopted." 370 Commonwealth
v. White37' also supports the proposition that, in adoption cases, religion is an
important factor, outweighed only by superior interests of the child's welfare. In
that case a Catholic mother, deserted by her husband, also a Catholic, placed their
eight-month-old child with a minister of the Assembly of God Church and his wife.
The father, in contesting the adoption proceeding, raised the religious issue and
demanded custody. The court voiced the most widely accepted position:
As a general rule, courts should endeavor to place the custody of a child
with persons of the same religious faith, but, bearing in mind the paramount
importance of the general welfare of the child, the courts may, in the exer-
cise of a sound discretion, place a child in the custody of persons of a differ-
ent religious faith if the child's welfare demands. A proper religious
atmosphere is an attribute of a good home and it contributes significantly
to the ultimate welfare of a child.
372
The court then affirmed the decree for the adoptive parents on the basis of the
father's misconduct and poor character, indicating that the best interests of the
child would be ill-served if the father were to have custody.
Where custody of children is an issue after a divorce, and the natural parents
are the antagonists, the religious factor is not as important. In Wood v. Wood,
37 1
a father sought to gain custody from his ex-wife on the ground that she was not
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rearing the children in the Catholic faith as they had agreed before marriage. The
coart dismissed this contention with a few well-chosen words:
In pure custody matters the welfare of the child must be the court's over-
riding consideration, and the responsibility for religious training of a child
must largely fall into the hands of the parent selected by a court as the
custodian.3 74
A rather extreme case 37 5 shows the extent to which a court's judgment as to the
material welfare of a child will outweigh all other factors, including those of a reli-
gious nature. The facts in Frank v. Frank76 showed that a mother married her
paramour, by whom she was pregnant before divorce from her first husband. She
then successfully sought custody of a child of the first marriage, because she was
able to provide more care than the father. Even though the natural father had been
raising the child as a Catholic, the court was content to say: "We can not say that
the chancellor abused his discretion in not giving the question of religion greater
weight in this case." ' In these cases the prime touchstone on which decisions turn
is that of the child's best welfare. An important constituent of "welfare!' here is
religion, but the courts cannot and do not choose between particular religions as
contributing more, or less, to that welfare.
(c) Agreements Concerning Religious Training
The so-called "pre-nuptial" agreement - a contract between engaged persons
relating to religious training of the children of the marriage - has generally been
considered unenforceable by civil courts."' To turn again to the Wood case,3 7 9 the
father sued either for custody of his child, or for specific enforcement of the wife's
agreement to raise the child as a Catholic. The court declined to enforce it, saying
that agreements of that kind, made under the auspices of church authorities, are
not matters with which a-civil court should concern itself. It based its decision on
two points: 1) that such agreements are impossible to enforce in the face of the
probability that mere lip service would be paid to any enforcing order, and 2) that
American governmental agencies traditionally remain aloof from ecclesiastical
matters in deference to specific constitutional prohibition.
In recent years, however, such agreements have often been incorporated in
separation and divorce decrees, with the result that they are governed by the state's
rules on obedience to, and modification of, court orders. Again, of course, the best
interest of the child is the chief guidepost. Two Illinois cases,38 0 however, have
shown a tendency toward rigidity; they assumed that a divorce decree was itself
controlling, because the welfare of the child was paramount in its original formula-
tion. In Taylor v. Taylor,s"' a Catholic mother had been given the right to deter-
mine the religious training of the children, and the Protestant father was given the
right to determine their educational training. The chancellor modified this decree
by eliminating the father's prerogative, saying that due to the fine line between reli-
gion and education, such a decree would prove troublesome and impractical. The
Supreme Court of Illinois reversed, saying that the only question was whether or
not circumstances had so changed as to justify the modification. Moreover, the
court indicated that there was no real religious issue in the case, dismissing it in
summary fashion:
The implication of plaintiff's argument that secular education cannot be
isolated from religious teaching is contrary to the basic tenets of our public
374 Id. at 104.
375 Frank v. Frank, 26 IUl. App. 2d 16, 167 N.E.2d 577 (1960).
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school system and it is a well known fact that millions of American Catholics
send their children to public schools without any apparent violation of their
religious precepts.
3 8 2
In the other Illinois decision, Gottlieb v. Gottlieb,
38 a similar situation was presented.
The Catholic mother, bound by the decree to raise the children as Jews, persistent-
ly violated its provisions by rearing them in the Catholic religion. The decree was
upheld against the argument that to enforce it would harm the children in the light
of their training up to that time.
[I]n the absence of clearly established circumstances indicating that the
best interests of the child would be served by modification we do not feel
that solemn agreements incorporated in a decree and sanctioned by the
court should be so lightly cast aside .... 3s3
In New York, a substantially different approach has been taken. In Hehman
v. Hehman,83 and in Martin v. Martin,3 8 6 children were allowed to choose which
religion they would prefer, notwithstanding that the decrees contained provisions
regulating their education and religious training. In those cases, the child's best
welfare was not considered as established by the divorce decree, in contrast to
Taylor and Gottlieb, but rather that their welfare depended upon their own choice.
Justice Friend, in the Gottlieb3 7 case, disagreed with the result in New York on the
ground that a child of tender years has not a mature and intelligent opinion on the
subject of religion, and there is no impartial way to determine the child's preference.
In sharp contrast is the opinion of Justice Shapiro in the Hehman case,
3 8 where he
says of the child: "[W]ith the heart of a child he may speed directly to what is the
truth for him more quickly and accurately than we adults whose lives and actions,
like Hamlet, are 'sicklied o'er with the pale cast of thought'. 3 8
8" The tendency of
the courts to handle religious problems in terms of existing legal concepts, where
readily available, is reflected again in this area. Prenuptial agreements are un-
enforceable standing alone; they may be enforceable when embedded in a judicial
decree.
(d) A New Approach
Divorce law ought not be an embodiment of morality but it should reflect the
teachings of religion on the importance of a stable family unit as far as is socially
desirable. Criticism of the existing marriage laws and family codes has been wide-
spread in the past years. It is too soon to predict whether state legislatures will
begin now to tighten up their domestic relations laws, but at least one state, Wis-
consin, has taken significant steps in attempting to regulate the -social institution of
marriage in an effective manner. Their new Family Code
8 0 expresses a visionary
attitude in dealing with that relation. It recognizes and expressly states the policy
to be followed in working with its provisions.
It is the intent of [the statute] to promote the stability and best interests of
marriage and the family. Marriage is the institution that is the foundation
of the family and of society. Its stability is basic to morality and civilization,
and of vital interest to society and the state. The consequences of the mar-
riage contract are more significant to society than those of other contracts,
and the public interest must be taken into account always. The seriousness
of marriage makes adequate premarital counseling and education for family
living highly desirable and courses thereon are urged upon all persons con-
382 Id. at 643.
383 31 Ill. App. 2d 120, 175 N.E.2d 619 (1961).
384 Id. at 621.
385 13 Misc. 2d 318, 178 N.Y.S.2d 328 (Sup. Ct. 1958).
386 127 N.Y.S.2d 851 (App. Div. 1954), aff'd per curiam, 308 N.Y. 136, 123 N.E.2d 812
(1954). Contra, Shearer v. Shearer, 73 N.Y.S.2d 337 (Sup. Ct. 1947); Ramon v. Ramon, 34
N.Y.S.2d 100 (Dom. Rel. Ct. 1942).
387 Gottlieb v. Gottlieb, 31 Ill. App. 2d 120, 175 N.E.2d 619 (1961).
388 Hehman v. Hehman, 13 Misc. 2d 318, 178 N.Y.S.2d 328 (Sup. Ct. 1958).
389 Id. at 331.
390 Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 245-48 (Supp. 1961).
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templating marriage. The impairment or dissolution of the marriage relation
generally results in injury to the public wholly apart from the effect upon the
parties immediately concerned. 3 9 '
Particularly exemplifying this new attitude are the following provisions. The
Code redefines marriage, not only as a civil contract, but as the legal status of hus-
band and wife.392 Permission of a judge is required for issuance of a marriage license
in all cases where there are minor children of a previous marriage, in order to in-
sure that obligations to such children will be met before new responsibilities are
undertaken.3 9 3 Justices of the peace may no longer perform marriage ceremonies."
And possibly most important is the section that provides that where a person con-
scientiously objects to divorce, he may insist on legal separation, which merely re-
moves some of the obligations of marriage, rather than severing the marriage bond.395
2. Antsmiscegenation - A Forgotten Value
In recent years there has been an increased awareness of legislative and judicial
responsibility in questions concerning civil rights. As a result, developments may
occur in cases deciding the constitutionality of antimiscegenation statutes, which
prevent marriage between persons of different races. As a practical matter, the gen-
eral thrust of these statutes is the prohibition of marriages between whites and
Negroes. About one-half of the states have enacted such legislation.396 In addition,
a few state constitutions have provisions embodying the same policy.3 7 Arguments
favoring these laws are usually based upon grounds of protection of civil harmony,
racial peace, and desire to keep the races pure and unmixed (on the basis of a
"scientifically proven" biological inferiority of colored races, especially Negroes).
There can be no reason why these statutes are allowed any semblance of validity
at this time. Only one state has held its antimiscegenation statute unconstitu-
tional;398 the rest have upheld them.39  The California decision in Perez v. Lip-
pold40 0 is interesting, not only as the one case holding for invalidity, but as a lengthy
exposition of what seems so obvious. Petitioners sought a writ of mandamus to compel
issuance of a marriage license to them against the prohibition of the existing law.
They contended that the statute prohibited the free exercise of their religion, specif-
ically, the right to partake of the Roman Catholic sacrament of Matrimony. The
court preferred not to decide the case on that ground, saying that if the law were
reasonably directed to a social evil, it must stand. To that end, they relied on
391 WIS STAT. ANN. § 245.001 (Supp. 1961).
392 Wis. STAT. ANN. § 245.01 (Supp. 1961).
393 Wis. STAT. ANN. § 245.10 (Supp. 1961).
394 Wis. STAT. ANN § 245.16 (Supp. 1961).
395 Wis. STAT. ANN. §9 247.085 (4), 247.09 (Supp. 1961). It must be noted, however, that
after five years a divorce may be had by either party, 'Wis. STAT. ANN. § 247.07(7) (Supp.
1961).
396 ALA. CODE fit. 14, § 360 (1958); Aiuz. Rnv. STAT. ANN. § 25-101 (1956); ARK. STAT.
ANN. § 55-104 (1947); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 90-1-2 (1953); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, §
101(a) (2) (1953); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 741.11 (1941), FLA. CONST. art. 16 § 24; GA. CODa
ANN. § 53-106 (1961); IND. ANN. STAT. § 44-104 (1952); Ky. REV. STAT. § 402.020 (1955);
LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 94 (West 1952); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 398 (1957); Mss. CODE
ANN. § 459 (1942), Miss. CONST. art. 14, § 263; Mo. Rxv. STAT. § 451.020 (1949); NEB.
REv. STAT. § 42-103 (1960); NEv. REV. STAT. § 122.180 (1957); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 51-3
(Supp. 1961), N.C. CONST. art. 14, § 8; OKLA. STAT. ANN. fit. 43, § 12 (1951); S.C. CODE §
20-7 (1952), S.C. CONST. art. 3, § 33; TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-402 (1956), TENN. CONST. art.
11, § 14; Tax. PEN. CODE ANN. arts. 492-94 (1952); UTAn CODE ANN. § 30-1-2 (1953); VA.
CODE ANN. §§ 20-50 to-60 (1950); W.VA. CODE ANN. § 4701 (1961); Wyo. Cobip. STAT.
ANN. 20-18 (1957).
397 See constitutions cited note 33 supra.
398 Perez v. Lippold, 32 Cal. 2d 711, 198 P.2d 17 (1948).
399 E.g., State v. Pass, 59 Ariz. 16, 121 P.2d 882 (1942); and State v. Gibson, 36 Ind. 389
(1871).
400 32 Cal. 2d 711, 198 P.2d 17 (1948).
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Reynolds v. United States,401 to wit, that some indirect and socially reasonable reli-
gious infringements are necessary and valid. Instead they based their decision on
two grounds. First, they said that the right to marriage is fundamental, and im-
plicit in that right is free choice of partners. The state, by restricting the right of
free choice in marriage on the basis of race alone, is thereby violating the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. Second, they held that the statute
was too vague, as a penal law, to be constitutionally enforceable. It made no pro-
vision for mixed ancestry, and did not specify what proportions of mixed blood were
necessary to classify persons as mulattoes.
The Supreme Court of the United States has never ruled on the question, but
has had two opportunities to do so. In Naim v. Naim,402 a white woman sought to
have her marriage to a Chinese annulled, claiming that the Virginia statute was
sufficient ground for nullity. The Virginia court held that the decree was properly
granted, notwithstanding the fact that the parties had married in North Carolina
to evade the Virginia statute. (It should be noted that the statute is applicable to
marriages contracted outside the state, where the persons return thereafter to reside
in Virginia.) The Supreme Court of the United States remanded the case on the
ground that the record failed to disclose facts sufficient to draw the constitut~ion-
ality of the statute in question, specifically because there was no exposition or finding
as to the relationship of the parties to the State of Virginia when they contracted
the marriage in North Carolina.403 After the Virginia court refused to send the case
back to the lower state court on procedural grounds, 4 4 the Supreme Court dismissed
the second appeal for want of a properly presented federal question. 40 5 In Jackson
v. Alabama,40° the conviction of a Negro woman for marrying a white man was




There has been no substantial religious attack on antimiscegenation statutes,
and very likely there will not be, until the day when interracial marriages no longer
carry with them the drastic social consequences present today.
3. Control of Birth - Social and Moral Agitation
(a) Artificial Insemination
Another sector of family law that may prove to be a source of future develop-
ment is that dealing with the artificial insemination of human beings. There is
little case law or legislation treating this subject as yet, but what there is condemns
artificial insemination by a third party donor as adulterous, and opposed to public
morals and welfare. 408 Perhaps the leading case at this time is Orford v. Orford,,f°9
an action for alimony by a wife who alleged she had given birth to a child ccn-
ceived by a third party donor. The husband defended by declaring that this was
adultery. The wife's argumeit was that adultery demanded normal sexual inter-
401 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
402 197 Va. 80, 87 S.E.2d 749 (1955).
403 Naimv. Naim, 350U.S. 891 (1955).
404 Naim v. Naim, 197 Va. 734, 90 S.E.2d 849 (1956).
405 Naim v. Naim, 350 U.S. 985 (1956).
406 37 Ala. App. 519, 72 So. 2d 114 (1954).
407 Jackson v. Alabama, 348 U.S. 888 (1954).
408 In Doornbos v. Doornbos, No. 54-S-14981, Super. Ct. Cook Oty., 1954, appeal dismissed,
12 Ill. App. 2d 473, 139 N.E.2d 844 (1956), it was held that heterologous artificial insemination.
with or without the husband's consent is contrary to public policy and good morals, and is adul-
tery on the part of the mother. This was an unpublished opinion noted in 36 CHrL-KENT L.
REv. 1, 23-24 (1959). In Strnad v. Strnad, 190 Misc. 786, 78 N.Y.S.2d 390 (Sup. Ct. 1948),
it was held that a child conceived by artificial insemination with the father's consent, was legiti-
mate on the theory that the father had "adopted" him. It should be noted that bills on the
subject have been proposed in Indiana, Minnesota, Ohio, Virginia, and Wisconsin, but have not
been acted upon. See also N.Y., SANITARY CODE § 112 (1947), which implicitly recognizes
heterologous artificial insemination as acceptable.
409 49 Ont. L.R. 15, 58 D.L.R. 251 (1921).
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course outside marriage, and that a distinction must be drawn between the act of
adultery, i.e., sexual intercourse, and conception and pregnancy, which is merely the
result of an impregnation. The court's holding was that the wife had committed
adultery in the usual way, but the judge went on to comment at length on the wife's
argument.
[T]he essence of the offense of adultery consists not in the moral turpitude
of the act of sexual intercourse, but in the voluntary surrender to another
person of the. reproductive powers or faculties of the guilty person; and any
submission of these powers to the service or enjoyment of any person other
than the husband or wife comes within the definition of adultery....
Sexual intercourse is adulterous because in the case of the woman, it in-
volves the possibility of introducing into the family of the husband a false
strain of blood. Any act on the part of the wife which does that would,
therefore, be adulterous. That such a thing could be accomplished in any
other than the natural manner probably never entered the heads of those who
considered the question before. . . . If it were necessary to do so, I would
hold that that in itself was "sexual intercourse."
410
This area presents a bewildering complexity of legal problems: 1) the question of
the child's legitimacy, 2) the question of inheritance rights, 3) the question of
adultery, 4) the question of a physician's liability for falsification of records and
for improperly performed inseminations, and 5) the question of the liability and
responsibility of the donor, to name a few. Because the existing law is scanty, no
prediction is possible as to the course to be taken. It seems rather more likely that
the issues will be fought in the political arena, and- therefore the existing social and
religious attitudes about artificial insemination take on increased importance.
Generally, the proponents of artificial insemination say that the practice fulfills
the need of healthy young couples who for some reason are unable to have children
in the normal way.411 Opponents of the practice say that, in light of the principle
that the end never justifies the means, it is opposed to the natural and moral law. -12
The Roman Catholic Church and the Anglican Church maintain that the practice
is immoral, and recommend the passage of legislation designed to make it a criminal
offense. The Protestant position has never been authoritatively stated, and the
Jewish position varies with the particular groups; orthodox, conservative, and liberal.
To what extent religious teachings will dictate the shape the law will take in this
area is difficult of ascertainment for the reason that there is no categorical moral
solution acceptable for application to all the people of our society. From a strictly
legal standpoint, the wisest course may well be abstention from positive legislation,
with the exception of the imposition of stringent control on the medical and biological
factors involved in order to prevent such dangers as incestuous impregnation.
(b) Contraception
Anthony Comstock, a fanatically zealous crusader against pornography, inspired
the passage of congressional laws appropriately known as the "Comstock laws" just
before the turn of the last century.41 3 In the years immediately following, the states,
410 Id. at 258.
411 Levisohn, Dilemma in Parenthood: Socio-Legal Aspects of Human Artificial Insemina-
tion, 36 CHL-KENT L. REV. (1959).
412 LoGatto, Artificial Insemination: Legal Aspects, and Artificial Insemination: Ethical and
Sociological Aspects, 1 CATHOLIC LAW. 172, 267 (1955).
413 Every article . . .designed . . . or intended for preventing conception or
producing abortion ... is declared to be noniailable matter.... 72 Stat.
962, 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (1958). [See § 2 of the original bill, 17 Stat. 598
(1873).]
All persons are prohibited from importing into the United States from
any foreign country ... any drug or medicine or any article whatever for
the prevention of conception or for causing unlawful abortion. . . . 62
Stat. 862 (1948), 19 U.S.C. § 1305(a) (1958). [See § 3 of the original bill,
17 Stat. 598 (1873).]
See also the McKinley Tariff Law, 62 Stat. 718 (1948), 18 U.S.C. § 552 (1950).
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with the single exception of New Mexico, followed the example of Congress. At this
time, some 33 states have statutes forbidding sale, distribution, advertisement, or
advice on the use of contraceptive devices. 414 Connecticut has forbidden the use of
contraceptives as well.4 1 5 Connecticut is also unusual in that its courts, as opposed
to the position maintained by other state and federal courts, 416 have refused to exempt
physicians from the reach of the statutes when they advise and counsel on the use
of artificial birth control measures.
417
The case of United States v. One Package, decided by the Second Circuit in
1936, definitely established that a doctor may import drugs or devices for preventing
conception when the health of his patients demands. 418 This decision was in large
part based on the result in Bours v. United States,419 which held that the abortion
provisions of the federal "Comstock law" were not applicable to situations in which
the abortion was to be done by a physician in order to save the woman's life.
Youngs Rubber Corp. v. C.I. Lee & Co.,4 20 and Davis v. United States,42' were
the intermediate steps in the progression from Bours to One Package. In the Youngs
case, contraceptives not intended for illegal use entitled the manufacturer to pro-
tection from trade mark infringement; and similarly, in the Davis case, the intent
to use the forbidden items for an illegal purpose was held to be necessary for a con-
viction under 18 U.S.C.A. § 1461 (which prohibits the transmission of contracep-
tives through the United States mails). This requirement is apparently well en-
trenched in the law, as was seen recently in United States v. H. L. Blake Co.,
4 22
where good faith sale of prophylactics to doctors, druggists, and jobbers (distributing
to such trade) for medical purposes, was beyond the reach df § 1461 in the absence
of proof of an intent to use the articles for the purpose of preventing conception.423
The states have accomplished the exemption of physicians prescribing contra-
ceptives for medical purposes both by statute424 and by decision. 5 In People v.
Sanger,426 the New York court applied the statutory exception to good faith advice
by a physician to cure or prevent disease, and included druggists acting on the
414 ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-211 to -213 (1956); ARx. STAT. ANN. §§ 82-944 to -954
(1960); CAL. BUs. & PROF. CODE § 601, § 4301-25; COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40-9-17, §§
66-10-3 to -10-12 (1953); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53-32 (1958); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16,
§§ 2501-04 (1953); HAWAII REV. LAWS § 155-73, §§ 302A-1 to -3 (1955); IDAHO CODE ANN.
§ 18-603 (1947) and §§ 39-801 to -810 (1961); IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-601, §§ 10-2803 to
-2804 (Supp. 1961); IowA CODE ANN. 725.5-.10 (1950); KAN. GEN STAT. ANN. § 21-1101
(1949) K. REv. STAT. §§ 214.190-.270 (1953); LA. REV. STAT. § 14:88 (1951); ME. R~v.
STAT. ANN. ch. 134, § 11, ch. 25, § 114 (1954); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 41 (1957); MAss.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, §§ 20-21 (1956); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 28.229 (1938); MINN.
STAT. ANN. §§ 617.25-.27 (1947); MIss. CODE ANN. § 2289 (1957); Mo. REV. STAT. §
563.300 (1949); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 94-3609, §§ 94-3616 to -3619 (1947); NEB.
REV. STAT. § 28-423 (1956) and §§ 71-1104 to -1114 (1958); NEv. REV. STAT. § 202.190, §§
202.210 -.230 (1960); N.Y. PEN. LAW §§ 1142-45; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-194 (1951); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2905.32 -.37 (Page 1953); ORE. REV. STAT. §§ 435.010 -.130, § 435.990
(1953); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4525 (1945); S.D. CODE § 13.1726 (1960); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 58-19-1(f), §§ 58-19-2 to -19-11 (1953); WASH. REV. CODE § 9.68.030, §§ 18.81.010
-.080 (1957); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 151.15 (1957).
415 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53-32 (1958).
416 United States v. One Package, 86 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1936); Davis v. United States, 62
F.2d 473 (6th Cir. 1933); Youngs Rubber Corp. v. C. I. Lee & Co., 45 F.2d 103 (2d Cir.
1930); McConnell v. City of Knoxville, 172 Tenn. 190, 110 S.W.2d 478 (1937); People v.
Sanger, 222 N.Y. 192, 118 N.E. 637 (1918).
417 Buxton v. Ullman, 147 Conn. 48, 156 A.2d 508 (1959).
418 United States v. One Package, 86 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1936).
419 229 Fed. 960 (7th Cir. 1915).
420 45 F.2d 103 (2d Cir. 1930).
421 62 F.2d 473 (6th Cir. 1933).
422 189 F.Supp. 930 (W.D. Ark. 1960).
423 A legal purpose is the prevention of disease. E.g., Youngs Rubber Corp. v. C. I. Lee &
Co., 45 F.2d 103, 108 (2d Cir. 1930).
424 N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 1142-45.
425 Commonwealth v. Corbett, 307 Mass. 7, 29 N.E.2d 151 (1940).
426 222 N.Y. 192, 118 N.E. 637 (1918).
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physician's orders. In McConnell v. City of Knoxville,427 a city ordinance allowing
the exception for physicians was held constitutional. The Massachusetts decision in
Commonwealth v. Corbett
4 2
8 is similar to Davi 4 29 in that it demanded knowledge by
the seller that the articles were to be used for the prevention of conception in order
to convict him under the Massachusetts statute.4 30 Informational literature con-
cerning the prevention of conception has been allowed under the physician's ex-
ception.
4 31
The most recent state activity in this field has taken llace in New Jersey and
Connecticut. The New Jersey statute 32 was held to be unconstitutionally vague in
State v. Kinnel Building Drug Stores.433 The whole attack on the statute there was
leveled on one phrase - "without just cause." Two cases decided prior to Kinney
in New Jersey had not entertained doubts concerning that phrase, and the basis for
the latest decision seems unfortunate. The New Jersey legislature may well have
difficulty in passing an acceptable statute in the face of the attitude of the court,
in spite of the statement: "There is no question but that the State can control the
sale of contraceptive material." 4" '
The Kinney decision, however, has not received the national attention that cer-
tain Connecticut cases have. After Tileston v. Ullman was dismissed by the Supreme
Court of the United States on jurisdictional grounds,43 5 five cases were instituted in
Connecticut that were believed to have "plugged the jurisdictional hole."
4"
In Buxton v. Ullman, a doctor alleged he could not prescribe contraceptives,
without criminal prosecution and the loss of his license, for a woman patient with
a serious heart condition. This woman also brought her own suit as Jane Doe. In
Hoe v. Ullman, the medical problem demanding contraception was an RH-negative
and RH-positive blood factor of husband and wife, a problem in genetics which
had caused the birth of three abnormal children, and it was contended that there
would be psychological damage to the mother from another such birth.
And in Trubek v. Ullman, a young couple, both law students, wished to complete
their studies before having children. The result of the Buxton4 3 7 decision in Con-
427 172 Tenn. 190, 110 S.W.2d 478 (1937).
428 307 Mass. 7, 29 N.E.2d 151 (1940).
429 Davis v. United States, 62 F.2d 473 (6th Cir. 1933).
430 MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 272, §§ 20-21 (1956).
431 Consumers Union of the United States v. Walker, 145 F.2d 33 (D.C. Cir. 1944), held
that 18 U.S.C.A. § 1461 did not apply to a special report issued by the plaintiff to its members
(restricted to those married and using prophylactics on doctor's orders), because this report
supplied information vital to life and health. See also United States v. Nicholas, 97 F.2d 510
(2d Cir. 1938); United States v. One Book Entitled "Contraception," 51 F.2d 525 (S.D.N.Y.
1931); United States v. One Obscene Book Entitled "Married Love," 48 F.2d 821 (S.D.N.Y.
1931).
432 Any person who, without just cause, utters... or possesses with intent ...
to sell... any [thing] ... for the prevention of conception or the procuring
of abortion... is a disorderly person. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A: 170-76 (1953).
(Emphasis added.)
433 56 N.J. Super. 37, 151 A.2d 430 (1959).
434 Id. at 432.
435 318 U.S. 44 (1943), dismissing appeal from 129 Conn. 84, 26 A.2d 582 (1942). The
Court said that, in bringing a suit on behalf of his patients, the doctor had no standing to sue.
436 Buxton v. Ullman, Doe v. Ullman, Hoe v. Ullman, Poe v. Ullman, 147 Conn. 48, 156
A.2d 508 (1959). Roe v. Ullman, No. 87984, New Haven County Court, was withdrawn in lieu
of Trubek v. Ullman, then No. 90417, New Haven County Court. Subsequently, when Trubek
reached the Connecticut Supreme Court of Errors, it was held that the rights of the parties
were previously determined by the decision in Buxton, 147 Conn. 633, 165 A.2d 158 (1960).
Three other cases were also brought at that time in the New Haven County Court, based on the
infringement of the religious freedom of Protestant clergynien who wished to counsel
parishioners on marital responsibilities. Willard v. Ullman, No. 90317; Livingston v. Ullman,
No. 90316; Teague v. Ullman, No. 90315.
437 147 Conn. 48, 156 A.2d 508 (1959). The decision was based on the cases of Tilestozi
v. Ullman, 129 Conn. 84, 26 A.2d 582 (1942), and State v. Nelson, 126 Conn. 412, 11 A.2d
856 (1940). In the latter case, an indictment of two doctors and a nurse for violations of the
statute was upheld, over demurrer.
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necticut was as expected. The statute was upheld, and an appeal was taken to the
United States Supreme Court. The appeal was prosecuted on the Poe and Buxton
cases, and it was held that the controversy was not sufficiently ripe to require a de-
cision on the merits.438 The reasoning of Mr. Justice Frankfurter was that Connecti-
cut had not chosen to enforce the statute, and thus the controversy was deprived
of the "immediacy" necessary for constitutional adjudication. The Court demanded
that there be a real danger of sustaining some direct injury as the result of enforce-
ment of the statute. Mr. Justice Douglas dissented on the dual grounds that: 1) in
restricting the right of the doctor to advise his patients, the statute was an uncon-
stitutional infringement of his freedom of expression, and 2) in prohibiting the use of
contraceptives by married couples, the statute deprived them of their liberty with-
out due process of law, within the meaning of the fourteenth amendment.
(c) Abortion
The original federal "Comstock law" also prohibited the passage of abortifacients
through the mails, 43 9 in interstate commerce,440 and from foreign countries.441 But
as was noted above, the decision in Bours v. United States42 exempted physicians
from the scope of its coverage. However, the law on sale, carriage, and advertisement
of abortifacients has created few problems in relation to those raised by penal laws
prohibiting the performance of an abortion - particularly those abortions designated
as "therapeutic."
Every state makes abortion a criminal offense, 443 and all exempt a therapeutic
abortion when necessary to save the mother's life.4 4 Only six allow the same excep-
438 Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961). It is said that the decision here is difficult to
reconcile with that of United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947). A possible
ground for explanation is that the Connecticut statute had been "enforced" but once in its
history (State v. Nelson, 126 Conn. 412, 11 A.2d 856 (1940), while the Hatch Political Activ-
ity Act, 53 Stat. 1148 (1939), as amended, 5 U.S.C. § 118(i) (1950), had not admitted of the
same laxity of enforcement.
439 72 Stat. 962, 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (1958).
440 72 Stat. 962, 18 U.S.C. § 1462 (1958).
441 62 Stat. 862, 19 U.S.C. § 1305(a) (1958).
442 229 Fed. 960 (7th Cir. 1915).
443 ALA. CODE tit. 14, § 9 (1958); ALASKA CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 65-4-6 (1949); Asuz REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 13-211 to -213 (1956); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-301 to -302, §§ 41-2223 to
-2224 (1947); CAL. PEN. CODE §§ 274-275; COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 40-2-23, §§ 66-3-65
to -3-67 (1953); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 53-29 to -32 (1958); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11,
§§ 301-302 (1953); GUAM PEN. CODE §§ 274-275 (1953); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 797.01-.02
(1941); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 26-1101 to -1104 (1953); HAWAII REV. LAWS §§ 309-3 to -5
(1955); IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 18-601 to -603 (1947); ILL. ANN. STAT. tit. 38, 23-1 to -3
(Smith-Hurd 1961); IOWA CODE ANN. § 701.1 (1946); IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 10-105 to -106
(1956); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 21-409 to -410, § 21-437 (1949); Ky. REV. STAT. §
435.040, § 436.020 (1955); LA. REV. STAT. §§ 14:87- :88 (1950); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. Ch.
134, §§ 9-11 (1954); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 3 (1957); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272,
§§ 19-21 (1956); MICH. STAT. ANN. §§ 28.554-.555 (1954); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 617.18-
.21 (1945); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 2222-2223 (1956); Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 559.090-.100
(1949); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §§ 94-401 to -402 (1947); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 28-404 to
-405 (1956); NEV. REv. STAT. §§ 201.120-.140 (1957); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 585:12-:14
(1955); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:87-1 (1953); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 40-3-1 to -3-3 (1953); N.Y.
PEN. LAW §§ 80-82; N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-44 to -46 (1953); N.D. REV. CODE §§ 12-25-01
to -25-07 (1960); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2901.16-.17 (Page 1953); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
21, §§ 861-862 (1951); ORE. REV. STAT. § 163.060 (1961); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 11-3-1
to -3-4 (1956); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§4718-4719 (1945); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-301 to
-302 (1956); S.D. CODE §§ 13.3101-.3103 (1939); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-21- to -2-2
(1953); Tax. PEN. CODE ANN. arts. 1191-1196 (1961); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, §§.101-104
(1958); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.1-62 to -63 (1950); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 9.02.010-9.02.040
(1952); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 5923 (1961); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 940.04 (1958); Wyo. ComP.
STAT. ANN. §§ 6-77 to -78 (1957).
444 Except Louisiana, LA. REv. STAT. §§ 14:87-88 (1950).
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tion where the abortion is necessary to preserve the mother's health.f
5 In construing
the requirement of "necessity," most states say that there must be actual necessity."
6
What of the mother who aborts herself, or consents to the abortion? Generally
she is not held accountable. In the Matter of Vince,
47 takes the usual approach in
these situations; it was said there that the mother's offense is wholly a common law
crime (not statutory),44 and therefore that it must be proved that the foetus was
"quick," i.e., alive, at the time of the abortion.
The only real controversy raging in legal circles concerning abortion is that
raised by section 207.11 of the Model Penal Code.
449 This section would constitute,
if adopted, a significant relaxation of the existing state law.
Section 207.11. Abortion and Related Offenses.
(1) Unjustified Abortion. A person who purposely and unjustifiably
terminates the pregnancy of another otherwise than by a live birth commits a
felony of the third degree or, where the pregnancy has continued beyond the
twenty-sixth week, a felony of the second degree.
(2) Justifiable Abortion. A licensed physician is justified in terminat-
ing pregnancy if:
(a) he believes there is substantial risk that continuance of the preg-
nancy would gravely impair the physical or mental health of the mother or
that the child would be born with grave physical or mental defects, or the
pregnancy resulted from rape by force or its equivalent . . . or from
incest... and
(b) two physicians, one of whom may be the person performing the
abortion, have certified in writing their belief in the justifying circumstances
and have filed such certificate prior to the abortion in the licensed hospital
where it was to be performed, or in such other place as may be designated
by law.
Justification of abortion is an affirmative defense.
Other sections make self-abortion unlawful if past the twenty-sixth week of the
pregnancy,45 0 and distribution of abortifacients unlawful unless to physicians and
others involved in the chain of distribution.
45' Prevention of conception is expressly
exempted from the section.
452
The formulation of this Model Code section by the draftsmen of the American
Law Institute has been vigorously attacked on objections 
to its language,
45 3
to its necessity on medical grounds,
454 and to the moral view it reflects.
4 s There are
irreconcilable and basic differences which have generated a great deal of bitterness
456
445 ALA. CODE tit. 14, § 9 (1958); COLO. Rnv. STAT. ANN. § 40-2-23, §§ 66-3-65 to -3-67
(1953); D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-210 (1961); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 3 (1957); N.M. STAT.
ANN. §§ 40-3-1 to -3-3 (1953); ORE. REv. STAT. § 163.060 (1961). The exception may apply
to mental health as well. See The King v. Bourne, [1939] 1 K.B. 687, 3 All E.R. 615.)
446 Adams v. State, 200 Md. 133, 88 A.2d 556 (1952); State v. Rudman, 126 Me. 177, 136
Aft. 817 (1927); Hatchard v. State, 79 Wis. 357, 48 N.W. 380 (1891). Contra, State v.
Dunkelbarger, 206 Iowa 971, 221 N.W. 592 (1928). (May a physician remove a dead foetus
from the womb and escape prosecution therefor? Commonwealth v. Wood, 77 Mass. (11 Gray)
85, 92 (1858), said yes; Anderson v. Commonwealth, 190 Va. 665, 58 S.E.2d 72 (1950), said
no, on the ground that abortion is a crime against both mother and foetus.)
447 2 N.J. 443, 67 A.2d 141 (1949). See also People v. Buffum, 40 Cal. 2d 709, 256 P.2d
317 (1953), which discusses the guilt of a mother cooperating with an abortionist.
448 Only Rhode Island and Vermont expressly exclude her, though. See statutes cited note
31 supra.




453 Quay, Justifiable Abortion - Medical and Legal Foundations, 49 GEo. L.J. 173-80
(1960). The specific complaint was vagueness and ambiguity.
454 Id. at 180-256.
455 Tinnelly, Abortion and Penal Law, 5 CATHOLIc LAW, 187 (1959).
456 See e.g., Alvah W. Sulloway, The Legal and Political Aspects of Population Control 
in
the United States, 25 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 593, 604-613 (1960). On population control
generally, see Norman St. John-Stevas, A Roman Catholic View of Population Control, Id. at
445; and Richard M. Fagley, A Protestant View of Population Control, Id. at 470. (These
articles were part of an extensive symposium, which effectively dealt with the problem of popu-
lation control.)
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- a situation that will continue because one of the antagonists, the Roman Catho-
lic Church, is committed irrevocably to its position.
Totally apart from the moral differences are problems involving such con-
siderations on the practical level as: (1) the psychological and physical results of
abortions; (2) the untold harms wrought upon women by quacks - the truly
criminal abortion mills; (3) the deleterious effects of unenforceability and nullifica-
tion of existing laws in cases where reputable physicians (in the public eye) are
involved; and, (4) the danger in declaring as criminal, behavior demanded in good
conscience by at least a substantial minority of the American people and (5) the
danger of weakening in an immediate and practical way the moral fiber of the
nation.
457
These considerations are also relevant in any planned reform of the contra-
ception laws. Some reforms seem to be necessary in the abortion and contraception
laws in order to remedy the evil of back room abortionists and the evil of unen-
forceable prohibitions of birth control. Possibly, the only good effect of the existing
law is the complete restriction of public display, advertising, and the possibility of
indiscriminate access by young people to abortifacients and contraceptive devices.
IV. FREE EXERCISE
A. TEST OATHS - An Anachronism Removed
Those who record the progress of religious liberty in this country have always re-
garded at least one battle as irrevocably won. Religious tests for public office, we
were assured, had disappeared long ago. The Supreme Court has consistently re-
ferred to this particular method of eliciting religious unanimity as barred.45  A
statement of Justice Rutledge illustrates this attitude:
Compulsory attendance upon religious exercises went out early in the
process of separating church and state, together with forced observance of
religious forms and ceremonies. Test oaths and religious qualifications for
office followed later. These things none devoted to our great tradition of
religious liberty would think of bringing back.
459
But the unmourned tests were not fully buried. Eight states have retained in
their constitutions the requirement of a declaration of belief in a Supreme Being as
a prerequisite for public office. 60 Typical of such provisions is that found in the
Mississippi constitution: "No person who denies the existence of a Supreme Being
shall hold any office in this state."46 1 Though it is impossible to discover whether
these clauses have been rigidly enforced, it is certain that their conformity with
the federal constitution had never been considered by the Supreme Court until the
closing days of the 1960 term." 2 The story of that first (and probably final) treat-
ment will receive the primary emphasis in this section of the survey.
The American experience in this area is closely related to the English religious
tests which arose from the struggles of various sects for supremacy during the seven-
teenth century. The establishment and gradual decline of these tests in England has
been well summarized elsewhere.46 3 It is sufficient to note that though the English
457 See Packer & Gampbell, Therapeutic Abortion: A Problem in Law and Medicine, 11
STAN. L. Rav. 417 (1959), on the attitude of hospitals and medical men to the necessity and
desirability of therapeutic abortion. This article indicates that strict statutory standards are not,
in practice, complied with.
458 Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1,. 44 (1947) (separate opinion); Girouard v.
United States, 328 U.S. 61, 69 (1946); West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S.
624, 663 (1942) (separate opinion).
459 330 U.S. 1, 44 (1947) (separate opinion).
460 ARx. CONST. art. 19, § 1; MD. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS art. 37; Miss. CONST. art. 14,
§ 265; N.C. CONST. art. VI, § 8; PA. CONST. art. I, § 4; S.C. CONST. art. XVII, § 4; TENN.
CONST. art. IX, § 2; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 4.
461 MIss. CONST. art. 14, § 265.
462 Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961).
463 PFEFFER, CHURCH; STATE AND FREEDOM 25 (1953).
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tests were instrumental in forcing the colonists to come here, many of them felt no
compunction against imposing similar restrictions within the colonies.
4" Opposition
to these religious requirements led to the insertion in the federal constitution of the
article VI provision forbidding such qualifications for federal office: "(N) o reli-
gious Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to an Office or Trust under the
United States."46 5 Some of the discussions during the period of ratification con-
cerning this clause are illuminating. Luther Martin, a delegate to the Convention,
said in addressing the Maryland legislature on November 29, 1787:
The part of the system which provides, that no religious test shall ever be
required as a qualification to any office or public trust under the United
States, was adopted by a great majority of the convention, and without much
debate; however, there were some members so unfashionable as to think,
that a belief in the existence of a Deity, and of a state of future rewards
and punishments would be some security for the good conduct of our rulers,
and that, in a Christian country it would be at least decent to hold some dis-
tinction between the professors of Christianity and downright infidelity or
paganism. 466
The opposite, and prevailing, attitude was expressed by Theophilus Parsons
in the Massachusetts ratifying convention:
It has been objected, that the Constitution provides no religious test by
oath, and we may have in power unprincipled men, atheists and pagans. No
man can wish more ardently than I do, that all our publick offices may be
filled by men who fear God and hate wickedness; but it must remain with
the electors to give the government this security - an oath will not do it:
Will an unprincipled man be entangled by an oath? Will an atheist or a
pagan dread the vengeance of the Christian's God, a being in his opinion the
creature of fancy and credulity? It is a solecism in expression.
467
Before turning to the specific Maryland test it is necessary to recall the com-
mon law disqualification of nontheists as witnesses and jurors. The rationale of this
exclusion, the notion that the law, as an assurance of their credibility, must require
that participants in trials believe in a personal avenging God, is an obvious analogue
to the religous tests for public office.""s The withering of this disability, now al-
most complete,4e 9 indicates that honesty and reliability are no longer thought to be
confined solely to theists.
The history of the English test oaths, the American constitutional provisions.
and the common law disabilities all combine to aid us in understanding the decision
which invalidated the Maryland religious test.
Roy P. Torcaso, having been appointed by the governor to the office of notary
public, went to the county clerk's office to obtain his commission. The clerk asked
him to sign the prescribed oath and affirmation of the existence of God.
4'10 Torcaso
refused and the clerk declined to issue the comiission. Torcaso thereupon sought
a writ of mandamus ordering the commission issued. He lost in the circuit court and
appealed to the Court of Appeals of Maryland.
471
In affirming the decision of the lower court, the Court of Appeals reviewed
464 Discussion of these colonial establishments may be found in Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S.
488, 490 (1961) and scattered throughout I STOKES, CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED
STATES (1950).
465 U.S. CONST. art. VI.
466 I ELLIOT, DEBATES ON THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 385-86 (1836).
467 II ELLIOT, DEBATES ON THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 119 (1836).
468 See Thurston v. Whitney, 56 Mass. (2 Cush.) 104 (1848); Blocker v. Burness, 2 Ala.
354 (1841); Brock v. Milligan, 10 Ohio 121 (1840); Atwood v. Welton, 7 Conn. 66 (1828).
469 See 3 JONES, EVIDENCE § 752 (5th ed. 1959).
470 This affirmation was required on the basis of Article 37 of the Maryland Declaration of
Rights which reads as follows: "That no religious test ought ever to be required as a qualifica-
tion for any office of profit or trust in this State, other than a declaration of belief in the exist-
ence of God; nor shall the Legislature prescribe any other oath of office other than the oath
prescribed by this Constitution."
471 Torcaso v. Watkins, 223 Md. 49, 162 A.2d 438, 439, 440 (1960).
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the history of religious tests in Maryland.4 7 2 It settled all problems of construction




More important than the problems of interpreting the Maryland constitution
is the question of the validity of that provision under the federal constitution. The
appellant contended that the test violated his freedom of religion and discriminated
against him.47 ' The Court of Appeals readily conceded that the fourteenth amend-
ment is supreme over state constitutions and that the freedom of religion provisions
of the first amendment applied to the states through the fourteenth.47.5 The court,
however, refused to find that the fourteenth amendment was violated by the reli-
gious test in its constitution. It argued that Torcaso was not being compelled to
believe anything but was merely required to affirm belief in God in order to take
a state office s.4 7  The state's power to set reasonable qualifications for its offices was
clearly established, said the court4 7 7 This requirement was viewed by it as reason-
able, particularly because it saw a paradox in having solemn oaths administered
by persons who did not believe in their sanctity.41 s
The court neither faced squarely nor answered satisfactorily the problem of
whether Torcaso's freedom of religion was infringed. It did refer extensively to
other provisions of the Maryland Declaration of Rights limiting the privileges of
nontheists.479 In that connection the court said: "The historical record makes it clear
that religious toleration, in which this State has taken pride, was never thought to
encompass the ungodly."480 Anticipating review by the Supreme Court, the Court
of Appeals predicted that its religious test would be upheld, 48 1 citing Mr. Justice
Douglas' statement in Zorach v. Glauson: "We are a religious people whose institu-
tions presuppose a Supreme Being. ' 4 2 In the same paragraph the court referred to




Almost a year after its decision in Torcaso the Court of Appeals was proven
wrong in its prediction as the Supreme Court unanimously struck down Article 37,
the religious test provision. 8 4 The opinion of the Court, in which all the Justices
except Mr. Justice Frankfurter and Mr. Justice Harlan joined, is a forceful indict-
ment of all religious tests. Mr. Justice Black based his opinion on the free exercise
clause. 48 5 He began by stating that this was clearly a religious test. s6 He then
examined the history of such tests in England and Colonial America.48 7 Article
VI of the Constitution, according to the Justice, is proof behind the Court's ob-
servation in Girourard v. United States that the "test oath is abhorrent to our tradi-
tion."
488
Turning to the first amendment, the Court stated that it was clearly designed
to go beyond article VI.489 Saying that the history, rationale and scope of the first
amendment have been thoroughly explored previously, Mr. Justice Black referred
in a footnote to seven cases interpreting the amendment. 49 Then, however, the
472 Id. at 441.
473 Id. at 441-42.
474 Id. at 440.
475 Id. at 442.
476 Ibid.
477 Ibid.
478 Id. at 443-44.
479 Id. at 443.
480 Ibid.
481 Ibid.
482 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952).
483 Torcaso v. Watkins, 223 Md. 49, 162 A.2d 438, 443 (1960).
484 Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961).
485 Id. at 496.
486 Id. at 489-90.
487 Id. at 490-91.
488 328 U.S. 61, 69 (1946).
489 Torcaso v.Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 492 (1961).
490 Ibid.
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Justice cited two cases, Cantwell v. Connecticut,4 1 the first case applying the free
exercise clause to the states, and Everson v. Board of Education,492 the first discus-
sion of the applicability to the states of the establishment clause, and quoted from
them.493 The Court next examined the famous statement of Mr. Justice Douglas
relied on by the Maryland Court of Appeals and quoted above.49 4 "Nothing decided
or written in Zorach lends support to the idea that the Court there intended to open
up the way for government, state or federal, to restore the historically and constitu-
tionally discredited policy of probing religious beliefs by test oaths or limiting public
offices to persons who have, or perhaps more properly profess to have, a belief in
some particular kind of religious concept."4 15
The next paragraph appears to be the core of the Court's opinion:
We repeat and again reaffirm that neither a State nor the Federal Gov-
ernment can constitutionally force a person "to profess a belief or disbelief
in any religion." Neither can constitutionally pass laws or impose require-
ments which aid all religions as against non-believers and neither can aid
those religions based on a belief in the existence of God as against those reli-
gions founded on different beliefs. 496
Finally, the Court considered the statement of the Court of Appeals that Article
37 was constitutional since no one is compelled to seek public office.497 "The fact,
,however," Mr. Justice Black answered, "that a person is not compelled to hold
public office cannot possibly be an excuse for barring him from office by state-im-
posed criteria forbidden by the Constitution. ' ' 9 8 Weiman v. Updegraif499 is cited
in support of this holding. In summary the Court said, "This Maryland religious
test for public office unconstitutionally invades the appellant's freedom of belief
and religion and therefore cannot be enforced against him."'0
The effects of the decision in Torcaso are not difficult to evaluate. The language
of the Court was clearly broad enough to outlaw all religious tests for public office.
If the case should arise, it is also fairly certain that any disabilities of witnesses based
on religious belief would also fall. Leo Pfeffer, counsel for Torcaso, is of the opinion
that the decision should, but will not, result in the amendment of state and federal
statutes prescribing oaths so as to remove the phrase "so help me God." 59 1
It is -difficult to tell whether Mr. Justice Black is of the opinion that nonreligious
persons are protected in their lack of belief by the "free exercise" clause. The Court's
statement that, "Neither [the federal nor state government] can constitutionally
pass laws which aid all religions against non-believers' ' 5°z is remarkably like an
earlier statement in Everson repeated in Torcaso. In that case, interpreting the
'establishment of religion" clause, the Justice said that it meant at least that, "Neither
a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can pass laws
which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another."503
The sentence in Torcaso, when compared with the sentence in Everson, seems to
refer to establishment and probably reflects the prevailing interpretation of that
clause. But Torcaso is purportedly decided upon the "free exercise" clause. It is the
appellant's freedom of religion which is said to be violated. Lower courts have
specifically atated that the fourteenth amendment does not protect freedom from
491 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
492 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
493 Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 492-93 (1961).
494 Id. at 494.
495 Ibid.
496 Id. at 495.
497 Id. at 495-96.
498 Ibid.
499 344 U.S. 183 (1952).
500 Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 496 (1961).
501 Pfeffer, Some Current Issues in Church and State, 13 rW. REs. L. REv. 33 (1961).
502 Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 (1961).
503 Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947).
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religion.504 Taken in total, this case apparently does extend the protection of the
free exercise clause to nonbelievers, but just how it does so is not clear. We are the
people of the Text and Gloss but, it is submitted, state laws should not be struck
down by Gloss unless clear reference is made to the provision of the Text which is
being employed.
One final effect of Torcaso should be mentioned. Two distinguished scholars,
debating the constitutionality of federal aid to education, have found in the Torcaso
opinion evidence of the Court's attitude on that question.50 5 This case, then, is in a
curious position: it eliminates an anachronistic remnant of an earlier era, and by
its language casts a long shadow on other, future controversies.
B. CLERICAL PRIVILmEGE - Noticeable Activity
Though the subject is a narrow one, there has been much legislation dealing
with the role of ministers of the church in courts of the state. It was the rule at com-
mon law that a minister did not have a legal privilege to refuse to reveal that which
was communicated to him in his role as confessor or spiritual advisor.501,
Dissatisfaction with this view has led to the enactment of statutes granting
such a privilege to all clergymen, regardless of denomination, where the elements
of penitential confession or spiritual counsel and advice, according to the usual
course of their practice or discipline, are present. Forty-one states now have such
legislation;507 in the last three years, seven states - Florida,50 Illinois,5° 9 North
504 See Zorach v. Clausen, 198 Misc. 631, 199 N.Y. S.2d 339, 344 (Sup. Ct. 1950);
Gordon v. Board of Education, 78 Cal. App. 464, 178 P.2d 488, 495 (1947) (separate opinion).
Contra, Ex parte Jentzsch, 112 Cal. 468, 471, 44 Pac. 803, 803-04 (1896).
505 Scanlan, Legal Aspects of Federal Aid to Parochial Schools, 37 NOTRE DAmE LAWYER
288, 305 (1962), Pfeffer, Some Current Issues in Church and State, 13 W. REs. L. REv. 14
(1961).
506 See 5 CATHOLIC LAW. 339 (1959); 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2394 (McNaughton rev.
1961); TORPEY, JUDICIAL DOCTRINES OF RELIGIOUS RIGHTS IN AMERICA 302 (1948); Russell
v. Jackson, 9 Hare 387, 391, 68 Eng. Rep. 558, 560 (Ch. 1851) (Privilege denied in dictum);
Wilson v. Rastall, 4 Term R. 753, 759-60, 100 Eng. Rep. 1283, 1287 (K.B. 1792) (the privilege
was confined to cases of counsel, solicitor, and attorney only); The King v. Sparkes (K.B.),
cited by Garrow, for the plaintiff in Dubarr6 v. Livette, Peake N.P. 108, 109-10, 170 Eng. Rep.
96, 97 (K.B. 1791) (the prisoner-papist's confession to a Protestant clergyman was admitted
in evidence); Anonymous, Skin. 404, 90 Eng. Rep. 179, 180 (K.B. 1693) (communications
with an attorney or scrivener were privileged; not so as to those with a "gentleman, parson,
etc." ).
507 ALASKA COMP. LAWS ANN. § 58-6-5 (1949); ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2233 (1956);
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 28-606 (1947); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE ANN. § 1881 (3); COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 153-1-7(3) (1953); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.241 (1960); GA. CODE ANN. § 38-419.1
(1954); HAwAI REV. LAws: § 222-20 (1955); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 9-203 (1948); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 51, § 48.1 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1961); IND. ANN. STAT. § 2-1714 (1946); IowA CODE
ANN. § 622.10 (1950); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 60-2805 (1949); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §
421.210(4) (1959); LA. REV. STAT. § 15:477, :478 (1950); MD. ANN. CODE art. 35, § 13
(1957); MICH. COMp. LAws § 617.61 (1948); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 595.02(3) (1947);Mo.
ANN. STAT. § 491.060 (1952); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 93-701-4(3) (1947); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 25-1201-1206 (1956); NEV. REV. STAT. § 48.070 (1957); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-
23 (Supp. 1960); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 20-1-12 (C) (1953); N.Y. CIVIL PRACTICE ACT ANN.
§ 351 (Cahill-Parsons 1955); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-53.1 (Supp. 1961); N.D. REV. CODE §
31-01-06 (1960); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2317.02 (Page 1953); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12,
§ 385(5) (Supp. 1958); ORE. REV. STAT. § 44.040 (1957); PA. STAT. ANN. fit. 28, § 331
(Supp. 1960); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 9-17-23 (Supp. 1961); S.C. CODE § 56-861 (Supp.
1960) ; S.D. CODE § 36.0101 (1939) ; TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-109 to -111 (Supp. 1961) ; UTAH
CODE ANN. § 78-24-8(3) (1953); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1607 (1959); WASH. REV. CODE
§ 5.60.060(3) (1956); W.VA. CODE ANN. § 4992(d) (1961); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 325.20
(1958); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-139(2) (1957).
508 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.241 (1960).
509 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 51, § 48.1 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1961).
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Carolina,510 Pennsylvania,51 1 Rhode Island,512 South Carolina,513 and Tennessee51
- have classified communications of this type as privileged.
There is no federal law on the subject, although the Supreme Court has
recognized the privilege in dicta,5 15 and the District of Columbia Circuit has de-
termined that recognition should be accorded to it.16 The Court of Appeals based
its decision on what was termed a "proper application" of Rule 26 of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure.
5 17
Dean Wigmore, in his treatise on evidence, has proposed four fundamental con-
ditions for the establishment of a privi.ege against disclosure of such communica-
tions:
(1) The communications must originate in a confidence that they will not
be disclosed.
(2) This element of confidentiality must be essential to the full and satis-
factory maintenance of the relation between the parties.
(3) The relation must be one which in the opinion of the community
ought to be sedulously fostered.
(4) The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of the
communications must be greater than the benefit thereby gained for the
correct disposal of litigation.518
The conditions laid down by Wigmore are satisfied by clergyman-penitent com-
munications, and the reasons for according recognition to the privilege seem com-
pelling. It appears that this problem of the relations between church and state is
coming to a near-unanimous and amicable solution.
C. INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM - A Need for Sensitive Balancing
1. The Fundamental Conflict
The "free exercise clause" of the first amendment and similar provisions of
various statle constitutions have repeatedly been subjected to .limitation.510 Although
510 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-53.1 (1960).
511 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, § 331 (Supp. 1960).
512 R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 9-17-23 (Supp. 1961).
513 S.C. CODE § 56-861 (Supp. 1960).
514 TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 24-109 to -111 (Supp. 1961).
515 Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105, 107 (1875).
516 Mullen v. United States, 263 F.2d 275, 280 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
517 Id. at 278-80. Judge Fahy stated:
The resolution of the problem today for federal courts is to be found in
a proper application of Rule 26, Fed. R. Crim. P., adopted in 1948 under
the authority of Congress. This Rule provides: ". . . The admissibility of
evidence and the competency and privileges of witnesses shall be governed,
except when an Act of Congress or these rules otherwise provide, by the prn-
ciples of the common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the
United States in the light of reason and experience."
. .. . Sound policy - reason and experience - concedes to religious
liberty a rule of evidence that a clergyman shall not disclose on a trial the
secrets of a penitent's confidential confession to him, at least absent the peni-
tent's consent.... The benefit of preserving these confidences inviolate over-
balances the possible benefit of permitting litigation to prosper at the expense
of the tranquility of the home, the integrity of the professional relationship,
and the spiritual rehabilitation of a penitent. The rules of evidence have
always been concerned not only with truth but with the matter of its
ascertainment.
It should be noted that under Rule 43(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the
determination of whether to respect the clergyman-penitent privilege would be controlled by
state statutes or decisions, since there are no contrary federal statutes or rules of court. In the
absence of a state statute or decision on the subject, the court would be free to exercise its
discretion.
518 8 WIoGoRE, EvmENCE § 2285 (McNaughton rev. 1961). Both the Model Code of
Evidence, rule 219 (1942) and the Uniform Rules of Evidence, rule 29, endorse the clergyman-
penitent privilege.
519 Antieau, The Limitations of Religious Liberty, 18 FoRDHAm L. REv. 221 (1949), for a
treatment of these limitations and the reasons upon which they are based; TORPEY, JuDICIAL
DOCTRINES OF RELIGIOUS RIGHTS IN AmERICA (1948).
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the ramifications of that clause are many and varied, the scope of this section will
be limited to a consideration of the cases - reported in 1959, 1960 and 1961 - that
affect the individual's free exercise of religion. Primarily, these cases apply principles
developed by the Supreme Court through judicial construction of the free exercise
clause. These principles have generally established that the practice of one's religion
cannot be used as an excuse for the violation of state law promulgated for the health,
safety, and welfare of its citizens. Religious beliefs, on the other hand, are ordinarily
regarded as sacrosanct; the advocacy of such beliefs is subject only to the restrictions
applied to any other form of expression.
The first of the notable cases defining the limits of free exercise sustained the
state interest in prohibiting polygamy regardless of its religious significance for Mor-
mons.52 In that case, Reynolds v. United States, the Court wrote into the first
amendment a societal structure which in effect excluded large groups of the world's
religious population from the protection of its freedoms. Nevertheless, the legitimate
interest of the state is undeniable. In a later case, 52 1 the Court, in a questionable
522
extension of Reynolds, affirmed the conviction of a Mormon for conspiracy to ob-
struct the laws of the territory of Idaho. Defendants were there indicted under a
statute requiring an oath of all voters that they were not members of any "order,
organization or association which teaches, advises, counsels or encourages '5 23 po-
lygamy. The only evidence was the fact that the defendants were members of the
Mormon Church when they took the oath; thus, adherence to a religious belief,
without more, was punished.
524
Another inroad on the sanctity of belief is seen in United States v. Ballard.s25
The defendant, charged with mail fraud, claimed he was disseminating religious
literature. His conviction was upheld by the Supreme Court on the ground that no
error was found in the trial court's instructions to the jury. Those instructions pre-
vented the jury from considering the correctness of the defendant's beliefs, but allowed
them to probe the sincerity of those views in determining whether or not fraud had
been committed.
In West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette,20 the compulsory recitation
of the Pledge of Allegiance was held unconstitutional as applied to a Jehovah's
Witness. The Court reasoned that this symbolic utterance did not so materially
advance the state's interests that it might require the taking of such a pledge. Indi-
vidual freedom prevailed, although the decision did not turn on the religious nature
of the objection.
A clear statement of the problem in measuring state regulation of religious
interests against the demands of the first amendment is found in Cantwell v. Con-
necticut.52 7 There, Jehovah's Witnesses had been convicted for violating a state
statute which was held by the state court to require solicitors of religious literature
to get a permit. The Supreme Court reversed the convictions and held that the
regulations could not apply to petitioners. The Court went on to say:
The constitutional inhibition of legislation on the subject of religion has
a double aspect. On the one hand, it forestalls compulsion by law of the
acceptance of any creed or the practice of any form of worship. Freedom of
conscience and freedom to adhere to such religious organization or form of
worship as the individual may choose cannot be restricted by law .... Thus
the Amendment embraces two concepts - freedom to believe and freedom
520 Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
521 Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 133 (1890).
522 Kurland, Of Church and State and the Supreme Court, 29 U. Ci. L. REv. 1, 8-10
(1961).
523 133 U.S. 333, 334 (1890).
524 Kurland, Of Church and State and the Supreme Court, 29 U. Cxi. L. REv. 1, 8-10
(1961).
525 322 U.S. 78 (1944).
526 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
527 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
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to act. The first is absolute but, in the nature of things, the second cannot
be. Conduct remains subject to regulation for the protection of society....
In every case the power to regulate must be so exercised as not, in attaining
the permissible end, unduly to infringe the protected freedom.
5 28
The principle, so-called, of accommodation is demonstrated in Pierce v. Society
of Sisters, 29 which established the freedom of children to attend religious schools
provided instruction in secular subjects meets reasonable minimum requirements of
the state. Such exemptions are generally placed on -the basis, inter alia, that as a
God-fearing but tolerant people, our governments should accommodate the religious
needs of its people wherever possible. Another facet of the principle of accommoda-
tion was demonstrated in Everson v. Board of Education.
53 0
2. Compulsory Education
The power of states to establish minimum standards for nonpublic schools
has proved a fertile source of controversy. Its alleged exercise has collided with the
religious interests of parents in recent cases.
The Mennonite-Amish objection to more than minimal education for children
brought equitable and criminal actions in Ohio. In State ex rel. Chalfin v. Glick,53 ,
local officials complained that Amish schools which apparently did not meet Ohio's
minimum standards were nuisances, and sought to have their operation abated. The
injunction was refused, the court basing its decision on the ground that no statute
forbade the existence of schools not meeting the state standards and that no evidence
proved them injurious to the public welfare.
The court rejected, on grounds not relevant here, the contention that the parents
had engaged in a conspiracy. In turn, this permitted the court to avoid deciding
whether the deliberate violation of laws on religious grounds amounted to teaching
the youths "active disregard and disrespect for the laws of the state,"532 and whether
any penalty would attach if it did. Thus it avoided what was perhaps the most serious
aspect of the case.
In the other Ohio case, State v. Hershberger,-3 3 five Amish children had been
committed by the trial court to the custody of the county welfare board because
their parents refused to send them to accredited schools. The parents sat silently
by while two children submitted and a third refused to go with welfare officials.
The other two could not be found. The latter children remaining absent, contempt
charges were lodged against the parents. At trial, the father alleged that his religion
would not permit him to give up the children. Defendants were convicted for their
failure to permit the welfare board to have custody of the child. Although the con-
viction was later reversed on technical grounds, the lower court's opinion is inter-
esting. In a lengthy obiter dictum, it discussed the constitutional questions, already
conceded by defendant, in order to answer newspaper critics.
Close and repeated reading of Hershberger and Chalfin reveals that such cases
get to court because of emotions rather than zealous law enforcement. Although,
as the court noted, since the remedy in Ohio for violating the school attendance law
is fine or imprisonment, there is natural reluctance to invoke such penalties against
sincere religious objection. The simplicity of our written protections of freedom and
the layman's concept of their extent collide with the limitations imposed by the
courts, leading to hot emotion. The obvious attraction of such cases to the press
inflames the passions latent in the dispute and forces each side to extreme positions.
528 Id. at 303-04.
529 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
530 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
531 113 Ohio App. 23, 177 N.E.2d 293 (1960).
532 Id. at 295. The court did find, however, that the record did not prove that "the children
were being taught active disregard or disrespect for the laws of the state." Id. at 298.
533 150 N.E.2d 671 (Ohio Juv. Ct. 1958), rev'd per curiam, 168 N.E.2d 12 (Ohio App.
1959).
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On the other hand, alternate remedies frequently delay the securing of the welfare
of the child and permit the courts to evade the real problems.
A device sometimes used to avoid the religious problem is that of home educa-
tion, as in State ex rel. Shoreline School Dist. v. Superior Court.5 34 Here, the child
had been withdrawn from the public schools because of parental objections on reli-
gious grounds to her exposure to meat, fish, dancing and music. She was made a
ward of the court, but was left in the physical custody of her parents, provided she
was given adequate schooling. The decision appealed from held that since the legis-
lature provided no standards for private schools, the home instruction was a permis-
sible private substitute to public instruction. Moreover, the lower court held that
the home instruction was comparable in quality to public schooling. The Supreme
Court of Washington reversed, relying in part on a 1912 case535 which had held
that home instruction is not equal to private schooling, regardless of the quality of
the instruction or the instructor. The court then proceeded to set forth the stand-
ards prescribed for nonpublic schools, which had, except for the prior decision
cited, been unknown. The religious contention was dismissed with a brief discussion.
The dissent pointed out that the court failed to reach the ultimate issue - the
best interests of the child. Moreover, the dissent pointed to the escape route left
unmentioned by the majority, i.e., the legislature provided in. addition to normal
excuses an exemption "for any other sufficient reason." ''  The necessity for curtail-
ing the practice of these parents' unorthodox views should, perhaps, have been re-
examined in light of the object of the state's educational interests. So reviewed,
it might appear that, as to these parents, the court's minimum standards for schools
exceed the limitations implied by Pierce v. Society of Sisters.537
A religious freedom problem has also arisen concerning religious practices in
the public schools. These cases are, however, fully treated elsewhere in this and
past Surveys.
3. Public Health
The interest of the state in the health and safety of a child is sometimes put in
conflict with the religious convictions of the parent or custodian. Four cases have
been recently reported. In Hoener v. Bertinato,538 a juvenile court was petitioned
to grant custody of an unborn child to the county welfare department. It was shown
that the parents, both Jehovah's Witnesses, had opposing RH blood factors, and that
blood transfusions would be required upon the birth of the child. The petition was
granted in accordance with the principle that the practice of religious beliefs in-
consistent with the state interest in general health and welfare should be limited. 39
Another Maryland case, Craig v. State,5 40 involved the manslaughter convic-
tion of parents who had failed to give proper medical care to their daughter. The
court reversed on the insufficiency of the evidence, but went on to lay down princi-
ples for the guidance of the trial court. It is the implications of those principles that
present the disturbing element in Craig. First, the court used the peace and safety
limitation to establish that the interest of the state should prevail over the perents'
religious objections. Second, the court rejected the contention that, because Chris-
tian Science practitioners were allowed (to function) in Maryland, these defendants,
534 55 Wash.2d 177, 346 P.2d 999 (1959), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 814 (1960). Justices
Warren, Brennan and Douglas disagreed with the denial.
535 State v. Connort, 69 Wash. 361, 124 Pac. 910 (1912).
536 346 P.2d 999, 1006 (1959).
537 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
538 67 N.J. Super. 517, 171 A.2d 140 (1961).
539 It is submitted that where the life of the child is involved, as here, freedom of religion
is also served by the vindication of the state interest. The child will be returned to its parents
to be raised under their tutelage; he may later adopt the beliefs of his parents and even practice
those beliefs by refusing medical aid proffered to him.
540 220 Md. 590, 155 A.2d 684 (1959).
members of the Church of God, were denied equal protection of the laws. It was
said that ministrations by a Christian Science practitioner failed to fulfill the duty
of parents to "provide medical care for their children."'5 41 Finally, the court dis-
missed the contention that due process had been denied because the offense charged
was not adequately defined by statute.
A third common situation is the case involving a parent's refusal to permit
vaccination of his children. A recent New Jersey case, Board of Education of Moun-
tain Lakes v. Maas,54 2 was also decided in favor of the state interest in health. The
case was initiated by the school board to have the defendant stop leaving the un-
immunized children at school. Although the statute allowed the school board to
exempt pupils whose "parent or guardian . . . objects . . . upon the ground that
the proposed immunization interferes with the free exercise of his religious princi-
ples,"
5 4 3 the court decided that the board was not required to grant exemptions, and
acquiesced in the board's uniform custom of denying relief under that clause. It
would seem that the judiciary would subject the local exercise of discretion to closer
scrutiny in view of the legislature's evident interest in preserving freedom of con-
science. It is noted that the school board's action assured neither the children's
immunization nor their attendance at" school.
An injunction sought on religious grounds against the fluoridation of the city
water was refused in Baer v. City of Bend."' The report contains a review of cases
restricting religious practices.
4. Conscientious Objection
Religious objection to war and military establishments raises substantial legal
difficulties. Again, the state's concern for its own protection is the prime policy
consideration, although it is true that some concession has been made to sincere reli-
gious scruple. In Hanauer v. Elkins,545 the court refused to order the University of
Maryland to admit two students who declined to take the basic course required in
military training. In its opinion the Court noted that the draft substitute is per-
mitted as a matter of federal legislative grace, that the privileges and immunities
clause of the fourteenth amendment does not iequire recognition of such privileges
by the state land-grant schools and that Congress has not, if it could, pre-empted this
particular phase of military obligation. The court distinguished West Virginia
Board of Education v. Barnette546 on the ground that it involved mandatory attend-
ance at school. It is submitted that the crucial compulsion in Barnette was not
attendance at school but the required giving of the flag salute, and that the real
significance of the case is that personal freedom prevailed over a state interest. Al-
though the Maryland court proved that the interests of Maryland could be served
by the compulsion involved here, it did not show why that interest should prevail
after the United States had altered its own demands in deference to religious views.
Similarly, in People v. Peck,5 47 a conviction for refusing to take part in an air
raid drill was upheld in a per curiam opinion, the court stating that the public good
demanded such provisions for safety. Unsuccessfully, the contention had been made
that this active preparation for war violated religious principles.
The granting of exemptions by the Selective Service System5 43 has generally
541 Id. at 691.
542 56 N.J. Super. 245, 152 A.2d 394 (1959) aff'd per curiam. Board of Education of
Mountain Lakes v. Maas, 31 N.J. 537, 158 A.2d 330 (1960), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 843 (1960).
543 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18:14 64.2 (Supp. 1961).
544 206 Ore. 221, 292 P.2d 134 (1956)."
545 217 Md. 213, 141 A.2d 903 (1958), appeal dismissed, 358 U.S. 643 (1959).
546 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
547 7 N.Y.2d 76, 163 N.E.2d 866, 195 N.Y.S.2d 637 (1959), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 622
(1961).
548 Universal Military Training and Service Act, 62 Stat. 604 (1948), as amended, 50
U.S.O. § 456(g),(j) (1958).
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quieted constitutional controversy in draft cases. In its stead are issues arising from
administration of the exemptions. One recurring issue is raised in the exemption
of ministers, especially as applied to Jehovah's Witnesses. In United States v,
Stepler,549 the defendant was convicted for failing to report for civilian work in lieu
of induction, even though he claimed the ministerial exemption. It appears that the
defendant's ministerial labors were confined to forty hours per month, while he
also held a full-time paying job as a bricklayer. The Third Circuit reversed the
board's decision, because the latter had made its determination on the ground that
"a member of Jehovah's Witnesses does not qualify" for the exemption because "he
does not have the training and qualifications of an ordained minister." 550 Such a
basis of decision obviously wanders into the periphery of the first amendment since
it involves an adjudication of internal church disciplines.
The case of United States v. Mohammed551 involved a Negro who sought min-
isterial exemption by claiming student status in the Muslim ministry. On appeal
from conviction for failing to report, for work in lieu of induction, the denial of the
ministerial classification was upheld on the narrow grounds that the defendant's
applications were untimely, and that his letters to the Board raised only the naked
claim, without supporting evidence, of his 'ministerial status - defendant's letters,
raising his "naked claims" indicate a considerable lack of education, little if any
legal counsel, and certainly a lack of essential information about the operation of
the Selective Service System. In this setting, the affirmation of the conviction on
technical grounds has a certain insensitive connotation.
Special classification solely on the grounds of conscientious objection turns
largely on the power of local boards to question the sincerity of a claimant's reli-
gious views. 552 Such an inquiry was used in United States v. Corliss553 to dispose
of three appeals from convictions for refusing induction. As to one petitioner, the
court relied in part on the fact that he couldn't cite a Bible passage to sustain his
beliefs, and that he constantly referred to typewritten notes while testifying. It also
appeared that the petitioner's belief had ripened into a conviction immediately after
he received the induction notice. In evaluating the record of defendant Corliss, the
court took pains to be fair - to the point of inquiring into the theological signifi-
cance of baptism according to defendant's tenets. The court reluctantly con-
cluded that the board's conclusions were legally defensible, because well-established
personal opposition is required as well as training and belief. The third petitioner
asserted that the questioning by the local board was infected with prejudice. The
court cited an impressive list of authority to the effect that this was of no concern
unless the appeal board appeared to have been misled by it.
The case demonstrates the difficult position in which a sympathetic judge is
put. Open inquiry into another's sincerity and training can easily involve the exam-
iner in matters of dogma. This borders on the establishment of orthodox religious
tenets. On the other hand, the need for equitable and efficient administration re-
quires that the fact-finding body be given a wide range of discretion in these
matters. The difficulty is not the law as Congress structures it but the inescapable
opportunity for the subtle play of emotion in its administration and the possible
effect of that emotion on free exercise. If one doubts that legislative courtesy may
become tyrannical in its dispensation, read the story below of one Donald Koch. 4
549 258 F.2d 310 (3rd Cir. 1958).
550 Id. at 313. It is interesting to note that the board also relied on the -fact that defendant's
testimony had been mostly biblical in origin, and that he had admitted there are Bible passages
favorable to war. The relevance of such inquiry is questionable.
551 288 F.2d 236 (7th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 820 (1961).
552 United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944).
553 280 F.2d 808 (2d Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 884 (1960).
554 Koch v. Zuieback, 194 F. Supp. 651 (S.D. Cal. 1961). Petitioner applied to a local
board for exemption as an objector; because his application was untimely, it was denied. When
he refused induction into the Armed Forces, he was convicted and sentenced to four years in
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5. Religious Peculiarities
The cases here involve restriction on the free exercise of certain religious
practices. In Native American Church of North America v. Navajo Tribal Coun-
cil,s5s an Indian church group that used peyote beans in its worship sought relief
from a tribal ordinance that outlawed their introduction into Navajo territory. Since
by treaty Indians are recognized as separate nations, the constitutional guarantees
of the first amendment were held not applicable to them.156
The principle that corporations are not within the ambit of the free exercise
clause was applied in State v. Spink Hutterian Brethren,557 where under state law
a religious commune was secure in its right to exist, but restricted in its freedom to
expand. This was an action to have the corporate charter annulled for alleged viola-
tion of a state statute. The original enabling act had been repealed but existing
communal corporations saved under the condition that "expansion of any activity
or power" was prohibited. The alleged violation of this section - by the leasing of
a different 80 acres of land than that leased at the time the proviso was enacted -
gave rise to the action. The lower court had found the repealing statute void because
this particular proviso was uncertain in meaning. It therefore granted judgment for
the corporation. On appeal, the case was modified and affirmed, as modified. The
proviso was not uncertain but it had not been violated.558
The leading case on the right to advocate religious beliefs publicly in recent years
is State v. Gorbisiero,59 in which an ordinance requiring permits for the privilege
of public speaking was held invalid as applied here. Defendant was a preacher
using a loudspeaker to express his religious views. The court said that the free exer-
cise of religion was unreasonably curtailed because the ordinance set no standards.5 60
prison. The board, aware of the forced change of address but notified only by the prison warden,
classified him 4-F. That classification extended his draft eligibility period to age 35. When he
was released on parole, the board reclassified him 1-A, sending the notice to an obsolete address;
the notice did not reach Koch. After waiting out the 10-day appeal time, the board obtained
his current address from the parole officer and mailed a change of address form. While in
prison, petitioner reached the age of 26. Not knowing of the reclassification, or the fact that it
extended his eligibility period to age 35, he thought his troubles were over. When he received
the address form, he personally went to the board's office to inquire why they claimed jurisdic-
tion of him. He learned, for the first time, of the preceding classifications. In three days, he pro-
tested in writing, asking for a V-A (overage) classification or, failing that, a conscientious
objector status.
A hearing was held at which he was denied the right to counsel and the use of two witnesses;
he was classified 1-0. Unsuccessfully, he appealed. Eighteen months later, the Board reopened
the classification on its own initiative and reclassified him 1-0. Upon timely request, an unavail-
ing hearing was held; timely appeal was unsuccessful. A marriage and divorce resulted in
further reclassifications; the last he protested and at the hearing the board denied him the
opportunity even to discuss the desired V-A classification. The appeal was unsuccessful. Koch
filed a civil action against local board personnel for damages and a declaratory judgment of
his status. In short, he contended that the official acts were done with intent to hound and
harass him, to entrap him and cause his imprisonment again and with knowledge that their
actions endangered his business affairs. The court said he failed to state a claim upon which
relief could be granted.
555 272 F.2d 131 (10th Cir. 1959).
556 Id. at 134, citing Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 (1896), excluding such nations from
the controls or protections of the fifth amendment and Barta Sioux Tribe of Pine Ridge Reser-
vation, 259 F.2d 553 (8th Cir. 1958) declaring in addition their exclusion from coverage of
the fourteenth amendment.
557 77 S.D. 215, 90 N.W.2d 365 (1958).
558 While the opinion recounts a rather hectic relationship between the state and these com-
munal Christians, it is submitted that the deprivation of their right to expand their corporate
holdings denies them no right guaranteed by provisions for freedom of worship. The method by
which legal title to property is held in this instance can be supplemented relatively easily by the
use of trusts or by specific covenants in instruments utilizing joint tenancies or some other
multiple-party device.
559 67 N.J. Super. 170, 170 A.2d 74 (1961).
560 Id. at 78.
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6. Prisoners' Freedom to Practice Religion
Cases involving prisoners in both New York and California institutions ques-
tion the degree to which constitutional guarantees of religious freedom can be
restricted by conviction and by the requirements of prison discipline.
Perhaps the least restraint on such freedom is seen in People ex parte Wright v.
Wilkins,5 61 where a prisoner claimed that his Muslim beliefs were being restrained.
He was not allowed to study an Arabic grammar in the recreation yard, and it was
claimed that the knowledge of Arabic was essential to the study of Muslim beliefs.
That claim was rejected by the court because the prisoner could read in his cell and
was allowed access to English translations of Islamic texts from the prison library.
Curiously enough, there was no explanation as to what threat to the safety and
good order of the prison was posed by this particular religious or recreational
practice.
5 62
More serious problems are presented by In re Ferguson 63 and Pierce v. La
Vallee'" where the freedom to practice Black Muslimism was allegedly restricted in
undue fashion. Muslimism maintains black supremacy and total segregation of the
races, and they claim to be an Islamic sect . 65 In the California case, the protec-
tion of prisoners' religious freedoms is left solely to federal guarantees.K18 The court
then has no trouble reaching the somewhat dubious conclusion 6' that federal pro-
tections, whatever they may be, do not invalidate the prison rules in question. Since
the one activity sought to be protected is the right of these inmates - who disdain
"white" authority - to congregate for worship or discussion, the result is somewhat
defensible. Peace and safety of the prison is dearly a legitimate interiest. On the
other hand, the conclusion is very broad. There is no evidence that permitting
assembly for worship would have resulted in a threat to safety. 6 Moreover, there
is evidence of intolerance by prison officials. The Muslims were officially denied the
classification as a religious group.5 69 Indeed, there was evidence of heavily preju-
dicial treatment of the Muslim sect 70
In the Pierce571 case, an injunction was sought, under the Civil Rights Act of
187 1,5 72 restraining prison officials from denying Muslims access to religious litera-
ture and advice. The court held that the prisoners had stated a cause of action in
complaining that prison officials had denied them access to literature and advice,
and that an injunction should be granted. The commendable reasons were that the
freedom of religion is a "preferred" right, guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment
561 26 Misc. 2d 1090, 210 N.Y.S.2d 309 (Sup. Ct. 1961).
562 See also McBride v. McCorkle, 47 N.J. Super. 468, 130 A.2d 881 (1957). The demands
of prison discipline permitted the officials to prevent a prisoner in the segregation section to
attend Mass in another part of the prison.
563 55 Cal. 2d 663, 12 Cal. Rept. 753, 361 P.2d 417 (1961).
564 293 F.2d 233 (2d Cir. 1961).
565 LINCOLN, THE BLACK MUSLIMS IN AMERICA 67-75 (1961).
566 Felons are specifically exempted from state protections, In re Ferguson, 55 Cal. 2d 663,
12 Cal. Rept. 753, 361 P.2d 417, 420 (1961), CAL. CONST., art. 10, § 7, CAL. PEN. CODa §
5058.
567 See Pierce v. Vallee, 293 F.2d 233 (2d Cir. 1961); Sewell v. Pegelow, 291 F.2d 196
(4th Cir. 1961); and Fulwood v. Clemma, 295 F.2d 171 (D.C. Cir. 1961), all of which reverse
lower courts that dismissed claims of denial of religious rights to the petitioners. Of course, none
dealt with proved facts.
568 The only physical resistance to authority noted was by a single prisoner; other resistance
was markedly passive. The prisoners "looked down their noses at those present as if he were a
very small piece of refuse." 361 P.2d at 420.
569 The court terms this reasonable without discussing whether this was a form of establish-
ment or whether it was within the limits of proper inquiry laid down in Ballard v. United States,
322 U.S. 78 (1944).
570 See correctional officers' characterization of one petitioner's scrapbook as "Muslim
trash," 361 P.2d at 419. As to the high moral standards of Muslimism, see also LINCOLN, THE
BLACK MUSLIMS IN AMERICA 75-82 (1961).
571 Z93 F.2d 233 (2d Cir. 1961).
572 17 Stat. 13 (1871), 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1958), 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1958).
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even to state prisoners who are indeed within the ambit of the Civil Rights Act.5 73
As has been noted elsewhere,57 4 this case may be reconciled with Ferguson because
it is more abstract and seeks protection principally of belief rather than practice.
Still Pierce and similar cases may require that more cogent reasons be adduced for
restricting prisoners' exercise of religion than sufficed in Ferguson and Wilkins.
7. Summary
If these cases prove nothing else, they show a sometimes quick and alarming
tendency to utilize the accepted principles of limitation without a sensitive and tol-
erant evaluation of the comparative necessity of the restriction with the preservation
of the "preferred" constitutional guarantees. Even in the more sympathetic anal-
ysis, 5 7 5 the preservation of lower echelon discretion prevails. 78 While one feels that
the principles of limitations are sound, and often feels that their particular applica-
tion is legally defensible, he is frequently left with the nagging impression that the
giving of wider range to the free exercise of religion in the particular context would
neither injure the prevailing interest said to be safeguarded by the limiting principle
nor defeat the object of the particular law or regulation, the observance of which is
allegedly threatened or violated.
V. CONCLUSION
In the two-year interval since the last Church-State Survey, there have been no
decisions or legislative enactments relating to gambling that constitute "develop-
ments" in the law. 577 For that reason, it was deemed prudent to consider the matter
only by brief reference in this conclusion section. It is a matter of conjecture whether
or not gambling sponsored by religious groups for the purpose of raising funds is on
the wane, but any change would almost certainly move in that direction. It is a fact.
that gambling for any purpose is looked upon with disfavor by most religions, and
any liberality in that respect can be regarded as maintaining only a precarious
position. 
5 7
To be sure, no general conclusions as to the current status of the law of church-
state relations can be deduced from the materials presented herein. Nevertheless, a
few specific comments can be presented, not in the hope of solving the problem, but
573 See comments in In re Ferguson, 55 Cal. 2d 663, 12 Cal. Rep. 753, 361 P.2d 417 (1961)
on the scope of the Civil Rights Act's protections and Koch v. Zuieback, 194 F. Supp. 651
(S.D.Cal. 1961).
574 Comment, 75 HAxv. L. Rv. 837 (1962).
575 See, e.g., United States v. Corliss, 280 F.2d 808 (2d Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S.
885 (1960).
576 The necessity for this discretion is not questioned; the comparative worth of its particular
exercise, it is submitted, should be subjected to greater scrutiny.
577 1958-59 Church-State Survey, supra note 2, at 424-427.
578 See WILLiAMs, LOTTERIES, LAWS AND MOALS 85-94 (1958). The author sets out the
positions of the three leading creeds in the United States:
(1) Jewish: Central Conferences of American Rabbis, 1949. "The Central
Conference of American Rabbis deplores the use of gambling devices to
raise funds for Jewish religious and communal institutions as being
contrary to our faith and tradition. The Central Conference . . . calls
upon its members to discourage such practices." (p. 85)
(2) Protestant: Legislative Committee of the New York State Council of
Churches, 1953-54. "We oppose gambling in any form under any aus-
pices. Gambling is like a creeping paralysis in our society. The alleged
good which comes -from money-raising activities based on petty gambling
cannot possibly counteract the evil done to society as a whole." (p. 91)
(3) Catholic: Ross, CHRIST AN ETHics 373-74. Although a person may
be able to resist the passion of gambling, "yet his action in indulging in,
or giving countenance to, any form of gambling is giving a certain
sanction to the practice and may entrap weaker persons into what may
become a ruinous habit. This is especially true of church fairs employing
gambling devices. . . . Prohibition of betting by the state is amply
justified." (p. 90)
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of focusing attention on some of the considerations that shed more light on the solu-
tions which surely must come.
The refusal of the Supreme Court to review the Swart case at a time when the
nation was looking for a settlement of the debate raging on the education problem
is indicative of one view of the meaning of the first amendment. This view would
denominate the amendment as a policy of studied inaction, a stern admonition to
the government - legislature, executive and even judiciary - to keep hands off the
problem of religions in a pluralistic society even to the extent of intentionally not
formulating a rule of law to be applied when cases arise. The education cases are
lessons in themselves of a lack of dominant purpose. The state courts, though not
all possessing the same procedural devices the Supreme Court has used to avoid
questions of church-state, have found ways around deciding the combat area.
As noted in the introduction, the courts are wont to speak of religious institu-
tions in terms of charities, buildings, etc. - in short, anything but religions. The
state courts, even more than their federal counterparts, are thus bypassing the rela-
tionship morass, to answer cases on the point in terms of the established concepts of
secular law. There are signs that the courts may no longer be able to dodge the
issue. The practices involved in the test oath case and Bayside were recognized for
what they were - special privileges awarded to religion. The courts have decided
cases arising in the education area on the religious issue since the Everson case
refused to dodge the issue fifteen years ago. It seems reasonable to conclude that
the next few years will find the realistic approach coming into many of these sub-
jects of the Survey.
By evading the issue, the courts have obfuscated certain underlying principles.
The church is thus considered as one thing for purposes of taxation, another for
education, and still another for zoning. The one simple reality of the good of reli-
gion has been overlooked. It is not clear that the results would be different if the
church were considered in one and the same way in all of these problems. Never-
theless, both from the analytical point of view and that demanding clarity in the
law, the present treatment of the church as varying things for varying purposes is
objectionable. The Swart and De La Salle Institute contradiction as to whether the
educational function of a church is integral to the religion is a prime example.
While this discretionary classification has of yet been little used to hinder religion,
the dangers from a vague state of the law are apparent.
The Amish cases portray another danger to religion. While the facts are pecu-
liar to one religion, the essence of the decisions abrogating this right of religious
belief where the state has a "paramount" interest could be applied to any religion
in the country. By deciding that the practice of the Amish Brethren was not really
religious in the sense protected by the first amendment, the courts established them-
selves as the arbiters of dogma. The schism cases are another example of the courts'
insistence on determining the religious beliefs of the churches themselves. These
problems are small, to be sure, but the potential is large. While the Mormon cases
may in the opinion of most commentators have been decided correctly, the limits
of this power must be clearly defined to prevent a tyranny of the majority when the
occasion presents itself.
Conflicts will arise where one man is simultaneously subject to two masters
one spiritual and one temporal. The conflicts may be resolved only by the tribunals
entrusted with the responsibility - the courts; yet, as Shelley v. Kraemer
57 9 estab-
lished in another context, the courts must be considered as an arm of one of the
combatants - the state. The courts have, thus far at least, preferred the state's
interests in that they insist on considering the problem as one divorced from religion.
So we have the different approaches in the test oath case and the Sunday closing
cases as to where the true interest of the state must lie. In both examples, the Su-
579 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
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preme Court imposed a secularizing rationale on religiously-motivated practices.
The question thus still to be resolved in regard to the whole area of church-
state is how far the nation will go in determining the secular worth of any religious
creed or belief. The end of such action may be a state imposed unity within our
pluralistic framework, but then again future surveys may find this unity in place of
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